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ABSTRACT

Internal and external organizational influences on faculty mobility were studied during the 1985-1986 academic year. The investigation, which was designed as a replication of a 1958 study of the academic marketplace by Caplow and Reece, involved interviews with department heads, colleagues of departed faculty members, and new appointees at six major research universities. Attention is directed to: the faculty search process, including the origination and definition of the faculty position, the initial search, screening procedures, and the role of affirmative action in the search. Also considered is the selection process and the difference between selection procedures and criteria for junior and senior faculty members, as well as the impact of a junior appointment on the department, the circumstances of the offer and acceptance, and certain special cases encountered in the study. Termination is also addressed, including dismissal, resignation, retirement, and death. The destination of departing faculty members and the reasons for and impact of their departure are also assessed. Market and institutional strategy are analyzed, and data are presented on market characteristics and participants. The interview schedule is appended. (SW)

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CHANGE IN THE ACADEMIC MARKETPLACE:

A STUDY OF FACULTY MOBILITY IN THE 1980s

by

Dolores Lewis Burke

A Dissertation submitted to the faculty of The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the School of Education.

Chapel Hill

1986

Approved by:

Adviser

Duncan MacRae, Jr.
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PART I

DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY AND PREVIOUS RESEARCH

BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

> It is characteristic of higher education systems that they are strongly influenced by tradition. They display what a biologist calls phylogenetic inertia. This is not surprising, for one of their functions is to conserve and transmit the cultural inheritance. It is characteristic of them, too, that from time to time they adjust themselves -- sometimes painfully -- to the social environment which surrounds them.
>
> Eric Lord Ashby

Introduction

This study is about change, specifically change in the academic marketplace. "Marketplace" is defined as the internal and external environment of the university that defines the academic labor market. The study springs from an interest in Theodore Caplow and Reece McGee's classic, The Academic Marketplace (1958), and a curiosity as to whether the conditions they observed in the late 1950s would hold in the early 1980s. Their investigation involved nine major research universities, members of the prestigious Association of American Universities, and attempted, in their words, "to develop a body of systematic knowledge about the academic labor market." They did, indeed, provide a number of insights into the personnel processes of research universities, and their work has been cited hundreds of times in the ensuing years.

Marketplace had an immediate and strong impact in higher education circles. Early reviewers regarded the book as "devastating," "disillusioning," a "straightforward and hard-hitting expose." A later, more thoughtful review referred to the study as a "significant contribution to the sociology of complex organization" (Mack, 1959). It is the latter context in which Caplow and McGee's work is considered in this study: as a base line for appraising change in academic personnel processes in the highly complex organization known as a research university.

The postwar period in which Caplow and McGee conducted their study was one of depleted supply in the academic labor market. The demand for college professors had created high mobility among the faculty, with which the managerially unsophisticated professionals of the universities were ill-equipped to cope. In the unlikely event that they had looked for guidance to the nonacademic private sector, then dominated by the manufacturing industry, they would have found little help in the tenets of scientific management still in sway. Although the Hawthorne studies had made a contribution to organization theory in the prewar years (Roethlisberger and Dickson, 1939), the social environment of universities contained only limited attention to the significance of the individual in the corporate organization. Likert's influential book, New Patterns of Management, was not published until 1961 and, given the time lag between theory development and application, was not effective in the social environment until much later.

By contrast to these earlier conditions, the supply of academic labor today is apparently bounteous, and the literature includes the work of many researchers on individuals in organizations (e.g., Drucker, 1981; Kanter, 1983; Mitroff, 1983; Reich, 1983).

An important environmental change for the research university is the contraction of manufacturing and the expansion of the service sector of the economy -- the nonacademic business environment is more *like* the university. In fact, the corporate world has infringed upon the academic in various forms of education and research, in some cases siphoning off Ph.D.'s who in earlier days would have become university professors. (See, for example, Bowen and Schuster, 1986, pp. 176-179.) Another important change is the foreign competition for American business that has encouraged a "search for excellence" in American firms, echoed in the comparable quest for higher status among universities competing with a greater number of similar institutions for human and financial resources. The movement to a service economy and the interest in improving perceived quality has helped to develop recognition of the fact that *the people of an organization provide its primary strength*. This is especially true in a university, where a tangible product is lacking and where diversity creates multiple purposes. Indeed, a research university is defined through the members of the organization, especially those professionals who carry out its research and teaching responsibilities, and who are crucial to the fulfillment of the organization's mission. Thus, an examination of faculty mobility should provide insights for quality control in higher education.

Consequently, this study investigates the academic marketplace -- the internal and external organizational influences on faculty mobility -- in order to furnish such insights, particularly as they are informed by the changed social environment of the university. The investigation draws from the Caplow and McGee study, then from ensuing research, and finally from interview data collected during the academic year 1985-86 (described more fully in the next chapter). These 1985-86 data are presented in Part II: Data Analysis, in four chapters. The first deals with the faculty search process, examining the origination/definition of the position, the initial search and screening procedures, and the role of affirmative action in the search. The second chapter investigates the selection process, considering the difference between selection procedures and criteria for junior and for senior faculty members, the impact of a junior appointment on the department, the circumstances of the offer and acceptance, and certain special cases encountered in the study. Termination is the subject of the third chapter, on the separation process. Different types of termination are treated: dismissal, resignation, retirement and death. Destination of departing faculty members and the reasons for and impact of their departure are studied. The fourth data analysis chapter focuses on market and institutional strategy, presenting study data on market characteristics and participants, and on institutional policies related to management, research emphasis, and the aspirations toward higher departmental status.

The last chapter -- Part III: Summation -- offers a discussion of the findings and suggestions for further research.

The Caplow and McGee Study

Caplow and McGee's major finding in 1958 was the overriding influence of the prestige system in the academic marketplace -- especially the feature of closed and preferential hiring. In fact, candidates were frequently hired without a personal interview, entirely on the basis of secondhand reports, leading to the conclusion that what others thought about a candidate might be more important to the recruiting academic department than qualities observed in themselves. (*Marketplace*, p. 122) Universities recruited within their prestige system, that is, from other universities of like prestige ranking (p. 112) and a crucial factor for the job-seeker was having enough and the right kind of acquaintances to whom one's availability could be indicated. Prestige was a threshold qualification, followed by perceived professional compatibility ("fitting in" the department), and after that other criteria came into play, as evidenced by the oft-quoted recorder response: "He played the recorder. That was the reason we hired him. . . . we thought that would be nice." (p. 165)

Prestige also played a part in terminations, appearing as one of the three "motives for migration" (p. 147) and described as a strong lure for academics on the way up (although the majority of moves were downward, motivated by a desire for security or authority).

Therefore, the prestige system could not be underestimated in its effect on the academic market. By virtue of producing the most Ph.D.'s, the major universities controlled the supply of Ph.D.'s, but the supply was differentiated according to the prestige of the sponsor. The candidates from the most prestigeful departments with the most prestigeful sponsors would end up in the most prestigeful departments and so on down the line. Thus, the prestige factor caused major differences between the academic market and the classic labor market: In the academic market, prestige was more important than salary; employers were not interchangeable and employees were not interchangeable. (pp. 168-169)

Nevertheless, perhaps the most important external influence on faculty mobility was the state of the labor market. Caplow and McGee's data were collected in a seller's market. Demographics pointing toward large enrollments and Sputnik-fueled demands for research were encouraging expansion in higher education at a time when the supply of available faculty members was low. The market was reflected in the low number of actual reported tenure denials, the willingness and ability of assistant professors to move years before the tenure decision, the small applicant pools for faculty positions. Like any expanding labor-intensive enterprise, higher education was concerned about a personnel shortage.

Institutional policies and practices, however, did not reflect that concern. Caplow and McGee found, for example, a rigid system of budgeting rules whereby a budgeted position became the property of the department, to use as it saw fit. As a result, over the years an assistant professor became a full professor and upon leaving was replaced by a full professor. Although the creation of new budget lines was difficult, there was no mechanism for eliminating obsolete positions. The picture was further complicated by the fact that there was no "table of organization" in a university -- the job was promoted along with the person. (pp. 139-143) Permitting the staffing needs of the university to be controlled by historical accidents created serious problems in achieving the best utilization of faculty resources in a seller's market.

Another suggested obstacle to optimum utilization of faculty was the confusion about the academic role that stemmed from uncertainty as to the relative importance of teaching and research. The faculty member's "work assignment" was teaching, but the evaluation of his performance was based on research. Indeed, Caplow and McGee made a strong indictment of the research university's emphasis on research: "It is only a slight exaggeration to say that academic success is likely to come to the man who has learned to neglect his assigned duties in order to have more time and energy to pursue his private professional interests." (p. 221) And the first of their eleven recommendations called for a tenure rank of lecturer to be established for those primarily interested in teaching. (p. 239)

The apparent dichotomy between teaching and research led Caplow and McGee to develop a theory of disciplinary versus institutional attachment as a mobility factor: the more research-oriented faculty member, owing to the identification of research with a discipline rather than an institution, is more likely than the teaching-oriented faculty member to leave the institution. In what may have been an example of "cryptomnesia" (Merton's term for similar ideas arising from independent research at the same time), Gouldner's (1957-58) conclusions about "locals" and "cosmopolitans" in a college setting were concurrently established by Caplow and McGee.

Caplow and McGee's major points -- the prestige system, market factors, institutional policies -- spawned or were joined by a wealth of research in the ensuing years. Chief among topics researched were the effect of prestige on recruitment and market; the market itself, especially in terms of structure; and institutional policies concerning the research emphasis of a university and bias in the marketplace. The research is summarized in the next section.

Related Research between 1958 and 1986

The prestige system, along with the preferential hiring practices associated with the prestige system, have become thoroughly confirmed in the literature. From Bunnell (1960) through Thompson and Zumeta (1985), the subjects of doctoral prestige and sponsorship have attracted numerous researchers, through study of either procedure or placement. In fact, even prior to Caplow and McGee's study, Committee B of the American Association of University Professors had published results of a study in 1929 noting that about 73 percent of appointment actions relied to some extent on "acquaintanceship" (being known in the profession) and commenting: "This is so general a policy as to make remark almost unnecessary." (p. 179)

In 1960, Bunnell conducted a very limited survey involving 23 responses from the 36 deans and presidents he had solicited; he excluded from his survey the procedures of writing letters to graduate schools and making inquiries at professional meetings. The most frequently used technique, checked 15 times, was that of obtaining advice from faculty and key people about people they knew who might be likely candidates.

In his study of chemistry, economics, and English departments, Marshall (1964) found that all three disciplines made heaviest recruiting use of requests to chairmen at other institutions and unsolicited letters of application. These methods were also high on the list of the most effective from the job-hunter's perspective, but were surpassed by contacts through friends and at annual meetings.

Similarly, Klugh (1964) found that in his sample of academic psychologists appointed since 1958, a resounding proportion of 76 percent had used friends or their major professor to job-hunt (the next most-used method netted 32 percent) and the method had a 39 percent effectiveness (compared to the next-ranked method at 16 percent).

Differentiation created by the prestige system (and rank) was stressed in Brown's (1967) study, wherein he identified the most successful methods in job-hunting. For the top 40 percent of schools in terms of prestige the most effective method was a convention service (professional acquaintanceship); this was also true of jobs for newly emerging Ph.D.'s at upper salary levels. Answering an ad for a position available proved most effective for schools at the 40 percent to 60 percent level, jobs paying in the middle range, and for assistant professors in general. Denominational placement services were most useful at the 60 to 80 percent level (a group dominated by denominational colleges), the lower salary range, and in the instructor rank. Private employment services gave most assistance in the bottom 20 percent of schools and at the associate professor rank. And at the rank of full professor, the only effective method was contact through colleagues.

Love (1972) noted the necessity of using informal networks, (acquaintanceship) to locate a job within the prestige system (and not entirely facetiously suggested a football-type draft where the lowest-ranked schools would get first pick of the new Ph.D.'s).

In a survey of social and physical scientists across ranks, Murray, Rankin and Magill (1981) found that 75 percent of the faculty members had obtained their current positions through information provided by personal contacts. Only 25 percent had located the job through advertisements.

A number of studies confirmed the substantial influence of the prestige of the candidate's graduate school on his placement in the academic system. Among those who examined the phenomenon of doctoral prestige as a factor in obtaining the first job out of graduate school were Hargens and Hagstrom, Crane, Solomon and Walters, Reskin, Long et al., Massengale and Sage, and Hargens and Hagstrom. (And as a practical example, Smelser and Content's three appointments in sociology went to graduates of Chicago and Harvard.)

Hargens and Hagstrom (1967) studied faculty members in the physical or biological sciences and identified doctoral prestige as a heavily important factor in placement at the assistant professor level. They saw competition as an element contributing to ascription, and drew a parallel between European scientific organizations and upper level American scientific organizations with similar levels of competitiveness.

Crane's (1970) sample consisted of new assistant professors in chemistry, physics, psychology, economics, English, and philosophy. She found, for example, that 77 percent of the new assistant professors at the top twenty hiring departments came from the top twenty graduate departments (Cartter rankings). Interestingly, she related her findings to a lower level of innovation in American universities and suggested that the American university elite could be improved by broadening.

Solomon and Walters (1975) broadened their concern to show that a particularistic prestige order affects not only recruitment decisions, but also editorial recruitment and article selection for journals -- an important point with respect to advancement in the profession.

Long et al. (1979) learned in a study of biochemists not only that doctoral or postdoctoral prestige had the strongest effect on the prestige of the first job, but that the next strongest factors were mentor's citations (sponsor's prestige) and selectivity of the scientist's undergraduate institution (this last factor serving to elongate the control exercised by academic predestination).

In another confirmation of the prestige effect, Massengale and Sage (1982) studied all doctorate-holding faculty members of doctorate-granting physical education departments and found that 73 percent of the faculty members in the top ten departments had earned their doctorates in the top ten departments.

With a somewhat different focus, Hargens and Hagstrom (1982) suggested that there might be a difference in the effect of doctoral prestige between high-consensus and low-consensus disciplines. They therefore examined data on faculty members in chemistry, physics, mathematics, biology, and political science and produced the strongest correlation between doctoral prestige and first-position prestige in political science. (One could, of course, argue as to whether "high-consensus" and "low-consensus" can be so clearly defined.)

There was some disagreement as to whether doctoral prestige was truly ascriptive or whether it might be grounded in achievement. Several researchers went on to the second or later jobs to determine whether doctoral prestige had a lasting effect. Hargens and Hagstrom (1967) said that among their physical and biological scientists it did not, drawing their conclusions from use of doctoral prestige and productivity measures. Stehr (1974), though, argued the point that the first job is important to the second and later jobs, and since doctoral prestige is influential in initial appointment, it does have a lasting effect.

Reskin (1979) considered sponsorship, and found it contributing to the faculty member's work at the middle and end of the postdoctoral decade. She saw what she considered as the ascriptive effects of sponsorship and doctoral prestige affecting later jobs.

Massengale and Sage did not find any change in stratification by rank in their sample and so concluded that not only the initial position was affected. These two researchers also noted that some "contest" might occur at the point of admission to a doctoral program, which would dilute the ascriptive definition of doctoral prestige. A similar point was raised by Wilson (1979). Clemente and Sturgis (1974), however, had purported to show that doctoral prestige was not a predictor of productivity in any case and was therefore allied with ascription rather than achievement.

Following their study, Long et al. observed that doctoral prestige had only a modest effect on productivity among biochemists measured after six years, and that the prestige factor had little predictive validity for research productivity. Disagreeing, Thompson and Zumeta (1985) acknowledged the influence of doctoral prestige but contended that it was positively related to productivity. In their study of biologists, chemists, and physicists, they found that the bias in favor of prestigious doctoral origin did not result in any serious reduction in overall scientific productivity. They also added a brief footnote to their paper indicating that the positive effect of doctoral prestige on productivity in the social sciences was growing.

Interestingly, in Smelser and Content's case study (1980) of a sociology search at Berkeley, about two-thirds of the applicants, including both those located through networks and those applying directly, earned their degrees at the top ten schools, indicating an element of self-selectiveness in the prestige system.

A third category of research questioned the interaction between market and doctoral prestige. Hargens and Hagstrom posited that the change to a buyer's market in academia could cause even greater reliance on sponsorship and ascriptive criteria, drawing an analogy to trade unions, where sponsorship and ascriptive criteria are more important in stagnant or declining industries. On the other hand, they suggested that the change might result in a greater openness of competition for jobs.

Reskin, like Hargens and Hagstrom, was concerned that ascription might predominate in tighter job markets; she thought that market structure might make a difference in the application of ascription or achievement to placement decisions.

Sawyer (1981) introduced market relationships to explain the apparent effect of doctoral prestige on the recruitment process. His contention was that the mobility of graduates was not dependent on individual characteristics (e.g. doctoral prestige) but rather was affected by the status differences between graduate departments.

Wilson, too, was concerned about such relationships, and pointed out in his 1979 book that market limitations of doctoral prestige had existed for some time.

Dornstein (1977) viewed prestige and sponsorship as "imperfections" in the labor market, linking professional and executive recruitment in her study. She gave as reasons for the imperfections the uncertainty involved in professional and executive recruitment (the difficulty of assessing quality) and the high autonomy of professionals and executives. She further explained that closed markets perform a function of preselection, narrowing the degree of uncertainty and lessening the danger that the person will not support the values of the department or corporation.

The results and implications in these three categories of research on disciplinary prestige -- recruitment methods, job placement, and market interaction -- serve to strengthen Caplow and McGee's basic argument. The research has expanded to include disagreement over ascription versus achievement, a point on which they were mute, and to increase knowledge of the market relationship. The research has extended, in the aggregate, across disciplines, contributing smaller pieces to their "big picture" approach in the arts and sciences. One can safely acknowledge, if one gives credence to social research, that doctoral prestige has had a substantial effect on the recruitment process in the academic labor market.

As to terminations, there is less validation. McGee (1971), writing about a group of four-year colleges in the Midwest, found that reasons such as "disciplinary professional, prestige, or research matters" carried the greatest weight in causing a move, and that "curricular or instructional matters, students" and "idiosyncratic and personal matters" had the greatest holding power against a move. Similarly, Brown had asserted, "For most professors, the opportunity for meaningful professional activity is the strongest influence upon job choice." (p. 151) And Marsh and Stafford (1967) had found that for academicians, values relating to work were a compensatory substitute for a higher earning level.

The question of salary was considered peripheral by Caplow and McGee, affecting mobility only in symbolic terms. Marshall (1964) agreed, listing as the most important reasons given by faculty members for leaving their positions as promotion and unsatisfactory working conditions. He also questioned faculty members on factors holding them in their jobs and found satisfactory working conditions taking a substantial lead. Further refining the question, he learned that three types of satisfaction contributed most heavily to immobility: teaching opportunities, the reputation of the school and department (prestige in a cameo appearance), and having friends in the department and faculty.

On the other hand, Blau (1974) claimed that salary was an important factor in job choice and that one could not determine its significance by questioning faculty members, as was done by Caplow and McGee and others, but only by inference from the choices that the best-qualified faculty members made. Similarly, Cartter (1976) believed that mobility rates were responsive to salaries and could, for example, cause an outflow of senior people to nonacademic jobs. He also thought that failure to achieve tenure in a tighter market might force assistant professors out of higher education.

So, researchers have given little attention to the reasons for departure of faculty members; in the research that has taken place, prestige does not weigh heavily in mobility decisions. As for Caplow and McGee's two other motives for migration, security and authority, the existing research sheds no light. Further, the evidence on salary effect is mixed. One would have to conclude that Caplow and McGee's position on the causes of faculty vacancies has not been adequately supported by ensuing research, but largely because of omission rather than disagreement.

Attention to market structure, on the other hand, has provided considerable extension of Caplow and McGee's ideas through a time of change. As Wilson (1979) pointed out, the structure changed from a buyer's market in the 1940s to a seller's market in the 1950s and 1960s (the period of Caplow and McGee's investigation) and back to a buyer's market in the 1970s and 1980s.

But an even more important feature of the academic market is its stratification, causing shortages in the midst of plenty. As Clark (1966) said, the great change in academic man is the increase in his commitment to the creation of knowledge, a commitment associated with specialization. Consequently, there is no "academic profession";

there are instead clusters of experts prone to identify with their own disciplines.

Blau (1973) further considered these dimensions of differentiation in academe, and presented definitions: differentiation of the society's academic system means many different colleges and universities; differentiation of a university means diverse schools and departments; and differentiation of a department means several specialties.

A number of ways, including differentiation, in which the academic market deviates from the classic market model were listed by Brown (1967): (1) Entry into the market is restricted -- e.g., by the calendar, by antipirating pacts, by a premium placed on stability, by promotion from within, by "inbreeding" and "outbreeding," by the tenure system; (2) knowledge about the market is constrained by lack of communication (Caplow and McGee talked about "information screens"); (3) moving is costly; (4) reasons for job choice on the part of academics are not solely economic; (5) the volume in academic markets is not sufficient to "make a market," that is, the market is divided and redivided into too small units.

Brown also elaborated on "divided markets" by explaining that professors are heterogeneous, not substitutable, and demanders and suppliers limit their participation. Therefore, he said, many forces work to keep the academic labor market from being perfectly competitive. In addition, universities and colleges are separate markets, and faculty mobility exists primarily between universities and universities and between colleges and colleges.

McGee (1973) disagreed with this last point. Although he emphasized Brown's point that "the" market for college teachers did not exist, he discovered that his expectation of a small college market comparable to the prestige university market was not fulfilled. Rather, there was movement between the two "markets," and the small colleges were competing with the prestige universities for faculty members. He concluded that the small college had survived on its differences from the university by providing educational alternatives but that it would continue to survive only to the degree that it adopted the values of the university.

Smelser and Content (1980) added to Brown's list these peculiarities of the academic market: Variations in consensus on criteria, that is, no one knows precisely what the scholarly product is; and the introduction of alternative criteria such as affirmative action. They also noted that higher education is a "self-supplying" industry, but there is always a lack of equilibrium between production and need because of a doctoral training period of three to ten years, during which demand can change. The supply problem is further complicated by a prestige system that encourages graduate-research programs without regard to utility.

Market differentiation has a "trickle-down effect" (the availability of candidates from prestigious programs to lower-ranked departments), recognized but not named by Caplow and McGee, that was studied by some researchers. Shichor (1973) added regional considerations to his study of sociologists and attempted to show that although there was a pattern of placement within the same region, the most distinguished departments fed graduates to other regions. Muffo and Robinson (1981) looked further at the trickle-down effect a decade later and found the top ten research universities contributing a much greater share of new faculty members to all categories of institutions (pp. 5-6):

Proportion of Doctoral Employees from
Top Ten Research I Universities* by Location

	1973 Group	1979 Group
Research University I	59.6%	69.5%
Research University II	41.2	69.5
Doctorate-granting I	21.0	37.2
Comprehensive I	17.0	21.7
Liberal Arts I	15.8	22.9

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*1976 Carnegie classifications

Moore et al. (1983) agreed that the academic labor market was segmented at the entry level, but displayed a slightly different "downstream" pattern for economists by tabulating comparisons among institutional levels (using the Cartter rankings) for the years 1960-68 and 1969-1978. In both periods the graduates of Level I schools spread downward among the levels. However, in the earlier period 36 percent of the Level I graduates were employed in Level I schools; in the latter period, the proportion had dropped to 30 percent but was still by far the largest representation in the categorized institutions.

In a study of interaction between market change and the academic stratification system, Youn (1981) found the effect of the change in demand to be substantial, but that the effect of supply exerts less influence. In a tight market, the trickling down effect existed in all of the disciplines that he tested (mathematics, physics, sociology, economics, English, and history). He defined the academic labor market as segmented in three ways: (1) research and teaching clusters; (2) four discrete institutional sectors -- leading universities, weaker universities; stronger colleges; teaching institutions; (3) disciplinary markets.

Like Caplow and McGee's findings on the prestige system, their findings and assumptions about market structure have been confirmed by subsequent research. The differentiation they noted (employers were not interchangeable and employees were not interchangeable) has not been disputed. Neither has their contention that most Ph.D.'s are trained in the major universities but only a fraction can be absorbed in the major universities (Marketplace, p. 211).

The institutional policy emanating from the 1958 study that has received the most attention by researchers in later years is the research-teaching conflict; it has been studied through individual orientation and through institutional reward systems. Abrahamson (1973) tested functional rather than market competition effects on salaries and found that nonadditive individual contributions to production, as in the case of the faculty member, caused greater average differences in salary (implying merit pay for recognition of research efforts). He also noted that an exception to his findings could be the marketability of more prominent faculty members, as mentioned by Caplow and McGee.

Trow and Fulton (1975) noted that publishing was concentrated in the elite universities, where 79 percent of the faculty published, and the medium-quality universities, where 72 percent of the faculty published. Publication was further concentrated in the biological sciences (84 percent), medicine and law (82 percent), social sciences (75 percent), and physical sciences (74 percent). In addition, they found that salary differentials favored researchers.

Kasten (1984) examined the relationship between rewards and research, teaching, and service at a research university in the Midwest. Her findings were that faculty roles were differentially coupled to tenure and merit pay, and that the tightest coupling was between research and rewards.

Sacco and Milana (1984) attempted to verify institutional emphases on research by determining the increase in the average number of authors per journal article over a twenty-year period; the increase turned out to be 48 percent in their sample. They suggested that if the increase resulted from increasingly complex research, then the appropriateness of the institutional reward system could remain intact, but if otherwise, serious questions could be raised. Their questions relate directly to Caplow and McGee's fears for "specious or trivial" research that contaminates the academic atmosphere. (*Marketplace*, p. 221)

As mentioned earlier, paralleling Caplow and McGee's work in the late 1950s, Gouldner (1957-58) wrote about latent identities, with findings of differences between Merton's "locals" and "cosmopolitans" in their relationships with their employing organization. The sample for his study was the faculty of a small private liberal arts college. He found that cosmopolitans were "low on loyalty to the employing organization, high on commitment to specialized role skills, and likely to use an outer reference group orientation." The locals were "high on loyalty to the employing organization, low on commitment to specialized role skills, and likely to use an inner reference group orientation." (p. 290) The "local-cosmopolitan" construct is analogous to Caplow and McGee's institutional loyalty versus disciplinary prestige.

Flango and Brumbaugh (1974) built on Gouldner's work in a survey of faculty members in the Pennsylvania state higher education system, with findings corroborating those of Gouldner, and further suggesting that cosmopolitans were more committed to publication and more likely to leave the institution.

Baker and Zey-Ferrell (1984) referred to local and cosmopolitan orientations of the faculty in an attempt to find support for the teaching role. The strongest network ties in teaching were among locals, and in research were among cosmopolitans.

Alpert (1985) looked at interdisciplinary (or cosmopolitan) effects in terms of structure, depicting matrix relationships between horizontally coupled components relating to the institution and vertically coupled components relating to professional recognition in the discipline. He saw academic departments as virtually autonomous units with strong vertical coupling. He further identified an increase of vertical influence with an increase in research, that is, a movement away from only dissemination of knowledge to the search for new knowledge.

Hagstrom (1965) agreed with Caplow and McGee that the higher-ranked department would have a stronger orientation to the discipline. By measuring communication and recognition, he indicated a significant amount of social control exercised by the discipline.

Additional light was shed on the academic career by VanMaanen and Barley (1984), who said that professional careers were affected not only by society's perceptions of their occupation, but also by achievement within the occupation. They suggested further, though, that professionalism need not cause conflicts of loyalty, that these were typically contextual and issue-specific.

Blau's research (based on interviews) purported to show that faculty members' loyalty to the institution was lower in the Northeast, higher in private schools, higher in smaller schools, and that the better the qualifications of the faculty member the lower the level of loyalty. He further elaborated that the qualities of a faculty member that enhance the institution's reputation reduce loyalty to the institution, and qualities that increase a faculty member's loyalty reduce that of his colleagues (making him additive rather than nonadditive, in Abrahamson's terms). The source of this paradox, he said, was the academic prestige system.

On the matter of importance to the institution, as reflected in the reward system, there is no question that Caplow and McGee's assertions were correct as to the basis of evaluation of a faculty member -- it is undoubtedly research. The local-cosmopolitan split also seems to be confirmed, although very recent research may be moving away from clear-cut division between the two concepts.

Bias in the academic labor market was mentioned by Committee B in 1929, as well as by Caplow and McGee in 1958, but was not studied until much later. Although Massengale and Sage (1982) found no differences in the effect of doctoral prestige between male and female physical educators, others have reported results contradictory to theirs. For example, Lewin and Duchin (1971) found a definite tendency to sex bias on the part of chairmen in a particular physical science discipline (not identified) in making hiring decisions. Their study did, though, support the universality of sponsorship across sexes: significant weight was given to recommendation of women by trusted colleagues.

Bernard (1964) had found in her study of biologists and chemists that doctoral prestige did not benefit women to the same extent as men. Among Ph.D.'s from the top twelve universities, she found that 55 percent of the male biologists and 31 percent of the male chemists were teaching in universities ten years after the Ph.D., whereas only 43 percent of the female biologists and 20 percent of the female chemists were so located. On the other hand, 22 percent of the women biologists and 27 percent of the women chemists had positions in colleges, compared to 12 percent of the male biologists and no male chemists.

Moore and Newman (1977) used a statistical model to show probable sex discrimination in the appointment of women economists. Their study also, though, supported the doctoral prestige notion by finding that the perceived quality of the individual, based on graduate program, had a significant influence on the quality of the placement (Roose-Andersen rankings).

Simon et al. (1967) asked whether women Ph.D.'s were as productive as men and whether married women were as productive as unmarried women. They found relatively small differences between men and women and between married and unmarried women. Marwell et al. (1979), working from a 1970 data base, argued that disparities between men and women in academic status and earnings derive from disadvantages that marriage imposes on women, especially in the form of mobility constraints.

Employment patterns for black academicians were revealed to vary widely from those of whites in Mommsen's 1974 study (based on 1970 data). Although blacks tended to obtain their doctorates from large, predominantly white institutions such as Ohio State, Columbia, Michigan, etc., the first position of 80 percent of the black graduates was at a predominantly black school (most without graduate programs inasmuch as only Howard and Atlanta award the doctorate).

Here the doctoral prestige thesis did not hold. The majority of the black faculty members studied, however, viewed themselves as mobile, expecting to move in the following ten years.

In a somewhat different sphere, Rafky (1972) studied matched samples of black and white faculty members in predominantly white institutions and concluded that irrationality in the market, as mentioned by Caplow and McGee, was a powerful barrier to employment of blacks. It is interesting to note, though, that 33 percent of the blacks, like 31 percent of the whites, found their first job through a friend, and 41 percent of the blacks and 43 percent of the whites found their present job in that manner.

Menges and Exum (1983), acknowledging increased hiring of women and minorities in the previous decade, identified barriers that hindered their progress within the professoriate. They viewed retention as a problem and introduced the concept of "worth" to be considered along with merit, arguing that "merit" is a concept shaped by white, male, middle-class values.

Bowen and Schuster (1986) commented generally on women and minorities as "emergent groups within the faculty," with the expectation that effects of past discrimination against women would be eliminated in the years ahead, as more of the women now in the junior ranks move up and become established scholars. They were not so sanguine about minorities, especially blacks, because of their low graduate enrollment figures.

It would appear that Caplow and McGee's statement that women were not taken seriously and could not look forward to a normal professional career (Marketplace, p. 226) has been somewhat modified by later research. Similarly, their finding that discrimination on the basis of race appeared to be nearly absolute (p. 226) has been revised. Nevertheless, bias in the academic marketplace has continued to be viewed by researchers as a problem that has not been solved.

In some ways related to the bias issue, Lewis (1975) questioned the dominance of merit in the academy, and identified procedures, such as external peer review and formalized rules for procedure and appeal rights, that he thought could be useful in safeguarding the meritocracy. But Smelser and Content (1980) thought the development of such procedures a deviation from the Caplow and McGee model of collegiality. They enumerated new political and bureaucratic dimensions in the academic marketplace: new constituencies, budgetary restrictions leading to political decisions, and a proliferation of administrative procedures responding to uncertainty and conflict. This is an area of research in the new world of higher education that could not be foreseen by Caplow and McGee in 1958.

Summary

In sum, the Caplow and McGee study and ensuing research show the following: The academic marketplace has been dominated by the prestige system -- in recruitment and selection of new faculty members, in the modification of the labor market, and to some extent in other aspects of mobility. Beyond the effect of prestige, the academic labor market has been strongly affected by conditions of differentiation or stratification, by problems of communication, and by a divergence from economic considerations. Bias in the academic marketplace has lessened but has not disappeared.

The alleged conflict between teaching and research has not been resolved. A number of researchers agree with Caplow and McGee's findings and concerns; few offer recommendations or explanations that would conciliate the differences between teaching and research orientations. Finally, a new worry has arisen about the effect of a growing legalism on the university organization.

The current study examined the present academic marketplace in the same way that it was investigated by Caplow and McGee in 1958. The reenactment of the Caplow and McGee study took place in an environment of concern about enrollment trends, government support, and other negative signals in the higher education community. Looking beyond the present, however, one sees the retirement trends and the enormous faculty needs of the 1990's -- estimated by Howard Bowen (as reported in the Chronicle of Higher Education in November 1984) at 500,000 new faculty members over 25 years -- necessitating an understanding and perhaps improvement of the process by which the faculty perpetuates itself. The real value of the current study, therefore, lies in the future.

PROBLEM AND METHOD

Study Considerations

As stated in the previous chapter, the study is addressing whether and how the academic marketplace as described by Caplow and McGee in 1958 has or has not undergone significant change. A secondary objective is to place the study within the context of organization theory, especially with respect to the management of human resources. Taking into account the ensuing research and changed conditions, what can we say about Caplow and McGee's notions in the 1980s? How have the personnel processes that they examined changed over the decades? (Or have they changed at all?)

It may be useful here to recount Caplow and McGee's formal research questions:

- What are the circumstances leading to faculty terminations?
- What factors in the academic situation are related to occupational adjustment? How is performance in academic positions evaluated?
- What are the consequences of alternate forms of department organization for the morale and productivity of faculty members?
- How do existing patterns of migration meet the conflicting requirements of stability and progress, both for individuals and for institutions?
- What is the range of existing practices for discovering and evaluating professorial candidates?

- What are the consequences of various methods of selection for the universities and departments which use them?

- What factors determine an institution's attractiveness to outside candidates? Do the same elements determine its power to hold its own staff?

- What are the criteria which govern the ranking of candidates for academic positions?

- How effective are the current methods of canvassing and recruiting?

- What is the effect of the prestige ranking of institutions upon the success of their recruiting efforts?

- What are the principal current trends in academic personnel policies?

- How is the faculty selection process related to the effectiveness of such academic functions as teaching, writing, public service, and research?

The findings stimulated by these research questions, combined with subsequent research, suggest the following indicators of change or constancy.

(a) Recruitment methods. The most-quoted feature of Caplow and McGee's study, and indeed a major contention, is that of closed, or preferential, hiring. Ingredients are "nepotistic" behavior, sponsorship, and doctoral prestige, aided by what they called "information screens," that is, an absence of information about jobs (on the part of the prospective candidates) and about candidates (on the part of the prospective employers).

Is hiring still closed, preferential? Has the broader advertising of positions in today's market altered the department's choice of candidates in quantity or quality?

(b) Selection criteria. Caplow and McGee found that publications were rarely read and that more than half the hirings in their sample took place without a campus interview. Letters of recommendation, however, were quite important in 1958. It has been suggested by researchers such as Dornstein (1977) that recommendations from reputable persons serve to reduce the uncertainty involved in hiring a professional. It was Caplow and McGee's maxim that a candidate is worth only what someone else thinks he is worth.

What are the current procedures for assessing candidates? What counts most? Has the change in the market structure intensified or diluted the prestige system?

(c) Hiring decisions. Participation in the process was relatively democratic in the 1950s, although Caplow and McGee noted the presence of autocratic chairmen. The literature since that period does not contain evidence of a lessening of democratic behavior in making academic appointments.

How are the hiring decisions made in the 1980s? Does the university administration play a heavier role? Are departments successfully autonomous in hiring the people they want?

(d) Women and minorities. Caplow and McGee placed both of these groups outside the prestige system and therefore of little interest to hiring departments. Today's political pressures and the promise of tomorrow's demographics have made the inclusion of women and minorities in the academic marketplace an issue.

Are hiring departments sensitive to the perceived need to hire women and minorities? How do they go about fulfilling that need?

(e) Circumstances of termination. Caplow and McGee found that the majority of the vacancies in their sample was a consequence of resignation; they found mobility greatest for the assistant professor and least for the associate professor. Further, they identified "motives of migration" -- prestige, security, and authority.

Is the incidence of denial of tenure as endemic to the assistant professor as it is thought to be? Has the mobility of associate and full professors changed? When people do move voluntarily, why do they do it and where do they go? What is the effect of their departure?

(f) Market structure. The most pronounced change in the academic marketplace since 1958 is its turnaround from seller's to buyer's market.

How has the market structure affected faculty personnel policies and practices?

(g) Institutional policies. Caplow and McGee noted a severe conflict between the teaching and research needs of the university that has not been mitigated greatly in later research. In addition, researchers such as Lewis (1975) and Smelser and Content (1980) have noted a growing legalism in the university.

How does the tension between research and teaching affect the university today? Has a more rigid codification of personnel procedures caused additional tension between collegial and administrative functions?

Research Questions

By summarizing the indicators noted above, and heeding Caplow and McGee's original research questions, the following basic research questions have been developed for the present study:

1. What are the existing practices and criteria for discovering and evaluating faculty candidates?
2. How are selection decisions made?
3. What are the circumstances of faculty terminations? What are the effects of terminations on the organization?
4. What is the effect of market characteristics on the organization through its personnel processes?
5. What is the effect of institutional policies on the organization through its personnel processes?

Complementary to these basic questions, the faculty personnel process will be considered in the context of contemporary thought about human resources in organizations.

Study Design

The study was designed as a replication of the Caplow and McGee study. The focus of the earlier study -- the arts and sciences department -- was used, as was the general methodology. There were three departures from their design: (1) in the unit of analysis, (2) in the number of institutions studied, (3) in the respondents.

1. The unit of analysis employed in the earlier study was a vacancy-and-replacement, in effect a sequence of events. The

universities in this sample generally were unable to match vacancies and replacements, and so I developed a design permitting the study of terminations and appointments separately.

2. The original study involved nine major research universities, each of whom was contacted. Three of the universities refused to participate in the current study. Given the likelihood of at least 250 interviews at the six universities, I decided against attempting substitution for the three nonparticipants.

3. Caplow and McGee confined their interviews to chairmen and "peers" -- a peer being that person in the department closest in rank and age to the person who left. I interviewed chairmen, peers (close colleagues) of the departed faculty members, and new appointees. I was able to do a small amount of cross-checking by talking with a few new appointees who had left another institution in the sample and a few emeritus professors, but these were not consistently developed data and were not used except to inform my own understanding.

With these few exceptions, the study was carried out in much the same manner as the earlier one. It might be noted here that as a woman I may have been treated differently from the men who conducted the interviews in 1957. No one tried to punch me in the nose, as happened to Reece McGee, nor was I called "stupid," another of his experiences. In comparing my interview data with his, which he very graciously made available to me, I find my interviews to be more civil and a bit more informative than those of the earlier era. This may simply reflect the commonplace occurrence of studies such as mine today, whereas Professor McGee and his associate, Robb Taylor, were plowing new ground.

The Sample

The data were based on all terminations from tenured or tenure-track positions that occurred in the six universities during the academic year 1983-84, and all appointments to tenured or tenure-track positions in the academic year 1984-85. Caplow and McGee studied 237 vacancies in the nine universities of their sample; this study investigated the circumstances of 167 terminations and 137 appointments, or a total of 304 personnel actions. The activity was spread across 50 disciplines, as compared to 32 in the comparable six universities in the earlier study (which were used for all data comparisons in the analysis). Virtually all of the liberal arts disciplines were included, although not all on every campus. Economics, English, and physics were included in all six universities and anthropology, chemistry, classical studies, history, philosophy, political science or government, and sociology in five of the six. Where the divisions of humanities, social sciences, and natural sciences were used, disciplines were assigned to divisions in accordance with their treatment at the specific university. For example, history may be found in the humanities or the social sciences, linguistics in the humanities or social sciences, psychology in the social sciences or natural sciences. Departments such as computer science and music have been included if they fall within a college of arts and sciences but have been excluded if they exist in a school of engineering or as a separate school. Administrative arrangements varied among the six universities: at some the chairmen of departments interacted directly with a dean of arts and sciences, at others the immediate relationship was with a divisional dean. In all cases the chairmen had available a written procedures manual setting out the administrative steps to be followed in making an appointment or forwarding a file for tenure consideration. Such written procedures did not exist when Caplow and McGee conducted their study.

The original researchers selected a convenience sample of major research universities, all members of the Association of American Universities, from which the six universities included in this study are drawn. Five of the institutions are "Research Universities I" according to the classifications developed by the Carnegie Commission of Higher Education (1976). The classification of Research Universities I is defined as:

> The 50 leading universities in terms of federal financial support of academic science in at least two of the three academic years, 1972-73, 1973-74, and 1974-75, provided they awarded at least 50 Ph.D.'s . . . in 1973-74.

A sixth institution falls in the "Research Universities II" classification, defined as follows:

> These universities were on the list of the 100 leading institutions in terms of federal financial support in at least two out of the above three years and awarded at least 50 Ph.D.'s . . . in 1973-74.

The research universities differ in their greater emphasis on research from "Doctoral-Granting Universities I," awarding 40 or more doctorates or receiving at least $3 million in federal support; "Doctoral-Granting Universities II," awarding at least 10 Ph.D.'s or emerging at that level; "Comprehensive Universities and Colleges I," including professional schools but lacking a doctoral program; "Comprehensive Universities and Colleges II," offering at least one professional or occupational program; and liberal arts colleges and other non-Ph.D.-awarding schools.

A number of studies, including Caplow and McGee's and this one, have used the major research university as a setting because it provides the primary training ground for new faculty members and also serves as a principal employer, thus establishing the norms for the profession. The research emphasis of such schools no doubt translates into faculty hiring criteria, conditions of termination, and other personnel aspects that are somewhat different from schools in the other Carnegie classifications, hence limiting applicability of results.

Within the research university classification, the six universities studied have diverse and representative characteristics: Two are in the Ivy League, two are in the Big Ten, one is in California, one is in the Southwest, three are private, three are public, two are in metropolitan centers, two are in middle-sized cities, two are in small college towns. The six schools employed slightly more than 10,000 of the nation's faculty members and accounted for about 10 percent of the doctorates awarded in the

United States in 1980. The departments represented in the sample contained a total of 3,302 faculty members.

The quality of the academic departments surveyed varied within and among institutions, with rankings ranging from one to fifty. The ranking measure used was "scholarly quality of program faculty," obtained by reputational survey, in Jones, Lindzey and Coggleshall (1982). Of ninety-five ranked departments, thirty-two were in the top ten and thirty-eight in the next ten (or seventy in the top twenty), eighteen were in the next ten and seven below that (or twenty-five below the top twenty). In three of the schools studied, virtually all of their departments that were represented in the sample and were included in the published rankings were found in the top twenty, two schools had a majority in the top twenty, and one had half of its departments below the top twenty. (Note that twenty-four of the fifty disciplines covered in the study were not included in the published rankings.)

Information was furnished by 306 respondents from the six universities, compared to 310 from Caplow and McGee's nine universities in the earlier study. The information was obtained in 266 cases by personal interview, in six cases by telephone interview, and in the remaining thirty-four cases by mail.

Collecting the Data

Early in the summer of 1985 a letter and data form were sent to each of the participating schools requesting the following information about terminations and appointments: Department and division; rank and tenure status of person who left and the reason for leaving (dismissal, resignation, retirement, death); rank and tenure status of the replacement; rank and tenure status of the appointee to a new position. In addition, published materials on personnel procedures were requested, and also the designation of a contact person in the administration with whom I could arrange day-to-day operations during the campus visit. In one of the public universities and one of the private universities, a letter over an administrative signature was sent to department chairmen in advance of my visit, a helpful gesture which expedited appointment-setting. In the other four universities, two public and two private, I obtained a letter upon arrival on campus which I used as a letter of introduction. Many of the respondents were familiar with the Caplow and McGee book, and so regardless of the degree of warmth in the official greeting, once I crossed the barrier of presenting my credentials to the administration, negotiating some kind of work space and message-taking, and getting on with it, I was well received on campus. I found many of the faculty members with whom I talked interested in and supportive of my research, and the remainder ranging from tolerant to mildly interested. Exceptions were three chairmen -- two at private universities and one at a public university -- who refused to talk to me although two, when pressed, referred me to senior faculty members who had served as chairmen and were excellent sources of information. In several instances it was not possible to identify or contact peers; there were similar difficulties in reaching all of the new appointees, some of whom were on leave or had moved on to other jobs. Following is a table showing the response rate by institution, the second column showing the number of possible interviews and the third showing interviews conducted as a percentage of the possibilities.

Institution	N	Response Rate
A	54	85.2%
B	49	89.8%
C	75	74.7%
D	48	91.7%
E	56	89.3%
F	71	93.0%
Total	351	87.2%

The sample of 306 completed interviews consisted of 77 assistant professors, 46 associate professors, and 183 professors, in 131 departments. The sample included forty-nine women and twelve Asian, Black and Hispanic minorities in fifty-one departments, as compared to Caplow and McGee's experience in the same schools of interviewing seventeen women and one Asian minority in twelve departments.

The interview schedule used (see Appendix I) was essentially that used in the earlier study, with slight modifications in which Professor McGee assisted. For example, I asked a new question about the effect of campus affirmative action requirements on the search process and a question about comparative applicant pools. I deleted a few questions that were quite low-yield in the original study (e.g., a question about the school of thought of the departed faculty member, which Professor McGee had characterized to me as a "fishing expedition" on their part). I added a section to the interview schedule of questions to be asked of the new appointee by paraphrasing questions from the section of the original form that posed questions to a chairman about a new appointment. In sum, the revised interview schedule followed the logic of the earlier study to find out about the people who left (who, how, why); to find out about the search (procedures, criteria, applicants); and to find out about the people who were appointed (who, how, why). Chairmen were asked about departures and appointments, peers were asked about departures and about appointments if they had useful knowledge about the latter, new appointees were asked about the circumstances of their own appointment. An interview with a chairman that encompassed both termination and appointment activity, or several of either types of activity, could take as long as an hour and a half. Peer interviews usually lasted less than an hour; if only one termination were being discussed, the time used could be as little as half an hour. Most new-appointee interviews were completed in half an hour. Because the questions were open-ended, designed to elicit individual comments rather than highly structured responses, the length of the interview varied to some extent with the degree of loquaciousness of the interviewee.

As to the actual process: Upon arriving on campus, I acquired a list of chairmen and a telephone and began calling to set up appointments. On every campus visited I was able to arrange at least one appointment on the afternoon of the first day. The chairman interview led to identification of peers and new appointees, and so some telephoning time was allotted every day during the first of the two weeks that I spent on each campus. All personal interviews were conducted in the faculty member's campus office or laboratory in as unobtrusive a manner as could be accomplished. Responses were recorded as nearly verbatim as possible on the interview form, and the interviews were dictated on cassettes at the end of each day. The tapes were subsequently transcribed onto floppy disks and printed in rough draft form. I checked the drafts against the original interview notes and edited the disks, from which final copies were printed and photocopied. The photocopies were cut into sections, dividing the responses into preset groupings relating to research questions, and pasted on index cards.

While on site, I summarized responses to selected questions on spread sheets, and kept records of interviewee responsiveness and unusual circumstances or situations that would assist later interpretation of the interview data. After my return from a campus visit, I summarized descriptive statistics for the school, comparing Caplow and McGee results with mine, and elaborating on the statistics by using the response summaries prepared on site. Consequently, at the end of each site visit for the purpose of collecting field data, I had developed a familiarity with and a wholistic view of the faculty personnel activity on that campus as well as some experience in handling the data.

Data Preparation

The advantage of using open-ended questions is that the information furnished by the respondents is less likely to be forced into preconceived pigeonholes constructed by the researcher. The disadvantage is the difficulty of making sense out of material that is not easily adaptable to quantification. In handling these data, I first made a list of "things I could count" and entered them on computer spreadsheets -- for example, appointments by institution, discipline, and rank; terminations by type, institution, discipline, and rank; department ratings; department size. Included herein as Appendices II through X are the various products of this data preparation step, including the comparable Caplow and McGee data.

Next I applied categorical coding to the index cards, providing each with an eight-character code designating school, discipline, and role of interviewee; a two- or three-character code identifying disciplinary division, such as social sciences; a four-character code establishing type of action, with a fifth character for type of termination; and a four-character code for academic rank. All of the coding I used was non-numerical and relatively self-explanatory. This preliminary coding permitted aggregation of the interview data for analysis in various ways. It also facilitated a weighting process for certain questions by designating the role of the interviewee; for example, a new appointee would be more likely to provide the source of initial contact with the department than would the chairman, or a peer might have a better idea of why a colleague left to take another job.

At the next stage I was significantly guided by Miles and Huberman (1984), as well as my own background in literary and legal research, in coding themes within the interview data. I had noted certain repetitions during data collection (e.g., references to spouse employment) and established codes for about twenty recurring concepts. Some additional codes emerged from further familiarity with the responses as I worked with the data. Because my data were "bounded" by specific questions, this 'fine-coding' task was not as complex as would be the case in ethnographic work.

Concomitant with fine-coding was content analysis of the data to furnish discrete quantifiable items. Among these were such determinations as the level at which an academic opening was defined and the level at which a candidate was selected, whether by provost, dean, chairman, department members or one or more acting in concert. Content analysis also permitted development of classifications such as negative or positive response.

The Ultimate Method

Finally, when one has counted all the countables and figured all the possible percentages and shuffled and reshuffled all the index cards and read and reread the interview data, there is nothing to do but to write. Writing is surely a form of thinking; the fusing of thought into the action of writing it up is what good research is all about. Ways of coding and manipulating data are merely the tools used to facilitate creative expression. One would not use a hammer to install a screw, and so it is wise to choose the right tools for the job, but they are only tools. In social research particularly, it seems important not to mistake the screwdriver used to install the shelf for the books that are displayed on the shelf. An elegant methodology that succeeds in revealing little or nothing about the social phenomenon we are studying is, in the final analysis, valueless. And so, quoting Theodore Caplow and Reece McGee,

> In sum, the methods used were the simplest which would serve. (Marketplace, p. 39)

PART II

DATA ANALYSIS

DATA ANALYSIS: THE SEARCH PROCESS

> Faculty recruiting is a consuming, gut-wrenching task. It's very tiring. But we've done an extremely effective job in this department -- our new hires have enhanced our capabilities enormously, put us on a new track. In spite of the burden, the department is willing to put the resources into it.
>
> Chairman of Sociology
> at a Private University

This chapter deals with the research question, "What are the existing practices and criteria for discovering and evaluating faculty candidates?" Caplow and McGee remarked that the most striking feature of academic hiring procedures was the time and effort that most departments devoted to appointments. "The average salary of an assistant professor is approximately that of a bakery truck driver, and his occupancy of a job is likely to be less permanent," they said. But it may take a large part of the time of several highly skilled people for a long period of time to hire him! (Marketplace, p. 114) That has not changed. The search process described in this chapter is extremely time-consuming, but it is viewed by department members as an essential part of their job. The word "colleague," widely used in academic circles, derives from the French legere, "to choose" -- new colleagues must be chosen carefully.

Thus, this chapter will respond to the research question by examining the introduction to the choosing, that is, the origination of a faculty position and the conduct of a faculty search.

Origination of the Position

First, it may be interesting to compare the field and rank of the 1958 searches with those reported in the 1986 study. The searches in the current sample, compared with the Caplow and McGee data, show two interesting shifts: to the natural sciences and to the full professor level. In 1958, approximately 35 percent of the searches took place in the social sciences and 28 percent in the natural sciences; in the 1986 sample, the social sciences proportion had dropped to 31 percent and the natural sciences increased to 33 percent. The humanities remained about the same. (See Table 1.)

[Table 1 about here]

Similarly, in 1958 associate professors accounted for almost 18 percent of the search activity and full professors for 10 percent; in 1986 those proportions changed to 12 percent for associate professors and 18 percent for full professors. Assistant professors dropped from a little more than 72 percent to 70 percent. (See Table 2.)

[Table 2 about here]

Caplow and McGee referred to an assumption about budget lines, or "slots," and a vacancy-and-replacement attitude that had a faculty departure triggering a faculty replacement at the same rank within the same department, almost automatically. This is no longer true, and in fact probably has not been true for years. In this study, the

TABLE 1. RECRUITING DEPARTMENTS, BY DISCIPLINARY DIVISION AND STUDY

Disciplinary Division	1958 Study		1986 Study	
	No.	%	No.	%
Humanities	24	36.9	33	36.2
Social Studies	23	35.4	28	30.8
Natural Sciences	18	27.7	30	33.0
Total	65	100.0	91	100.0

TABLE 2. APPOINTMENTS, BY ACADEMIC RANK AND STUDY

Academic Rank	1958 Study No.	1958 Study %	1986 Study No.	1986 Study %
Assistant Professor	66	72.5	96	70.1
Associate Professor	16	17.6	17	12.4
Professor	9	9.9	24	17.5
Total	91	100.0	137	100.0

opening being filled was frequently not a direct replacement (except in budget terms) for a departed faculty member; often it was a composite or a choice made to strengthen the department and sometimes it was a newly defined position designed to meet new needs within the department.

In any case, the academic department was not given a replacement position automatically but was required to request authorization to recruit from the dean (usually, sometimes other academic administrators were involved), and that authorization could be negotiated in some detail: rank, field, term of appointment, tenure status, salary range. Detailed negotiation was not a hard and fast rule, and there were a number of instances in the sample where the department began recruiting very broadly, and some where lack of initial success resulted in changing the specifications. In several senior appointments, the person was located before the authorization was requested, that is, it was learned that a senior person might be available and authorization to recruit the specific individual was sought. Infrequently, the opening was initiated by a dean or provost -- for example, an incoming senior professor was accommodated by giving the department several junior positions to fill, or a need in an interdisciplinary program was assigned to a particular department -- but the recruiting process was the department's responsibility.

Departmental views of the authorization process varied, as witness these two comments from the same university:

> If there is no change in the total number, we just tell the dean [that we are going to recruit] -- we assume a permanent roster.
>
> We react to signals from the dean's office. The dean lets us know what we can do, and then we try to work around to what we need.

Generally, prior to a request for authorization the department must try to decide what it wants. Methods for accomplishing this varied slightly across institutions and across disciplinary divisions, but especially across individual departments, with different effects even in similar departments. For example, in two small humanities departments, the first in a public and the second in a private university, the respective chairmen commented:

> The department had several meetings to decide whether we wanted someone in the same field. The department was able to reach consensus without loud disagreement.
>
> The department had a retreat at a conference center -- one and a half days -- we were really in solitary confinement. There we developed a five-year plan.

And in two larger social science departments, both in public universities:

> I [the chairman] poll the faculty and compile the statistical summary of the distribution and I look at that along with teaching needs. Then I work with the executive committee consisting of two persons of each rank plus two graduate students and make the decision.
>
> A departmental meeting was called to set priorities -- we discuss and fight!

Most departments that are large enough have organized themselves in ways to facilitate decision-making:

> We have an executive committee elected by the whole department nominated within certain groups, and that committee

> meets with the chairman and then they vote. The committee is advisory to the chairman. The chairman can go against their wishes but he better have a good reason or he loses his credibility.
>
> We have a table of organization here, essentially, determined by the nature of the discipline -- like a baseball team has to have nine people on the field.

Now and then the team approach did not work:

> It was a complex search conducted in two separate fields. The department couldn't agree on what was needed.
>
> The department doesn't arrive at a consensus until it starts looking!

Even in those institutions where departmental "executive committees" were prescribed, the results were not uniform:

> There is input to the executive committee through the five division coordinators. The executive committee in this department consists of the full professors and they make the decision on what we are going to do.
>
> Our executive committee consists of five professors, three associate professors, and two assistant professors, who are elected by the faculty. One of their regular orders of business in the late spring or early fall is to decide what kinds of vacancies we are going to have.

Nevertheless, a clear pattern emerged as to the level in the academic department where the decision about the nature of the opening was made. The pattern can be seen in the analysis of decision levels in the ninety-one recruiting departments (Table 3), as among full faculty, committee, or chairman. Although there was a slight proportional bent toward committee decision in public universities and in larger departments, about 60 percent of the departments sampled enjoyed full faculty participation in the decision and the overall effect was one of democracy in action.

[Table 3 about here]

The determination of what kind of person the organization will seek is a participatory decision.

The Search

As noted earlier, it has been contended in the higher education literature that while faculty hiring is viewed as open, or competitive, in reality it is closed, or preferential. Caplow and McGee cited "nepotistic themes" as a heavy contributor to this state of affairs: e.g., help from the home institution, knowing or being known by someone influential in the hiring, having some previous connection with the institution. More than half the assistant professors and more than 60 per cent of the associate and full professors in their sample had made no overt efforts to locate their jobs but were individually pursued by the hiring department.

A change has occurred, however, at the initiation of the search. Faculty recruitment in the 1980s, with few exceptions, begins with advertising; the search is public knowledge and there is no evidence that the apparent openness of the process is deceptive. Every department surveyed (with the exception of special situations, to be discussed later) began its search by preparing and placing an advertisement in a professional journal customarily read by job-seekers in the discipline. Some went so far as to advertise additionally in more general publications such as the *Chronicle of Higher Education*. All of these were legitimate advertisements; no preselection had taken place. One suspects that Brown's (1967) and

TABLE 3. DECISION LEVEL OF FACULTY POSITION DEFINITION

Unit of Comparison	Number of Departments				
	Decision Level				
	Full Faculty	Committee	Chairman	Special	Total
Institution:					
Public	27	14	6	6	53
Private	27	4	2	5	38
Total	54	18	8	11	91
Disciplinary Division:					
Humanities	20	7	1	4	32
Social Sciences	17	4	4	4	29
Natural Sciences	17	7	3	3	30
Total	54	18	8	11	91
Department Size:					
Small	24	1	-	5	30
Medium	26	9	5	3	43
Large	4	8	3	3	18
Total	54	18	8	11	91

others' assertions that knowledge of the academic job market is constrained by lack of communication are no longer valid; if anything, knowledge of the opening is overcommunicated!

Differing opinions about placing ads in journals were expressed by chairmen. The views are typified by these two comments from the natural sciences at the same public university, both relating to searches at the assistant professor level, and both from departments ranked in the top ten:

> At the junior level, sometimes there are surprises from the ads, people that we wouldn't turn up otherwise.
>
> No one ever shows up from the ads that we didn't already know about, the ads satisfy the legal requirements.

The value of open advertising is confirmed by the fact that of the seventy-four assistant professors interviewed for this study, forty had obtained their positions by responding to advertisements in professional journals. One assistant professor in computer science remarked that when he started looking around, "There were five hundred ads and you skim through and see what you would like to apply for."

The experience of assistant professors, however, did not hold across ranks. Among associate professors, only four out of fourteen responded to advertisements; at full professor rank, only four out of twenty indicated that they had learned about the job through an advertisement. (See discussion below.)

Additional open advertising took place through notices of openings sent to other departments at institutions granting the Ph.D. in that particular discipline. According to new-appointee respondents, these notices were often posted on bulletin boards by the recipients.

Although the process could be characterized as universalistic up to this point, it then became particularistic. For example, the department members made telephone calls to persons known at other institutions in order to call the opening to their attention and try to ensure that their best people applied. (This method has the socially acceptable label of "networking," as opposed to the socially unacceptable "old-boy network." Presumably the web now includes old girls.) About 40 per cent of the assistant professors interviewed reported hearing about the job through some kind of personal contact: a colleague, a graduate advisor, a faculty member in the searching department, or by being "in place" in the relevant department as a visiting faculty member or in a postdoctoral fellowship. Virtually all of the persons appointed at the senior level mentioned such contacts.

Neither inbreeding (hiring one's own Ph.D.'s) nor outbreeding or "silver-cording" (hiring one's own Ph.D.'s after they have served an initial apprenticeship or established a career elsewhere), both characteristics noted by Caplow and McGee and later by Brown (1967), loomed large in the current investigation. Only three assistant professors, two associate professors, and two professors had earned their doctorates at the employing institution. Further removed, five assistant professors and one professor had been undergraduates; two assistant professors had siblings who had been undergraduates there.

The once prevalent method of placement by a mentor at the "right place" also seems to have vanished. One chairman related an anecdote contrasting past and present procedures:

> There's the old story told in Slavic languages about the senior scholar in the field. If you wanted to fill a job you got on the phone to him and asked him for someone and he would ruminate and then say, "I gif you Joe Smith."

Another expressed relief at no longer being

> . . . at the mercy of a senior man here who has a friend somewhere with a graduate student he wants to place.

And another added an element of objectivity to the networking:

> We call people at the top twenty or so places -- the person plus one or two others to keep them honest.

The minority opinion was that things were better in the old days via the old ways. A chairman in the humanities at a public university talked nostalgically about his practice twenty years ago of taking trips to other schools, coming back and telling the faculty about the best person he had seen, and subsequently hiring that person. A social sciences chairman in a public university believed that the old boy network of years past had produced better candidates. And a chairman in the natural sciences at a private university remarked on the current mix of procedures:

> We end up with the same candidates. It [current search procedure] broadens the pool, but when we get down to the wire it's the same system. There is no depth in the pool.

Another chairman described the present procedure as "rounding up all the suspects," and in this study the suspects were rounded up through advertising that could be quite detailed or quite vague, depending upon several factors, or as one chairman put it: "Well, it depends on which year it is, the phase of the moon and all that!" As a general rule, larger departments tended to advertise less well defined openings; smaller departments with precise teaching or research needs and fewer people to cover them were more specific in their job descriptions. A chairman of one of the latter type said, "Even the course load was specified in the ad!" Advertisements for senior positions were also less well defined. Always, there was a concern for quality and in many instances the acknowledgement that if a superb person showed up, the department might display a certain amount of flexibility in retailoring the job needs:

> We often look for anybody anywhere at the junior level. The department is attracted by intelligence.
>
> The committee set some general priorities about fields but we also just have to go after the opportunities that come along to get the people who are top rate. We don't go out hiring for a field and compromise quality.

In spite of the organized orderliness of the process, there can be a serendipitous element even, in this case, in a top-ranked biology department in a public university:

> We didn't know about [the successful candidate]. Someone heard about her. All of our methodical searching didn't turn her up. Her Ph.D. advisor was one of our graduate students, but he was not on our nominator list.

Needless to say, broad communication of information about the opening, coupled with market changes, generate large applicant pools, especially at the junior level. In Caplow and McGee's 1950s the majority of the positions filled had ten or fewer candidates. In the 1980s, the situation is far different. For example, the sociology search for three assistant professors described by Smelser and Content (1980) netted 285 candidates. Questions about applicant pools for assistant professor openings at these six universities elicited the information that two-thirds of the departments typically attracted more than fifty applications for an assistant professor opening, and over a third attracted more than a hundred applications. (See Table 4.)

[Table 4 about here]

As might be expected, applicant pools at the associate and full professor levels rarely attracted a large applicant (or nominee) pool. As one respondent noted, "The big question in a senior search is, who can we get?"

It might be noted here that a split seems to be occurring in the associate professor rank. Several departments in the sample appointed associate professors without tenure, in order to offer a higher salary than could be given an assistant professor, or to provide opportunities for research prior to tenure consideration, or for other reasons. It was also remarked in conversation that some research universities purportedly have created an associate professor without tenure rank for their own faculty members, in order to extend the tenure clock.

The expansion of the junior applicant pool is no doubt affected by three factors working in combination: the dissemination of knowledge of the opening, the increase in Ph.D. production since the late 1950s, and the decrease in total number of academic openings

TABLE 4. TYPICAL NUMBER OF APPLICATIONS FOR ASSISTANT PROFESSOR POSITION, BY DISCIPLINARY DIVISION

	Number of Departments				
	Number of Applications				
Disciplinary Division	Fewer Than 50	50-100	100-200	More Than 200	Total
Humanities	12	5	6	3	26
Social Sciences	7	9	8	2	26
Natural Sciences	5	4	8	4	21
Total	24	18	22	9	73

since 1970. There is not, however, a direct relationship between the increase in the number of Ph.D.'s produced and the number of applicants for academic jobs. The National Research Council (1983) reported that 46.7 per cent of the total of 23,833 Ph.D.'s produced in 1969 planned to seek academic employment but only 31.9 per cent of the 28,716 produced in 1983 planned to do so. Thus, the actual numbers dropped from 11,130 in 1969 to 9,160 in 1983. Decreases are reflected in all fields. For example, there was a drop in real numbers from 946 to 526 in the biological and health sciences, and from 1,968 to 1,606 in the social sciences. In addition, the number of Ph.D.'s produced has decreased in some fields and has been accompanied by a decrease in the proportion going into academe. In the humanities, for example, the total number dropped from 3,585 to 3,292 and the proportion seeking academic employment dropped from 73.8 per cent to 45.9 per cent. Similar declines occurred in physics and astronomy, chemistry, and mathematics. Consequently, it is likely that the larger applicant pools are more a function of the broader advertising of fewer jobs than of more Ph.D.'s. Confirming this point, Bowen and Schuster (1986) found little unemployment of Ph.D.'s, and Youn (1981) observed that supply has less influence on the academic labor market than demand. (This can be an important consideration as demand increases in the 1990s.)

Academic departments have devised efficient ways of dealing with the large applicant flow. Larger departments might have standing recruitment committees, frequently one for senior and one for junior appointments. In others chairmen appointed ad hoc search committees whose composition varied. Some chairmen preferred a search committee consisting of specialists in the field; some put an outsider from another field on the committee "to keep them honest." In a few large departments with well defined sub-specialties, the group within which the position would be located chose its own committee. One chairman talked about his "anarchic" department: "I don't make any assignments, people are interested and they step forward and do the work." Occasionally the search committee extended outside of the department in order to draw upon expertise located elsewhere in the university or to accommodate an interdisciplinary focus.

Search and screen committees, no matter how constituted, set about their business of sorting out the candidates in a remarkably similar manner, differentiated only by the level of the search. First, the materials describing the candidates were assembled: curricula vitae, including lists of publications and statements of research plans, and letters of recommendation or references (the latter because some departments liked to request the letters themselves). The first cut was often made by the committee on the basis of the candidate's specialization or research interests or, in the case of a junior appointment, the improbability of completion of the doctorate by the specified appointment date. (Two departments screened first on thesis materials.) It was noted by most respondents that the letters of recommendation were extremely important as a screening device. Lewis (1975) has pointed out at length the shortcomings of letters of recommendation, commenting that such letters are a "ritualistic exercise used only to confirm what the reader wants to confirm" and that the writers tend to say what they think the department wants them to say about the candidate (p. 50). Nevertheless, in this academic world of uncertainty about professional potential, letters of recommendation remained paramount in the search criteria. As in the earlier period studied by Caplow and McGee, the identity of the author is important:

> Letters count for a lot, good letters by writers with some reputation. The field is small enough that letters are not taken lightly. We know everybody who's writing.
>
> They [the search committee] read the letters of recommendation for the first screening. Extra weight is given for letters from truly distinguished people.

But note occasional reservations:

> Letters are very important . . . Sometimes you get real duds and you wonder how many you missed because of the importance you placed on letters.
>
> Letters are significant even though they are inflated and it is who writes them that is important.

And there were attempts to validate the information contained in the letters:

> We asked for more than three references because we don't get replies from everybody and want at least three. There was a fair amount of phoning. If you trust the person that you phone, that's very often very useful.
>
> We ask for letters and we follow up the letters with phone calls.

There was some disparity in the data as to the importance of letters of recommendation in a senior search; both of the following comments came from chemistry departments not ranked in the top ten:

> We depend fairly strongly on outside letters. We will solicit opinions from people we know in the field, ask for comparison with leaders in the field. I [the chairman] write these letters myself.
>
> We don't pay much attention to letters, we think we know the best people -- Nobel Laureates, members of the National Academy, etc.

At the junior level, screening continued by obtaining (if not already in hand) and reading samples of the candidate's writing. I emphasize reading because Caplow and McGee identified several instances where materials were not read. Today's evaluators, with few exceptions, read the candidate's work.

> The screening committee farms out to the appropriate members of the faculty various papers. The search committee reads the c.v. and the letters and then the papers of about twenty to thirty people. The whole faculty reads papers of the visitors.
>
> The search committee screened down to 10 or 12 and asked for dissertations which the committee read. Then we screened to three and everyone reads those dissertations.
>
> For a senior person we read the work very, very carefully.

In the humanities, social sciences and selected natural sciences, the writing sample was almost always the doctoral thesis or chapters from the doctoral thesis, which was judged on the basis of topic as well as research and writing ability. "The dissertation subject is the most important thing." In those natural sciences where postdoctoral fellowships are common or required, writing beyond the dissertation was expected. At the end of the screening, the search committee presented to the department either a "short list" to be reduced further by the full faculty or a list of prospects for campus visits. An interceding step in some departments was the interviewing of candidates at the national meeting of a professional association (although this was not consistent across a discipline and seemed to be influenced by the chairman's attitude toward interviewing at national meetings).

At the senior level, although letters of recommendation may remain an important prerequisite to appointment, the members of the department are usually familiar with the candidate's work and are often more intent on convincing him or her to take the job than in deliberating over qualifications. "The most important credential is, would he have any interest in coming here?"

Throughout the search process, the full departmental faculty was welcomed and encouraged to read the files, express opinions to members of the search committee, and argue for inclusion or exclusion of candidates. Formal procedures were used by some departments:

> There are two people in charge of recruiting. We start out with about 150 names that we have screened down from the total applicants [for more than one position]. There are regular workshops by field with two or three people responsible for each field. Review sheets are filled out by the faculty.

In other departments, proceedings were less formal:

> The search committee has the initial job of shaking the bushes, calling, writing, etc. to make sure that all the good people apply. They then whittle the list down but the faculty are given a "white ball" and can put anyone back on the short list.

Again, we find a highly participatory decision-making process. As one experienced chairman commented:

> I've been chairman here for a long time, before that chairman of another department, before that chairman at another university. If there is a lesson to be learned, it is that you can never please everybody all the time, but if there is one place where you have to be democratic, it's in selecting new faculty.

Affirmative Action

Although bias was a concern of Caplow and McGee, their book was published almost a decade before passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and before President Johnson signed Executive Order 11246 in 1965. The "affirmative action" required by the Executive Order, although ambiguous for higher education until employment law was specifically extended to cover faculty members in 1972, created new rules and regulations governing the search process. Consequently, the interview schedule for the study was modified to include the question, "What effect do institutional affirmative action requirements have on your recruiting?" Responses indicated that the impact point of affirmative action on the search process appears to have passed. The words "institutionalized" and "internalized" were used again and again to describe affirmative action; less positive terms were "legalistic" and "tedious." In the ninety-one recruiting departments sampled, a large majority did not consider their searches to be affected by institutional affirmative action requirements (Table 5).

[Table 5 about here]

TABLE 5: EFFECT OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION REQUIREMENTS ON RECRUITING, BY DEPARTMENT

Effect	Departments	
	No.	%
Department exceeds requirements	14	15.4
Not much effect	43	47.3
No effect at all	21	23.1
Negative effect	10	11.0
Other (specific effect)	3	3.2
Total	91	100.0

The chairmen who were most positive about the philosophy of affirmative action divorced themselves from the actual administration of affirmative action on their campus.

> We would not have chosen her if we did not feel she was best, but when I became chairman there were no women in the department. We have four right now (out of twenty). The requirements on this campus are nothing, all paperwork. They set goals but we could always say that other people were more qualified. It is necessary to have the right attitude in the key people, not present it as a bureaucratic chore.
>
> Well, I think the department is itself quite committed to making a genuine affirmative action effort. It is department policy that the committee present the top woman and the top black regardless of where they rank. The department has a fair number of social activists -- we were very active in the Vietnam War and in efforts to expand the size of the black student body. At present we have three female colleagues, all quite recent but all tenured now. The dean doesn't care about the issue . . .

At the other end of the spectrum, one encounters these comments:

> The affirmative action requirements in general are a big albatross around our neck, probably the worst thing about hiring here, creates a very cumbersome process. It has mostly negative effects. We need people as chairmen who are genuinely interested; that is the only way to progress affirmative action.
>
> The affirmative action requirements on this campus are not effective. The general stress on affirmative action is helpful, the financial support is helpful. The campus program for minority fellowships for postdocs is helpful. The special slot for affirmative action is helpful. Bureaucratic details are not helpful. They slow things down and there are all sorts of petty annoyances. The reporting requirements are cumbersome. It is just a pain in the neck. I believe that general pressure for affirmative action is good, but when the lawyers get into the picture, they screw it up.

Two women and one black male in the sample thought that their appointments were related to affirmative action. One of the women said:

> There is still a lingering feeling in this department about preferring a male. I was really their second choice, but the administration would not pass on the male they wanted.

The chairman in this case said that some members of the department felt that she got the job because she was a woman. He thought her publications were more impressive. There was some indication that this was a departmental conflict, with affirmative action overtones, that was pushed up to the dean level for resolution.

Interestingly, there was little philosophical argument presented by the chairmen against affirmative action; the complaints had to do with the administration of the program. Two chairmen did claim affirmative action to be irrelevant -- they searched for the best regardless of skin color or anatomical structure, they said. A few chairmen considered the requirements superficial, as indicated in this response:

> We called the "positive action office" or whatever it's called to do the legal thing.

There was some question as to whether the current degree of acceptance of women and minorities in academe would have occurred without affirmative action, but also a suggestion from some chairmen that it may have had more effect, at least for women, at the training rather than the hiring level. There was considerable lament over the scarce supply of black Ph.D.'s, and in fact one black professor acknowledged:

> The job market for a half dozen black people is fantastic. There are unlimited opportunities for good blacks if they go to the right schools.

In spite of the universal complaint about the paperwork connected with the administration of the affirmative action program, one chairman conjectured, "The paperwork reminds us of the intent and perhaps motivates us to be more attentive." And perhaps because of the paperwork required, affirmative action seemed firmly fixed in many minds in its relationship to the advertising of positions, which almost everyone agreed was desirable. A dissenting opinion from one mathematics department, "We would not advertise if it were not for affirmative action," was contradicted in other mathematics departments. In fact, some chairmen thought that routine advertising, at least of junior positions, began some years before affirmative action, as higher education expanded explosively in the 1960s and the "old boy network" was strained beyond its capacity. But generally, this remark was typical:

> I suppose the important thing is advertising. We are much more confident that we seem to be objective. We feel more comfortable about it. There is an awareness without really thinking about it.

There were clear differences in the responses to questions about affirmative action according to the style of affirmative action administration on the campus. At one public university and one private university the requirements were viewed as stringent, intrusive, and largely unnecessary. At the other four schools, two public and two private, where the internal procedures were significantly more low-keyed, there was more of a societal awareness and somewhat less irritation displayed.

But perhaps the most telling observation was made by one chairman who said:

> I read the publications of the organizations of women faculty on this campus and feel that they are preoccupied with the same same issues of ten years ago that are no longer pressing issues. It is not difficult for women any more. But the question is what it's going to mean in twenty years to be a university professor. [This university] has a two-tiered structure, stars and others, and the others hire as cheaply as possible and keep as cheaply as possible.

Data Summary

This chapter has presented interview data that recounts the recruitment procedures used in the six research universities studied. Generally, the following points and comparisons may be made:

1. There is a shift in recruitment activity from the social sciences to the natural sciences. This may represent what a physics chairman called the "Toyota revolution" -- the country finally coming to understand the importance of a technological society and investing heavily in the sciences. There is also an increase in demand at the full professor rank (although assistant professor searches remain the large majority of recruitment activity). The expansion of full professor recruitment may reflect the failure of research universities to maintain a consistent flow of faculty members through the ranks.

2. In a departure from the Caplow and McGee data, direct replacements of vacated positions are not the norm in the 1986 data. Faculty positions are the subject of deliberation within the department before authorization to recruit is requested of the dean.

Qualifications for a position may be stated generally or specifically, but advertising requires that more advance thought be given to job specifications than occurred in Caplow and McGee's sample.

3. As posited by Caplow and McGee and confirmed by Bunnell (1960), Marshall (1964), Klugh (1964), Brown (1967), Hargens and Hagstrom (1967), Crane (1970), Love (1972), Long et al. (1979), Murray et al. (1981), and Massengale and Sage (1982), faculty hiring remains closed and preferential rather than open and competitive, once a certain threshold of perceived ability is reached. In other words, although knowledge of an opening is generally public, leading to larger applicant pools, the process of screening becomes increasingly ascriptive as the field narrows. The prestige factor is decisive -- in the Ph.D. program from which the candidate emerged, in the persons who write letters of recommendation for the candidate.

On the other hand, the inbreeding and outbreeding thought important by Caplow and McGee and later by Brown are not significant in the 1986 sample.

4. The advertising of positions results in much larger applicant pools, as noted by Smelser and Content (1980), for junior positions. Consequently, screening of candidates has been routinized across research universities and across disciplinary divisions. As reported by Caplow and McGee, the most important initial screening criteria are research and publications (but today they are read) and

letters of recommendation. Personal contacts become important as the search progresses.

5. Affirmative action is accepted as an institutionalized concept in recruitment, but the administration of affirmative action programs within the university may have little effect. Departmental commitment to affirmative action appears to engender the most success in attaining unbiased recruiting, thus reinforcing the departmental responsibility for the recruitment process.

In sum, the "existing practices and criteria for discovering and evaluating faculty candidates" differ little from those identified by Caplow and McGee and subsequent researchers. The demographics have changed (and see the later discussion of market forces); faculty positions are considered more thoughtfully; inbreeding and outbreeding are no longer noticeable factors in recruiting. But confirming the major point made by Caplow and McGee and reasserted by a number of other researchers, the prestige system retains its primacy and hiring is preferential. The phylogenetic inertia of the faculty personnel system is hardly disturbed at all by the search process.

DATA ANALYSIS: THE SELECTION PROCESS

> We know instantly when we are up against a really good mind. The quality of mind is not difficult to sort out. I quote Housman: "I can no more define poetry than a terrier can a rat, but I fancy we both know it when we see it."
>
> Former Chairman of Classics
> at a Public University

In the first data analysis chapter, "The Search Process," we looked at the way in which a faculty position is defined by the recruiting department and the procedures used in searching for candidates. This chapter responds to the research question, "How are selection decisions made?" and carries the search to completion, in the selection and appointment of the new faculty member. Elements of selection to be reviewed are the decision-making process, circumstances of the offer and acceptance, and "special cases" arising in the current sample. A deviation from the Caplow and McGee format is the inclusion of interview data from new appointees themselves, not present in the 1958 study.

As was noted about the search, there is some variation in the process as it relates to rank, that is, different procedures apply to junior and senior appointments. For example, we saw that applicant pools were quite large and that advertising was an effective recruiting method for junior positions. Applicant pools were much smaller for senior positions, and senior faculty members were not effectively recruited through public advertising. As will be seen in the following discussion, the close of the recruitment process differs by rank as well.

Selection of Assistant Professors

As noted earlier in Table 2, the great majority of hiring activity -- almost three-fourths of the total -- occurred at the assistant professor rank. Therefore, the selection of the assistant professor was of primary concern in this study. Looking at the final stage of the recruitment process of an assistant professor, one finds at the outset a difference from the 1950s. Less than half of the assistant professors in Caplow and McGee's sample were interviewed prior to being hired. In the current study, there was general agreement that the interview was the pinnacle of the upward climb for the junior faculty candidate -- the place where the candidate could perform brilliantly or self-destruct. There was little variation across departments, but the following were exceptions: Four of the departments in the sample conducted interviews only at professional meetings and did not invite candidates to visit the campus; one chairman explained in this way:

> The interviews were conducted by all of us [who attended the meeting] interviewing in a group. There is only a campus visit if there is some controversy. We present the case to the department and the department votes.

In three other cases, the campus visit was relatively undemanding, for example:

> We have become disenchanted with lectures and we try to put the candidates in different environments, that is, small groups by field, with graduate students, etc., and then everyone who has met the candidate comments.
>
> We don't ask junior candidates to make a presentation. We tried that in the past, but they are too nervous and they generally just present something from their dissertation that we can read anyway, and it just doesn't work. We want to make sure they know what they are getting into before they come here, and much of our effort during the visit is spent in explaining to them what we do and what we expect of them and trying to determine whether this fits in with their career plans.

But for the large majority of the new appointees, the job search culminated in an experience described by one chairman as "grueling" and by an assistant professor as "intensive." The routine was fairly standard across the departments surveyed, and activity fell roughly into three categories: group professional, individual professional, and semi-social. The group professional activity, viewed by many as the most important, was the presentation -- or in some cases two presentations, one informal to faculty members and graduate students with research interests similar to those of the candidate and the more formal presentation to a larger group that might include members of other departments. The job talk, as it is called, was seen as an indication of classroom performance as well as the candidate's ability to communicate research results. In a psychology department at a private university:

> We give much weight to the presentation. We are very concerned with teaching at the undergraduate level.

In a history department at another private university:

> The critical thing is the departmental seminar which consists of a thirty to forty-minute talk including twenty to thirty minutes on current research, ten minutes on future research, ten minutes on what they want to teach. Then there is a rigorous question and answer period. We have two faculty members who ask the incisive questions and we listen very carefully to how they handle those questions.

In a classics department at a public university:

> There was a talk at noon in the lounge to which students came. We are interested in whether they can lecture and how they would interact with the University community, especially students.

In a zoology department at another public university:

> The informal seminar with colleagues can be blue skying but the formal one where students are present had better not be.

The individual professional meetings can be arranged in different ways: "office hours" held by the candidate, a prearranged appointment schedule developed from faculty and graduate student signup sheets, less formal meetings made possible by size in smaller departments. In four universities in the sample, appointments were arranged with deans or associate deans, who "talked with the candidates about teaching"; in two private universities in the sample, administrators met only with candidates for tenured appointments. (It was interesting to note in talking with assistant professors that several mentioned the meeting with the dean as a plus for the university.) It would be an exaggeration to classify the individual meetings within the department as job interviews. It was generally conceded by chairmen, and corroborated by assistant professors, that the "interview" more often consisted of the faculty member talking about his own research than querying the candidate.

There was also a good deal of attention paid to acclimatizing the candidate: "We tell them what life is like here."

The semi-social category covers approximately everything else that occurs during the candidate's visit. The chairman may take him out for a beer, the graduate students may take the candidate out for pizza, the search committee or some other combination of departmental people will buy him or her lunch and dinner and breakfast. There were receptions including spouses (one chairman said of the successful candidate, "my wife liked her") and one particularly sensitive chairman arranged dinner for the candidates with the assistant professors in the department. The candidates were shown the town, and some got to meet real estate agents. But the semi-social has to be considered very semi; as one candid chairman remarked, "We entertain them socially and we try to grill them as we do that."

In fact, the visit is very much a test of whether the candidate will fit in as a colleague. The autonomy of a faculty position and the lack of socializing devices within the department make it important for the candidate to display at least some of the characteristics that will lead the members of the department to identify him or her with their values and norms. The following comments from three different schools and three different disciplines in three different parts of the country are revealing:

> Then there is the very important personal time spent with the the candidate -- for example, driving to and from the airport.

> He [the successful candidate] stayed at my house on his visit to campus. You have to get to know them, you are choosing a colleague.
>
> It [the interview process] is a quasi-mating dance.

Yet, the basis of choice -- that clincher that gets the job -- was rarely described in personal terms by the chairmen interviewed. Quality of research, the dissertation, and especially the presentation -- style, competence, substance -- were important factors. Humanists were looking for breadth, the unusual expertise, originality, and poise and warmth in communication. Social scientists were placing a premium on quantitative methodology, but also were looking for creativity, style, and depth. Natural scientists were attracted by independence; they were particularly mindful of the cloning problem, and tried to make sure that their new junior faculty member could work without his or her mentor. Across disciplines there was recognition of personal dynamism ("We don't want a recluse in this department"), spirit, excitement about their work -- as one chairman called it, "fire in the eyes." It is refreshing to note, in spite of the governing selection criterion of research orientation, the emphasis on teaching in these major research universities: commitment to teaching, teaching experience, and a presentation that displays a potential for teaching were mentioned frequently. Quoting another chairman, "We don't hire anyone who is not a good teacher no matter how brilliant he is." This is not to suggest that research is not the principal emphasis in hiring, as was made clear in this statement:

> We don't want a poor teacher, but the top fifty percent is okay, whereas we want the top one percent in research.

An interesting part of this study has to do with the timeworn theory of doctoral prestige -- the inference that the status of the department where one acquires the doctorate is a predictor of the status of the department in which one will be employed. The theory was first posited by Caplow and McGee based on their 1955-57 sample, and has been repeatedly confirmed in the literature since then, as noted earlier -- and always the relationship between the prestige of the Ph.D.-granting program and the prestige of the employing department had been found to be positive.

The results here generally support the theory but are somewhat mixed. The departments were divided into categories based on the Jones et al. (1982) rankings, as follows: Category A departments are those ranked in the top five; Category B the next five; Category C the next ten; and Category D are those departments ranked below the top twenty. The same categories were applied to the assistant professors appointed. The sample consists of 66 ranked departments -- 12 A's, 11 B's, 19 C's, and 14 D's -- and 71 ranked assistant professors -- 31 A's, 17 B's, 8 C's, and 15 D's. The distribution is surprising:

```
Departments ranked A hired  5A +  3B + 1C +  3D = 12
Departments ranked B hired  8A +  5B + 1C +  1D = 15
Departments ranked C hired 11A +  6B + 3C +  4D = 24
Departments ranked D hired  7A +  3B + 3C +  7D = 20
       for a total of      31A + 17B + 8C + 15D = 71
```

Shown graphically in Figure 1, it is suggested that the "trickle-down effect" was not uniform, and that in fact the application of the doctoral prestige theory was erratic. What is clear is that more A's were hired than anybody else, and that the C and D departments, which may be more upwardly mobile, had the highest hiring rate and acquired a number of A's in the process. If A and B departments were combined, they would still hire less than half the A assistant professors and slightly less than half the B's, or only 43 percent of the combined group of A and B assistant professors. Of course the dominance in the sample of A-ranked assistant professors does itself lend support to the doctoral prestige assumption (although one must remember that the best departments are also the largest producers of Ph.D.'s).

[Figure 1 about here]

In one instance of a D-ranked assistant professor being hired by an A-ranked department, the faculty member had actually been hired from a postdoctoral appointment at an A-ranked department. In another, the successful candidate had been engaged in clinical practice after graduate school. There were no apparent modifying circumstances for any other of the D-ranked candidates selected by other than D-ranked departments, nor for the C-ranked candidates who moved up. In spite of these deviations, however, the doctoral prestige effect is supported by the aggregate data. And although doctoral prestige was at least tentatively confirmed by the numbers as well as anecdotally as an important factor, concerns were expressed:

FIGURE 1. DOCTORAL PRESTIGE OF CANDIDATES SELECTED, BY RANKED DEPARTMENT



> There are more Ph.D. producers . . . In some sense I worry because the field is bigger and we could easily miss an Einstein -- Albert wouldn't make it in today's market. We may be missing good people in smaller schools.
>
> This doctoral prestige thing -- some of it is prejudice!

Nevertheless, whatever variance exists in the prestige of appointees' institutions is not a condition forced upon the persons making the selection. These departments have been quite successful in appointing those who were their first choice; twelve instances of second choice were reported (eight were A or B candidates), and few lower on the list. But it was generally conceded that any of the top candidates would be acceptable and going to second choice was not a significant move.

> We are very often making hiring decisions about people where variance in quality is one to two percent and margin of error four to five percent, so it makes very little difference who we select out of that top group.

The match for the assistant professors in the total sample is highly positive as well; only six new appointees admitted that the job was not their first choice. (See Table 6.) A total proportion of 66 percent of the new appointees expressed a strong preference for the job they obtained, more than two-thirds of that group having rejected other offers. Across disciplinary divisions, the comparable proportions in the humanities were 63 percent preferring, half of those rejecting other offers; in the social sciences 70 percent, with two-thirds rejecting other offers; in the natural sciences 65 percent, with nine-tenths rejecting other offers. Looked at by type of institution, there is even less variation, with the figures for public universities at 67 percent preferring, two-thirds rejecting other offers; and for private universities at 66 percent, with slightly less than two-thirds rejecting other offers.

[Table 6 about here]

New assistant professors were attracted to the department by diverse factors: Four elements of choice were clustered at the top, two external to the institution and two internal. Most frequent mention was of the individual's professional opportunities, that is, compatibility of research interests with the strengths of the department and flexibility in teaching to permit expression of personal research interests. This included several references to interdisciplinary opportunities -- an attraction for today's young scholar. In second place on the list was the matter of image -- reputation and prestige of the department or the institution, e.g. "Ivy League" (again supporting the prestige theory). Third was geographical location (regardless of the location!), including reference to spouse employment in a number of instances. Close behind image and location was the perceived intellectual quality of the campus or department environment.

Also, the personal touch mattered to some. A female humanist in the West who had rejected several other offers said,

> One of the strongest selling points was how much I liked the people who interviewed me.

And a male scientist in the East, also much in demand, said:

> The personal treatment I received here was impressive. I was turned off by faculty arrogance at one school.

TABLE 6. ATTITUDE OF NEW ASSISTANT PROFESSORS TOWARD APPOINTMENT

Attitude	Number of Assistant Professors					
	Total	Disciplinary Division			Institution	
		Humanities	Social Sciences	Natural Sciences	Public	Private
Rejected other offers	33	8	15	10	18	15
Interviewed elsewhere but wanted this job	16	7	8	1	8	8
Interviewed elsewhere and wanted job elsewhere	6	1	2	3	4	2
No other interviews	19	8	8	3	9	10
Total	74	24	33	17	39	35

When chairmen were asked to speculate on the reasons for an assistant professor accepting the job, the items mentioned most frequently were the same four given by the new appointees, but in slightly different order of frequency. The prestige factors and intellectual environment were thought by the chairmen to be the most important, with geographical location maintaining third place. But the most important attraction for the assistant professors -- their own professional opportunities -- was fourth in the chairmen's minds.

Not surprisingly, a successful chairman recognizes the competitive market, the fact that no matter how many candidates are generated by supply and demand realities or broad advertising, the top layer is still not very deep. Consequently, the department concerned with building or maintaining strength treated its applicants well. One assistant professor was impressed by "the red carpet treatment, very fine" and a chairman remarked, "I try to sell the place." Even though most disciplines operate today in a buyer's market, the more perceptive persons in those disciplines apparently understand that the definitions of an economic market with respect to supply and demand are not adequate for an academic labor market, where specific skills and qualities are being sought.

Impact of Appointment

Caplow and McGee found that only 33 percent of newly appointed junior faculty members were expected by chairmen to have a long-term effect on the department. In sharp contrast in this study, chairmen reported that 83 percent of the junior appointments were expected to have a long-run effect on the department. The chairmen responded negatively on 7 percent and hedged on 10 percent.

There were five general categories of positive response about the appointment: realization of a critical mass or stabilization of a group within the department; contributions to program development or covering specific courses; contribution of special skills, interests, or strengths; professional reputation (affecting "how we are perceived"); or simply in the vein of expecting every appointment to help build the department.

> He has reinforced a group of people we have actively working. It helped to stabilize that group.
>
> He will be the principal person in Medieval Japanese literature, crucial to the program. The senior person in this area will retire soon.
>
> She will be making contributions by offering courses at the graduate level that we would not otherwise offer. Also, the individual matters because we have big lecture courses and everyone teaches them differently.

The reasons for negative responses were split between general and specific: The department was committed to the area and the addition of a person made no difference, or it was a large department and one assistant professor did not matter much; she would leave as soon as she found something better, or his research program was weak. Several of the "uncommitted" responses involved environmental factors beyond the department's and the new appointee's control -- structural reorganization, space limitations, equipment problems.

Choosing the Senior Faculty Member

Although the ordering of the process for selecting a senior person resembles that used for the assistant professor, the character of the process is different. The senior candidate is an established professional; there is less uncertainty about potential contributions to the department and thus possibly a more confident approach by the members of the department to the task of selection. As noted earlier, the applicant pools for a senior position, especially at the full professor level, are limited.

> If necessary, the search committee makes phone calls, but it was not necessary in this case. The senior person [in this department] knew everybody in the field. The committee made only one recommendation.
>
> His name just surfaced as the person we wanted to go after for this position.

The campus visit may not exist at all.

> There is no visit. If it is a top person they will have been through here.

Or it may take a modified form:

> The first time we talked to [the candidate] it wasn't really an interview. More, what do you think about this area, we want to beef it up, etc. He probably visited three times.
>
> We organized a seminar series for our graduate students on research in the field and invited lots of folks, some of whom still don't know they were under consideration.

In the latter case, the person appointed remarked:

> No one said there would be this job opening. I knew there would be an opening because I knew someone who had left here. The department set up a symposium, no mention of a job. It was not subtle.

But in a similar situation at another school, the tactic was more successfully disguised:

> I gave a seminar in the department and they called me a couple of weeks later and asked me if I wanted the job. I didn't even know there was a job.

In some respects, the principles of selection may remain the same across ranks:

> The committee screened on area first and then, because we wanted a full professor, on reputation and research productivity. We then ruled out people whose field was too close to those already here. We eliminated some that we knew didn't have the level of scholarship that we wanted. We eliminated some on the basis of their research interest. We would not select a person who was an excellent researcher but known to be an average teacher, and we would not select someone who wanted to come here and do only research, and that was the case in one instance. Everyone in our department is expected to teach graduates and undergraduates.
>
> We had a high-flying senior person come in one year. He asked the graduate students if they were going to be voting on his appointment and when they said no, he said he would be wasting time on them. We didn't hire him.

The senior candidate is likely to be wooed at a higher pitch than the junior candidate, and the visit includes a broader cast of characters on the campus. Following are reports from four different universities:

> The visit was primarily the same [as that of the assistant professor also appointed] except that we were trying to sell ourselves to him a little bit more than he was trying to sell himself to us. Also, he interviewed with the dean and provost.
>
> They [the senior candidates] talked with senior faculty in related departments and to deans and the vice president.
>
> On the visit the candidate gives a talk, the faculty "attends" them, they are "feted."

> The interview was the same [as for the junior position filled] except that the two finalists interviewed with the provost and the president.

Both successes and disappointments in the courtships were recounted, as in these examples from the same university:

> Our timing was good. He wanted to be a senior scholar with a reduction of responsibility.
>
> Our first offer was to a person whose wife would not move. She had just been promoted to a job in which she was very happy.

The reasons for the choice of the particular senior appointee were not articulated as well by chairmen as they had been for the assistant professors. There was much mention of research quality and significance, and there seemed to be a desire for breadth:

> I think it was that he was more mature in the field and his interests were broader. He does a lot of collaborative work.
>
> He brought greater breadth. His work is more theoretical. He is able to evolve and synthesize.
>
> He represented an area the department didn't have.

Personality was mentioned -- fitting into the department. It may be that this is an even more important factor for the senior than for the junior appointment, in the sense of ensuring that the faculty is comfortable with the prospective appointee. The senior person may be more of a professional threat; as one chairman acknowledged, "I brought him down for a lecture and the department got very nervous."

Again on the subject of "matching," another said:

> Ostensibly, her work is good and she is younger than the other candidate and therefore thought to have more potential. But really we just liked her personally a lot better.

Some remarks were surprisingly similar to those made about assistant professors:

> His research record and reputation [were the basis for the choice]. We assess teaching ability but it is largely secondary, but we would not hire a lousy teacher. We have no place to hide someone like that. Everyone in our department has to teach undergraduates.
>
> Research is all important. Teaching counts some. Being a good guy around the department counts a smidgen.

But finally, and perhaps most accurately, several chairmen simply admitted that selection was an intuitive process.

Interestingly, the prestige of the department from which the senior person was recruited played a lesser role in these selection decisions. Using a table similar to that shown earlier for assistant professors, the results were as follows:

5 departments ranked A hired 2A + 1B + 1C = 4
2 departments ranked B hired 3A = 3
10 departments ranked C hired 2A + 1B + 1C + 2D = 6
11 departments ranked D hired 1A + 2B + 1C + 4D = 8
for a total of 8A + 4B + 3C + 6D = 21

Note, though, that the sample included thirteen appointees who were not ranked, as shown below.

1 A hired 1 from a foreign university.

5 C's hired 2 from foreign universities,
2 from research institutes,
1 from a research job in industry,
1 from a 4-year college.

5 D's hired 3 from foreign universities,
1 from a nonacademic professional job,
1 from a 4-year college,
1 who was unemployed (with an A-ranked Ph.D. of some years back).

In this group of successful candidates, all but five had been the first choice of the department; the five were two full professors and three associate professors. As might be expected, all of the senior appointees interviewed were at their first-choice job, although one woman who had moved because her husband lost his job remarked that she would have preferred to stay where she was. Four of the associate professors (out of fourteen respondents) and ten of the full professors (out of twenty respondents) either applied or were nominated only to that single position or were personally recruited by the department, that is, they were not "on the market." Seven of the associate professors and nine of the full professors had rejected opportunities to be considered elsewhere.

The new senior faculty members were attracted to the department for diverse reasons, ordered differently by academic rank. Professors gave the most mention to the reputation of the department -- in some cases indicating potential rather than present prestige, a desire to be involved in building or creating. Second on their list were salary and perquisites, tied with and sometimes overlapping research support (resources and emphasis). Third came quality of students, particularly the graduate students and graduate program, along with richness of the campus/community environment. Associate professors, like assistant professors, were attracted to the department by compatibility with their research interests, and by intellectually stimulating colleagues. Second was the department's reputation.

For these new appointees there were also "push" factors -- reasons for leaving their previous department; but the "pull" was expressed more strongly and a few said there were no push factors at all. At the top of the professors' list was a feeling of having done what they wanted to do there, "It was time to leave." Their second-place motivator was quality of life, wanting to leave the city or the small town in order to enjoy the peace and quiet of a settled community or the greater cultural opportunities of the urban life. Associate professors had left because their department was unwilling to tenure or slow to promote, or because they felt their future limited in other ways (for example, by conflict with senior colleagues).

The opinions of the chairmen about the attraction for professors, contrary to self-aggrandizement notions, gave highest points to the campus and community environment ("this is a nice place to live"), with department reputation coming far down the list and research support below that; salary and perquisites were mentioned only once and quality of students not at all. They showed slightly more rapport with associate professors by echoing their top reason of research interests, but neither the associate professors' choices of department reputation nor of colleagues was high on the list. As for push factors, the chairmen's most frequent response was "none" or "I don't know." For professors, they thought that geographical location, including opportunities for spouse employment, was an important negative point in the previous appointment. Again, the chairmen were more sensitive to the associate professors, identifying tenure chances and related issues as the primary reason for leaving.

Generally, the selection of associate professors and full professors ranged from a process quite similar to that used for assistant professors to the personal recruitment of a distinguished faculty member. Except in the case of the very junior associate professors who had not been tenured at their previous positions, the causes of variance in the process are difficult to identify. The variation seems to have more connection with departmental personality, how the department views itself and its needs, than with any other condition.

Offer and Acceptance

The end of the recruiting story is much like the beginning, but differs at the level of participation in decision-making from the era chronicled by Caplow and McGee. In their late 1950s sample, all members of the department participated in the hiring process in only 31 percent of the hiring departments and the chairman exercised sole authority in 13 percent of the departments. In this study, the 91 recruiting departments made their hiring decisions at the levels shown in Table 7. Again, as in the earlier table on the origination of the position, there is a slight tendency toward committee decision in public universities, in the natural sciences, and in larger departments. But in 82 percent of the departments the decisions were made by the full faculty. No decisions were made by the chairman acting alone.

[Table 7 about here]

This pattern presents an even higher rate of participation in the department for the appointment decision than existed for definition of the position to be filled, and conflicts with an oligarchic representation made by researchers in the 1970s. Touraine (1974) commented that decisions about faculty appointments were made by the chairman and senior members of the department. Kenen and Kenen (1978), working with Parsons and Platt's earlier unpublished data and examining perceptions of power among the faculty, concluded that department chairmen and senior faculty were perceived to have the major control over faculty appointments. Using later data, though, Baldridge et al. (1978) and Smelser and Content (1980) saw decision-making more broadly based in the department.

An addition at this point, not mentioned by either Caplow and McGee or later researchers, is graduate student involvement in the appointment decision, present in an advisory capacity in more than half of the departments surveyed.

Care was taken by some departments to ensure that an informed decision was being made. Following are comments about decisions on a full professor, an associate professor, and an assistant professor.

> We send a form about each candidate to the faculty asking questions so that it is not just a yes or no ballot.
>
> The form is sent to the department members on which they make written comments and particularly note what contact they have had with the candidate and indicate what their decision would be about making an offer. Then the faculty meets to discuss.

TABLE 7. DECISION LEVEL OF FACULTY SELECTION

	Number of Departments		
	Decision Level		
Unit of Comparison	Full Faculty	Committee	Total
Institution:			
Public	41*	12	53
Private	34*	4	38
Total	75	16	91
Disciplinary Division:			
Humanities	28*	4	32
Social Sciences	25*	3	28
Natural Sciences	22	9	31
Total	75	16	91
Department Size:			
Small	27	4	31
Medium	37*	6	17
Large	11*	6	43
Total	75	16	91

*For two associate professor appointments in large social sciences departments in public universities and for one full professor appointment in a medium-sized social sciences department in a private university, the decision was made by a committee consisting of the tenured faculty in the department. Decisions in the same departments concerning assistant professors were made by the full faculty.

> The department members who have met the candidate fill out a ballot. It is not just yes and no but comments about teaching, research potential, etc.

One should not assume that the departmental decision is made without controversy. Reports from a public and a private university follow:

> There were a few dissents initially, but it was finally unanimous.

> The faculty and research associate and graduate student representatives meet and then there is a free-for-all.

But the conscientious chairman works to bring the department together:

> I try to bring the department to consensus on an appointment. The department should be in a position of welcoming a newcomer, nurturing our younger people.

The actual offer required administrative approval. Five of the universities required review and approval of tenured appointments by central faculty committees who were advisory to the dean or provost; the sixth had a central committee that acted on internal promotion and tenure decisions but did not review appointments. At two of the institutions, one public and one private, requests to make an appointment at the assistant professor level were also referred to central committees. Such review at the junior level was viewed as unnecessarily prolonging the process and was deemed a nuisance by the chairmen. One remarked rather sarcastically,

> When I see the white smoke coming out of the administration building chimney, I write the offer letter.

At the other four schools the chairmen sent their request to appoint an assistant professor direct to the dean and usually received approval to make the formal offer within a few days. No rejections by the administration were reported at the junior level in either of the central-review institutions, which raises a question as to whether the procedure is necessary at the junior level.

Negotiation by the chairmen took place on two levels: with the dean and with the candidate. Items of negotiation with the dean ran to inclusion of the new faculty member in special programs such as summer and research support and housing, start-up funds for research, and salary. As to the last, one respondent explained:

> The faculty votes and I then phone up the dean and we argue about the salary involved. It's a ritual. There is a script for it. He points out that our assistant professors earn more than anyone else in Arts and Sciences, and I tell him that I won't make any offer unless I can make a good one. This all takes only a day or two beyond the time of the faculty vote.

Negotiation with the candidate may have covered such additional items as moving expenses, laboratory or office space, and teaching assignment. The chairmen reported negotiation in about 40 percent of the appointments, about two-thirds of that figure with candidates and the remaining third with the administration. Incidence of negotiation escalated with rank and involved almost all of the full professors. The chairmen reported negotiation with only twenty-four assistant professors.

Among the seventy-four assistant professor respondents (a smaller sample than the ninety-six on which the chairmen were reporting because not all ninety-six could be contacted), negotiation or lack of it was distributed as shown in Table 8, with almost an even split between negotiators and non-negotiators. Interestingly, the only differences by sex in the study occurred here, where the proportion of women who negotiated the conditions of their appointment was much lower than that of the men -- 56 percent of the men negotiated their terms of employment but only 29 percent of the women did so. Further, the fledgling natural scientists, who of course were likely to have laboratory needs, appeared to be the most likely to negotiate -- at 76 percent of their total as compared to 45 percent of the total social scientists and 29 percent of humanists. There is also a difference between public and private institutions, with 57 percent of the new assistant professors in private universities negotiating and only 38 percent of those in public universities doing so.

[Table 8 about here]

Many assistant professors of both sexes expressed regret at not having negotiated before accepting the position; one female humanist said ruefully, "I'm really stupid about that -- had I but known!" Those who did negotiate frequently mentioned that they had been advised to do so by someone in their graduate department or a junior faculty member in the hiring department. A favorite object of negotiation was a personal computer!

These data contain numerous disparities in addition to the discrepancy between the twenty-four out of ninety-six assistant professors with whom the chairmen negotiated (25 percent) and the thirty-five out of seventy-four assistant professors who negotiated

TABLE 8: NEGOTIATION OF EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BY ASSISTANT PROFESSORS

	Number of Assistant Professors		
	Did Negotiate	Did Not Negotiate	Total
Institution:			
Public	15	24	39
Private	20	15	35
Total	35	39	74
Disciplinary Division:			
Humanities	7	17	24
Social Sciences	15	18	33
Natural Sciences	13	4	17
Total	35	39	74
Sex:			
Male	28	22	50
Female	7	17	24
Total	35	39	74

(47 percent). For example, note this chairman's remark: "She negotiated salary -- she was a faculty brat and knew about those things!" The appointee in question indicated no negotiation. It appears that these differences occurred through lapse of memory on the chairman's part about a junior appointment; details seemed much more firmly fixed in the case of senior recruitment. Another factor that may have influenced the disparity was chairman turnover. A new chairman may have been quite interested and involved in a senior appointment as a member of the department but less interested and consequently less informed about the closing details of junior recruitment.

Special Cases

Beyond the descriptions given, there exist special situations that might be considered negotiated positions, as compared to defined positions conceived through departmental procedures and acquired in a broader selection process. Inasmuch as these special situations constitute 8 percent of the appointments in the sample, they are worth a brief mention.

The eleven special cases in the sample sort into four general categories of which, judging from comments of respondents, they are representative. The first such category was referred to on several campuses as a "target of opportunity" appointment. In this sample the category included a full professor who was recruited back to the faculty after having left and spending a few years at another school; a full professor who is black; a distinguished professor acquired as the result of a special bequest made to the university; another distinguished professor who wanted to return to the United States from abroad, and where the university he had left was experiencing financial constraints that precluded his return there.

The second category, which has some overlap with the first, was characterized by a dual-career couple finding a single departmental home. The two cases (four new faculty members) included here were instances of specific recruitment of one member of the twosome and welcoming accommodation of the other. The larger sample included several such arrangements made within or without the institution in a regular search.

A third category involved positions allocated to a new senior faculty member; he personally selected the appointees. A variation of this procedure found elsewhere in the sample was the addition of positions in a department; for example, in an associate professor appointment: "In this case it was a commitment to a [new] senior person in the field to have another person in that field." In other departments, the new senior person had chaired or was chairing the search committee.

Finally, a fourth case was that of a department's own Ph.D. who had not been able to settle into a suitable permanent position, was invited back in a visiting appointment, and subsequently moved into a tenure-track position without a search. A variation on this theme was the temporary sheltering of graduates in visiting or other temporary roles (from which several of the assistant professors in the study were hired) either before they obtained their first job or when they failed to obtain tenure elsewhere.

It is interesting that proper form was followed in all of these cases: the department reached consensus on the appointment (perhaps with an occasional flavor of cynicism).

Data Summary

In the first data analysis chapter we found that little change had occurred in the search process since Caplow and McGee's study. This chapter has finished the recruitment process with a review of selection. Generally, these points and comparisons may be drawn:

1. In a departure from the Caplow and McGee study, the campus visit is seen as the crucial step in the appointment of an assistant professor. The form of this junior interview is fairly standardized across institutions and disciplinary divisions, as it was in the earlier sample when it occurred. Generally, the evaluative criteria applied to the components of the visit are highly subjective; in addition, although evaluation of candidates after the campus interview makes use of the more objective criteria that existed at earlier stages of the recruitment process, the application of such criteria at the final point is subjective, or "intuitive." Put another way, no one gets hired entirely because of the results of the campus visit, but one cannot be hired without success at that point; further, the interview is a demarcation point beyond which the subjectivity of department members alone applies.

2. Supporting Caplow and McGee's findings, doctoral prestige appears to be a factor in the appointment process, although it may not be uniformly applied. On the other hand, doctoral prestige appears to have less influence in senior appointments, which would seem to conflict with conclusions about successive jobs after first placement drawn by Stehr (1974), Reskin (1979), and Massengale and Sage (1982).

3. Differing from the results of Caplow and McGee's study, the new junior appointees are expected to have an important influence on the department. The match between recruiting departments and new appointees is good, with most departments hiring their first or second choice and most new appointees obtaining the job they want. But there is some incongruence between chairmen's and appointees' responses. Although research interests and abilities appear as an important criterion of choice in both the department's and the candidate's selection decision, it is most heavily weighted in the junior candidate's decision. Chairmen also often fail to recognize a senior professor's motivation for choice of job as a combination of professional and personal reasons: having reached a pivotal point in a career, seeking a better quality of life. (See further discussion in the next chapter.)

4. As in the definition of the faculty position, in the previous chapter, appointment decisions are made by the faculty of the department -- in 82 percent of surveyed departments by a vote of the full faculty and in 18 percent of the departments by a subset

consisting of all tenured faculty members or an appointed or elected committee of the faculty. This is a more intensely democratic pattern than was noted by Caplow and McGee, and supports the findings of Baldridge et al. (1978) and Smelser and Content (1980). It may represent a change even from the early 1970s, when Touraine (1974) and Kenen and Kenen (1978) concluded that appointment decisions were made oligarchically.

Offers are made after administrative approval, as in the 1950s. The procedure for obtaining approval varies in formality and complexity by institution, but departmental personality is also a factor.

5. Negotiation of the employment contract is common at the senior level and engages about half of the junior appointees, unlike the much lower incidence across ranks in Caplow and McGee's study. Negotiation of positions also occurs in special situations, some of which are similar to those of earlier days. For example, Caplow and McGee's sample included "target of opportunity" appointments, although they were not specified as such, and there were also incidents in their data of a department's appointment of its own Ph.D. without consideration of other candidates and the accommodation of a new senior person's research needs through additional targeted positions. New to this study is the custom of accommodating the dual-career couple, a subject which will be treated further in a later chapter.

In summing up this chapter, a thread of change begins to appear -- in the importance of the campus interview for junior candidates, in a possible loosening of the hold of doctoral prestige over an entire career, in a broadening of faculty participation in departmental personnel decisions, in the negotiation of terms and conditions of employment. These changes are balanced by the subjectivity of the selection process, the operation of the prestige system in junior level hiring, the fact that the broadening of faculty participation in decision-making is a change of degree rather than kind, and a traditional accommodation of special situations in the faculty personnel system. Whether the change is sufficient to affect the inertia will be examined further in the following chapters.

DATA ANALYSIS: THE SEPARATION PROCESS

> I think his main reason for going there was that they seemed real pleased to have him work for them.
>
> Associate Professor of Economics
> at a Private University

The previous two data analysis chapters examined the recruitment process involved in acquiring new faculty members. We now turn to termination of faculty members, guided by the third research question, "What are the circumstances and effects of faculty terminations?" Caplow and McGee, assuming a vacancy-and-replacement structure, focused their study on the termination. Such a focus proved infeasible for this study because "vacancies" created by terminations could not be consistently and accurately related to appointments. Therefore, the separation process is being treated as the sequential step that occurs after appointment rather than an introductory step before appointment.

To illustrate the relationship problem, Table 9 compares appointments with terminations in the current data. There are two interesting points here: (1) The full professors were not replaced in kind, and (2) the shift to the natural sciences recognized earlier in comparisons between the 1958 and 1986 appointment data occurred _within_ the current study as well. Although full professors accounted for sixty of the terminations, at about 36 percent of the sample, they numbered only twenty-four in appointments, or about 18 percent of the sample. In similar fashion, there were forty terminations in the natural sciences, 24 percent, and forty-five appointments, 33 percent. Both the humanities and social sciences lost ground, with terminations at approximately 38 percent each and appointments at 31 percent for the humanities and 36 percent for the social sciences.

[Table 9 about here]

The replacement rate was considerably higher in the current study. Caplow and McGee's data showed 143 vacancies with 91 replacements, or a 64 percent replacement; the current data showed 167 terminations and 137 appointments, or an 82 percent replacement.

Another comparison that is useful in describing the current academic marketplace is shown in Table 10 dealing with type of termination. The incidence of dismissal and resignation in the 1958 and the 1986 data is about the same, but retirements have increased substantially from 17 percent of the Caplow and McGee sample to 23 percent of the current sample. Concomitantly, loss of faculty members through death has dropped from 11 percent of the 1958 total termination figure to 3 percent in the current study. The lack of change in dismissals and resignations is also noteworthy amidst talk of higher standards and greater difficulty in achieving tenure and of market conditions that would be thought to hinder mobility.

[Table 10 about here]

TABLE 9. TERMINATIONS AND APPOINTMENTS

Unit of Comparison	Terminations 1983-84		Appointments 1984-85	
	No.	%	No.	%
Academic Rank:				
Assistant Professor	87	52.1	96	70.1
Associate Professor	20	12.0	17	12.4
Professor	60	35.9	24	17.5
Total	167	100.0	137	100.0
Disciplinary Division:				
Humanities	63	37.7	43	31.4
Social Sciences	64	38.3	49	35.8
Natural Sciences	40	24.0	45	32.8
Total	167	100.0	137	100.0

TABLE 10. TERMINATIONS, BY TYPE

Type of Termination	1958 Study		1986 Study	
	No.	%	No.	%
Dismissed	35	24.5	43	25.7
Resignation	67	46.9	81	48.5
Retirement	25	17.4	38	22.8
Death	16	11.2	5	3.0
Total	143	100.0	167	100.0

This chapter will consider terminations in categories of type, as shown in the table above, with attention to the circumstances of tenure denial, the motivation and destination of faculty members who leave before retirement, and the impact of departure on the department.

Dismissal

Dismissal of the assistant professor, that is (in this sample), denial of tenure or denial of reappointment prior to tenure consideration, accounts for only a quarter of the terminations from academic positions but may be an important indicator of the effectiveness of the selection process. If one assumes a fairly constant rate of appointment since 1978 (the date when most of these departing assistant professors were appointed) and compare the incidence of dismissal (43) with the incidence of junior appointment in the sample (97), it can be suggested that the selection process is not a good predictor of success on the job. Even allowing for a greater number of appointments in 1978, say 150, the failure rate shakes one's confidence in the system. What went wrong? An examination of the cases of dismissal may provide some clues.

First, an initial complication occurs in the tenuring process by the split responsibility, between the academic department and a central faculty committee that is advisory to the provost. Generally, the academic department, in this sample, could make the decision to deny tenure; an exception was one campus where all decisions were required to be sent forward to the review committee.

If the department reached a favorable decision, a recommendation for tenure was sent to the committee. In the dismissals in this study, the denial decision occurred at the department level in about two-thirds of the cases (see Table 11). In the two universities where most of the actions took place, Private E and Public F, there is a clear difference, with about half of the decisions made centrally in Private E and less than a fifth made centrally in Public F. It can also be observed that the congruence between departmental and institutional standards lessens as the ranked quality of the department decreases. Or, put another way, there is dissonance in the organization.

[Table 11 about here]

Examples of dissonance may also be drawn from these comments, the first from a chairman and the second from a colleague:

> We felt that there had been unethical behavior on the part of the committee. I personally requested an opportunity to meet with the committee and debate their decision, but they would not do that. It would be normal that they would not meet with the department representative and I did not really expect them to accept my challenge. The dean did not support tenure for our candidate.

> We put him up for promotion and the first decision came down in April. We appealed, thought at first that the appeal might go someplace. He is a philosopher, does not just spout philosophic theory. He was philosophic in his life, sensitive, judicious, wise. His values were attached to his feet, not just words. We didn't know finally until somewhat late. We might have made more public efforts if we had known. Perhaps we were led on.

And the disagreement in values may fester among the faculty, as noted by this chairman:

TABLE 11. DECISION LEVEL OF TENURE DENIAL

Unit of Comparison	Number of Decisions		
	Department	Central Committee	Total
Institution:			
University A (Public)	2	-	2
University B (Private)	1	-	1
University C (Public)	3	1	4
University D (Private)	2	3	5
University E (Private)	8	7	15
University F (Public)	13	3	16
Total	29	14	43
Department Ranking*:			
1 to 5	-	-	-
6 to 10	7	1	8
11 to 20	11	4	15
Below 20	8	4	12
Total	26	9	35

*Ranking used is the faculty quality factor from Jones etal (1982). Only ranked disciplines are included above; 8 departments in the total (43) were in disciplines not ranked.

> He is used by the department as an example of poor administrative judgment: ". . . and they didn't give Smith tenure!"

Second, where the denial of tenure or reappointment occurred at the department level, and although candidate and hiring department agreed on the importance of research at the outset, there may have been a divergence of interest on the new assistant professor's part as time passed after appointment. All of the tenure or reappointment denials were based on scholarship -- the research and publication criterion on which the assistant professors were evaluated for selection. Colleagues of the departed faculty members had candid comments:

> He was strongly at odds with the administration as to what criteria should be applied to a faculty member. He won the teaching award two years in a row. He was very helpful and popular with other faculty members about helping with their research, but his own research program was in trouble. We had a lot of arguments. I told him that he was removing himself from a system that he couldn't beat and that the students would lose. He is not very tolerant of imperfections in a bureaucracy. He spends a lot of energy banging his head against the administration building and you just get a bloody head that way. I agreed with his principles but you have to face the real world.
>
> He was a good friend of mine, very smart, but not interested in playing the academic game. The letters in his file were negative, people didn't know him. I tried to encourage him to establish visibility. I suggested getting in touch with [a prominent younger person at another university] as a link. I tried to convince him he had to publish, criticize other people's work, etc.
>
> He just didn't publish. He came up for tenure with only two articles of very limited focus. He had been reworking his dissertation and hadn't had it accepted for publication but actually refused to show it to the department. We had no choice.

Third, the assistant professor may have failed to deliver on the promise of colleagueship, either on a professional or on a personal level, as indicated by these chairmen's comments:

> There was a split vote in the department that is very rare, not reflecting spectacularly strong views, facts, but rather a division within the hearts of many people. This was a man in whose corner almost everyone was -- he was extremely bright, had good ideas but couldn't get them down on paper. Almost everyone in the department had Dutch uncle talks with him.
>
> She was not proposed by the department for tenure but it was not unanimous, I broke the tie. I had strong doubts as events unfolded. Departments can find themselves in very complicated and difficult positions. This woman behaved in a way that is inappropriate.

Finally, the standards may have changed between the time of appointment and the time of tenure consideration, as in these two cases, the first a committee decision in University E and the second a department decision in University F:

> I thought the committee made a very narrow decision in his case. That year they decided to adopt an extremely rigid set of criteria. He was turned down on the basis of not having a book although he had several articles.
>
> This is an upwardly mobile department. We are targeting being in the top five.

An interesting revelation in these data is that the departments ranked in the top ten accounted for only eight of the dismissals, and there were none among the top five. This suggests that the highly subjective final stage of the selection process works best in the top quality departments. In other words, the failure of selection criteria to predict tenurability may be not so much a fault of the procedure itself as in its application.

Resignation

An obvious question concerning resignations of assistant professors is whether tenure pressures had anything to do with the departure. In this sample the answer was yes in slightly more than a third of the cases, as shown in the breakdown of number of resignations of assistant professors affected by tenure concerns (Table 12). The same two institutions, one private and one public, that accounted for the majority of the involuntary terminations of assistant professors also accounted for the greatest number of voluntary resignations among that group. Note, however, that in 17 out of the 23 cases in these two schools, tenure was not an issue. Notice also that quality of department, as in tenure denial, appears to have little effect on tenure concerns but the greater number of voluntary resignations of assistant professors was from the lower-ranked departments.

[Table 12 about here]

These comments by colleagues provided insights into tenure fears:

> It was just a question of whether he would leave prior to being denied tenure. He was a Chicago Ph.D. and had extremely high expectations regarding the quality of his written work. In graduate school he was instilled with these high expectations of scholarly work and felt his papers were never quite at the level he expected of himself. In my opinion, what he never really realized was that for every published paper there are a number of rejections and part of the process is responding to criticism. He may have had some inability to deal with rejection. He is very good. Also, if he had had someone senior in his field to work with who would have kind of forced him to submit his work. Fortunately when I was in his position I did have someone senior to work with. Watching him go through these first few years of an academic career

TABLE 12: TENURE STRESS IN ASSISTANT PROFESSOR RESIGNATIONS

	Number of Assistant Professors		
	Tenure Stress Cited	Tenure Stress Not Cited	Total
Institution:			
Public A	3	1	4
Private B	3	4	7
Public C	2	3	5
Private D	1	1	2
Private E	5	7	12
Public F	1	10	11
Total	15	26	41
Department Ranking:			
1-5	1	-	1
6-10	5	2	7
11-20	3	11	14
Below 20	2	8	10
Not ranked	4	5	9
Total	15	26	41

> makes me think that it is a mistake to hire good junior people in a field where there are no senior people.
>
> Her leaving was something of a surprise. She waived review for tenure. At her previous university she was very close to a man in the late stages of assistant professor who got so nervous during his tenure review that his ulcer hemorrhaged and he died! She also had a bad experience on her book. Some of the people who originally liked it thought she had destroyed it after she revised it to a more theoretical viewpoint. Everyone here talked with her and encouraged her to seek tenure.

Themes of apprehension for the young scholar were woven into these responses: intellectual isolation and intellectual incompatibility with senior colleagues, along with, in these two cases, graduate training that produces unrealistic expectations and the "horror stories" surrounding the tenure process. Some similar thoughts about intellectual climate are expressed by colleagues of those assistant professors who had no concerns about tenure when they left.

> He was discouraged by the profession, which is controlled by senior traditionalists. He is extremely talented and well schooled in his particular area, but he was up against a wall here.
>
> There was personal tension between him and the local star in his field.
>
> He had to commute to [a scientific laboratory several hundred miles away] to do research.
>
> Another problem is that there really aren't many senior faculty for the junior faculty to work with, to become active in research with.

Among other suspected reasons for leaving, money was mentioned as a primary motivating force in two cases, but the more typical comment was:

> They didn't offer him much more in the way of money, but he thought he would be more appreciated there.

Another frequently mentioned element in the voluntary departures of assistant professors was spouse employment: the spouse who could not find a good job, the new spouse who was somewhere else, the dual-career couple who found a better situation.

The fourteen associate professors who resigned shared only five supposed reasons for leaving. In rank order, they were lack of promotion to full professor (five mentions); intellectual isolation (three); conflict with chairman or other senior person (two); and "personal" or entirely a matter of attraction to the new position (two each). Colleagues were generally sympathetic with the associate professor's feelings about lack of promotion, for example:

> She was not happy when she left. She felt she had not been given the kind of consideration she deserved. She is an extremely important scholar in her field, and this is not necessarily measured by books. She has an international reputation. I think the mechanical approach by the [central tenure and promotion] committee is extremely shortsighted, stupid.

There were a variety of reasons proffered for the full professor resignations; most frequently mentioned were intellectual incompatibility with colleagues, lack of research support, hostility in the department, and personal reasons.

> He felt that some of his colleagues in his own area here were not as intellectually stimulating as he would have liked.

> He is an incredibly bright, outspoken, aggressive person and here those characteristics will get you nothing. They like WASPs with stiff upper lips who support the administration. He was not popular with his colleagues.

And there were some mentions -- matching those noted earlier by newly appointed professors -- of a "time to leave" feeling:

> I had a long talk with him and he said to me, "I'm bored, I can see myself doing the same thing for the next twenty years that I did for the last twenty years; I want a change." He had been here since he got his Ph.D. He had reached the full professor rank. He had done everything he could do here and he wanted a different kind of experience.

Efforts were made by the department to retain the resigning assistant professors and associate professors in about a third of the cases -- roughly equivalent to the percentages found by Caplow and McGee -- for fourteen out of the forty-one assistant professors and five out of the fourteen associate professors. The efforts consisted predominantly of salary counteroffers and a leave arrangement for the first year at another school. The latter, judging from the total sample including new appointees, was a common device used to provide a tie to the department in the hope that the faculty member will decide to return. These leaves might run as long as three years for a senior person, and this sample included one two-year leave at the assistant professor level, although the usual period is one year. Reasons for not attempting to keep the faculty member ranged from a feeling of helplessness in the face of an excellent offer to a feeling of good riddance:

> He was a shoo-in for tenure here, but we knew we couldn't compete with Harvard.

> We decided not to match the offer. No one argued his ability as a scholar, but he was a real bastard. He is very difficult, I mean really difficult, in the classroom. This is one of the few times when we have been willing to say that even though the scholarship is okay, we would just as soon get

> rid of the person. He is first rate in his field but he drives people nuts.

Much more effort was expended on the full professors; eighteen of the twenty-six were the object of intensive efforts at retention -- but almost exclusively the efforts were reduced to money! Inasmuch as the motivation to move at this level was probably not salary-based (according to the previously reported interview data), one could expect the efforts to be, in the words of one chairman, "too little, too late." In one instance, though, the salary offer may have been more meaningful (although ultimately unsuccessful) because of colleague sacrifice involved. This system was unique in the sample and may be unique in the country!

> We have a very specific system that was implemented a few years ago when the financial pinch made itself felt acutely. If you want to keep somebody, if you want to match an offer, the dean will match anything that the department is willing to give up of its salary raises. We have to put our money where our mouth is. The faculty supported him.

In the eight cases where no efforts were made, the reasons fit the same pattern as shown for the assistant and associate professors: There was no use ("it was a *fait accompli*") or there was hostility toward him in the department. Indeed, one resignation had resulted from the department's insistence that the dean remove him as chairman.

Destination

Where did these departing faculty members go? To diverse places. Again using department rankings, Table 13 indicates some differentiation by rank and reason for leaving. The drift was decidedly downward for assistant professors but not for those at the more senior level, where more than half of the associate and full professors who moved to ranked departments maintained or improved their prestige level.

[Table 13 about here]

To elaborate on these data shown in Table 13: The dismissed assistant professors who went to A and C departments returned to temporary jobs at their PhD institutions. One assistant professor in the "other" group went to Cambridge; the others went to U.S. institutions or disciplines not ranked. In the "other" group of assistant professors who resigned, four went to foreign schools, one to a professional school, and one to an administrative position. Among the associate and full professors in the "other" category, two went to foreign schools, one from a ranked department moved to an unranked discipline, and four took administrative jobs, including two college presidencies.

An interesting comparison here is that between the percentage of faculty members leaving higher education now and those leaving in the 1958 study (Table 14), or as one respondent commented,

> In the future the "marketplace" issue is not going to mean movements from one university to another but rather movements in and out (mostly out) of academia.

Although most pronounced among the dismissed assistant professors and the associate professors (in fact, full professors show a decrease), the overall effect is one of perceptible increase in the number of those leaving higher education.

TABLE 13. DESTINATION OF DEPARTING FACULTY MEMBERS

Academic Rank	Ranking* of Dept.	Total	Number of Departures Destination Ranking* of Departments					LHE	Other
			A	B	C	D	E		
Asst Prof (dismissed)	A	-							
	B	8			1	1	2	1	3
	C	15					1	9	5
	D	12	1		1		3	3	4
	NR	8						4	4
Total		43	1	-	2	1	6	17	16
Asst Prof (resigned)	A	1					1		
	B	7	1			1		2	3
	C	14	1		1	3	4	1	4
	D	10	2			1	2	3	2
	NR	9						4	5
Total		41	4	-	1	5	7	10	14
Assoc Prof and Prof	A	3		1				2	
	B	1	1						
	C	17	1	3	1	2	3	2	5
	D	10	1			2	1	5	1
	NR	9						3	6
Total		40	3	4	1	4	4	12	12

*A = Departments ranked 1-5
B = Departments ranked 6-10
C = Departments ranked 11-20
D = Departments ranked 21-40
E = Departments ranked below 40
NR = Department in a discipline not ranked
LHE = Left higher education

[Table 14 about here]

In further illustration of what may be a new way of thinking about the application of doctoral study, here is a quote from an assistant professor in his terminal year:

> We all know the game -- if we can't accept it we should get out, choose a different profession. We undergo brainwashing in graduate school. We are attracted by the lure of formulating and solving problems. But there are also problems to solve in the private sector. I may leave higher education.

Those assistant professors who moved voluntarily within higher education were thought by colleagues to be attracted primarily by more compatible colleagues and a better place in which to pursue their research interests. These reasons are similar to those given by new appointees for selecting a job, as reported in the chapter on the selection process. Also tied for first place, somewhat more important for this group of advanced assistant professors, was greater spouse employment opportunity (about evenly split between academic couples and couples in which one member was seeking a nonacademic job). Further down the list were tenure or tenure chances (not considered the most important reason in any case) and geographic location, the latter having some overlap with spouse employment. Incidentally, the comment closest to Caplow and McGee's recorder quote in a hiring situation occurs here, in reverse circumstances:

> I don't know what attracted him. There were people there he could work with on research. He is an excellent cello player and perhaps getting into Boston made a difference for him.

TABLE 14. FACULTY MEMBERS LEAVING HIGHER EDUCATION

Academic Rank	Percent Leaving Higher Education 1958 Study	Percent Leaving Higher Education 1986 Study
Assistant Professors--dismissed	27.3	39.5
Assistant Professors--resigned	23.5	24.4
Associate Professors	28.6	35.7
Professors	33.3	26.9
All Ranks	27.0	31.5

Associate professors and professors, in most cases, were thought to be attracted by more prestigious positions -- full or distinguished professorships, administrative responsibilities of a highly influential nature -- but not necessarily at better places. Seen in second place for associate professors were geographic location and spouse employment. Close to first place for professors were research support and research interests. Again, these reasons are similar to those reported earlier.

The actual content of the new academic job differed very little from the one left. Exceptions were a movement into a European system and two moves to different disciplines, with one of those and one other within a discipline split between an academic department and an interdisciplinary research center. There were six mentions of a change in teaching -- "Less teaching but more in his specialty"; "She is teaching a wider range"; "He teaches only graduate students."

Among assistant professors, of those who moved voluntarily thirteen (32 percent of the total) were promoted to associate professor at the new position, and of those who were denied tenure, a comparable thirteen (30 percent of the total) were promoted. Among associate professors, five (25 percent) were promoted to full professor, and thirteen (22 percent) of the full professors who left were promoted to an endowed chair, a chairmanship, the directorship of an important program, or the presidency of a college or university.

As suggested by data presented earlier, the use of personal contacts in obtaining a job increases with the experience of the faculty member. Only 8 percent of this group were thought to have responded to advertisements, most of those at the assistant professor level. The principal factor in the job search was personal contact for 83 percent of the associate and full professors, 63 percent of the assistant professors. Ads were the principal factor in the job search for less than one percent of those in the senior ranks, and only 10 percent of the assistant professors.

Retirement and Death

Today's longer life span is reflected in the difference between retirements and deaths in Caplow and McGee's sample and in the current study: there has been a 31 percent increase in the proportion of retirements and a 73 percent decrease in the proportion of deaths. The five deaths in the current sample -- one assistant professor, two associate professors, and two professors -- were of faculty members (all men) ranging in age from 32 to 62 and all were caused by illness (four cancer and one heart disease).

The thirty-eight retirements covered a wide spectrum, including the relatively new phenomenon of "early" retirement, that is, those occurring prior to the traditional normal retirement age of 65. Patton (1977) had looked at early retirement, finding that women were more likely than men to retire before the age of 65, and associate professors were more likely than members of other ranks to do so. Neither finding was supported by this study. Early retirements accounted for almost a third of the total (twelve out of the thirty-eight), but all of the early retirees were men and only two were associate professors. There were two "involuntary" -- that is, institution-initiated -- retirements in the early retirement sample, one resulting from a severe decline in scholarship and the other from a criminal conviction. Two other early retirements were caused by poor health. In the other eight cases, the faculty member retired early because of favorable financial arrangements and a desire to shed at least some academic responsibilities, but in several cases not all such responsibilities.

Patton also noted that many retiring faculty members intended to remain active professionally. Of the thirty-eight retirees in the current study, twenty-nine remained professionally active after retirement, and thirteen of those continued teaching, advising students, or conducting research involving students in the department where they had been full-time members. One emeritus professor reported on his recent activity:

> I just edited a book . . . I'm very active at present with other faculty and students on opposition to apartheid . . . I've also written chapters for two books to be published this year . . . My scientific work continues with NIH funding; I have an active laboratory studying cells of the immune system. I didn't retire because I disliked my faculty role, I wanted some years to do things outside my discipline.

Others were described by colleagues:

> He has been active in many departmental doctoral "advancement to candidacy" committees in spite of his formal retirement. He remains a very active consulting colleague. His last book was published in the last two years.

> He has a separate research organization that he is maintaining, mostly federally funded. He continues to publish. He goes to international conferences.

The retirees' past contributions to the department were viewed in a generally positive way in most instances, with very little disagreement between the chairmen and peers responding. There was, though, recognition of unsatisfactory elements in the faculty member's academic position prior to retirement -- these could frequently be characterized as "generational" in nature:

> He became disappointed in the tendency for more and more of the teaching of writing to devolve onto graduate students. He thought the way they were trained to teach was a little bit lax. He had been in charge of the freshman writing program and was old fashioned about form and style.
>
> He was unhappy about the turn that the whole academic environment was taking. He was a very conservative person, reactionary, patriarchal. He was historically minded rather than critically minded. He frowned on all this newfangled stuff!

And there were a few comments like these:

> He was not a little embarrassment to the department when it started really developing in the 1970's. He had good rapport with students in the survey courses at the elementary level, but he was never appointed to the graduate faculty when that was necessary before our reorganization. He isolated himself from the department.
>
> She was a very contested teacher, in some ways very bad. She was not good with undergraduates but was good at the upper level. She absolutely refused to be a team worker and was very difficult to get along with.

Overall, the reaction of the faculty members to their retirement was considered by their colleagues to be positive. An emeritus professor himself reported the pleasure of escaping the "boredom of faculty meetings," and a colleague described another retiree's attitude in this way:

> She was looking forward to having free time without all of the demands of committee work and faculty meetings and student exams, and so forth.

For most of those who were no longer professionally active, the prognosis was still positive, as in this example:

> He finished the revision of his book shortly before he retired and decided to pursue his hobbies, music, etc. He moved to Chapel Hill. We invited him for a lecture recently and he said no, he wasn't keeping up with the field.

There were a few reports of reluctance about retiring or of missing teaching, and this rather poignant remark:

> She said that she would look forward to it [retirement], that there were many things she wanted to do and that she didn't want an office here in the department, but she seems to be wandering around here, a little lonely.

Impact of Departure

When well educated, experienced professionals leave an organization, it would be expected that their loss would be felt. Caplow and McGee expressed surprise that this was not the case in their sample, and conjectured that departure was perceived as rejection and caused a reluctance on the part of department members to acknowledge the full effect of departure. (Marketplace, p. 100) They commented further that the careful scrutiny of candidates for a faculty position and the complicated process of search and appointment implied a uniqueness in the appointee that was belied by the lack of impact of a departure on the department. (p. 102) There was no effect in more than 60 percent of the cases in their sample.

The same conditions held to a large extent in the current study, although the total no-impact group has dropped to 51 percent. Where they found 50 percent of full professor terminations to have no effect, this study saw that proportion drop to 36 percent. Their 44 percent for associate professors has decreased to 33 percent in the 1986 study. As indicated in Table 15, the departure of assistant professors and natural scientists seemed to have the least impact on the department, and the top-ranked departments suffer less effect from a termination than do lower-ranked departments (but these departments also had far fewer terminations). The fact that there was not much difference between the impact of the departure of professors who resigned and those who retired casts some doubt on Caplow and McGee's rejection theory.

[Table 15 about here]

Even more curious are the parallels between the reasons for a departure having an effect or not having an effect. According to respondents, departures of junior faculty members had no effect on the department because the assistant professors who left were not successful in research, never had many students, had not been there long enough to make a difference, were not in the mainstream of the department's interests, were in a large department where one person did not matter much, or had been replaced satisfactorily (not necessarily a direct replacement). On the other hand, the reasons for the departure of an assistant professor having an effect on the department were that it was difficult to find people in their

TABLE 15. IMPACT OF FACULTY DEPARTURE ON DEPARTMENT

Unit of Comparison	Proportion Some Effect	 No Effect
Institution:		
Public	48%	52%
Private	46%	54%
Disciplinary Division:		
Humanities	52%	48%
Social Sciences	49%	51%
Natural Sciences	42%	58%
Department Ranking*:		
1 to 10	35%	65%
11 to 20	44%	56%
21 to 40	47%	53%
Below 40	50%	50%
Academic Rank:		
Assistant Professors	37%	63%
Associate Professors	67%	33%
Professors--resigned	60%	40%
Professors--retired	62%	38%

*Jones et al. (1982)

particular fields, they were exceptionally good teachers, their area was left uncovered, it was a loss to the department's research effort, it was a small department and the loss of one person was felt, or the department lost the position.

There were few clues in the interview responses as to the real reasons behind impact or lack of impact. For example, following are ambiguous comments about assistant professors who were denied tenure in natural science departments, the first concerning two departures from the same subfield that had no effect on the department and the second about a person whose departure did have an effect:

> [No effect:] Well, I suppose number theory is diluted, but that has to be balanced against other considerations.
>
> [Effect:] I was very sorry that as an experiment it didn't work out because I thought it was a revolutionary appointment at the time.

Comments about departures at the senior level were similar to those made about assistant professors, but with the additional complaint that the departed faculty member had not been active enough in the department, had not made strong contributions to the department; in a few cases the senior faculty member had actually "left" the department for an administrative post within the university some time before leaving. Associate professors and professors were missed for the same reasons as assistant professors but also because of national or international prominence -- loss of prestige for the department -- and sometimes because it meant the loss of a hard-to-replace chairman or program director. Also noted about professors by professors was the loss of a personal friend. There were references of this kind by assistant professors and junior associate professors about assistant professors as well; they were sometimes couched in political terms:

> People like the chairman breathe much easier now. Others of us miss the kind of interaction and discussions we had with him. The students definitely lost. . . . [He was] a very good friend.
>
> It was negative for me of course because he was my friend. It does shift the balance of power in the department concerning the future of the department as far as the younger members are concerned.

Only 38 percent of the responses indicated that a retiring faculty member's departure had no effect on the department, and in that case usually because they had become inactive in research or had become peripheral or even antagonistic toward the department. An effect was felt for most of the reasons noted above, but in addition it was often said about a retiree that the loss was personal, his going marked the "end of an era."

> He stood for something that's not that common now. Most of his energy went into actual teaching. He thought there were certain old fashioned things you ought to do in learning Milton -- for example, memorizing chunks of it. He thought what we were being paid to do was to be a rhetorician in the old fashioned sense. Now we think we are scholars first.
>
> We replaced him with a vastly different kind of person. He was a scholar of the old tradition and respected for what he did, but this department has been moving in a different direction.

Data Summary

Following the examination of the recruitment process, this chapter has presented data about terminations from the faculty via dismissal, resignation, retirement, and death. In doing so, the chapter permits triangulation in several areas as the same aspects are viewed from different perspectives. For example, there is a considerable degree of congruence between the reasons cited for leaving an old position and accepting the offer in the selection data and the reasons given for leaving a position and going to a new one in the separation data. This will be discussed further in the last chapter.

Generally, the data from this chapter lead to the following points and comparisons:

1. The earlier noted difference between the 1958 and 1986 studies with respect to greater emphasis on the natural sciences is paralleled by a difference within the 1986 study, where it can be seen that a larger number of positions are being filled in the natural sciences than were created by terminations. There is also a shift down in the ranks, with a much smaller proportion of full professors and a much larger proportion of assistant professors being appointed than would be expected from termination proportions in those ranks. Demographic shifts are also of emerging importance as retirements increase. In contrast, there is little change from the Caplow and McGee study in the proportion of dismissals or in the proportion of resignations among the faculty terminations. These factors will be discussed further in the next chapter.

2. Tenure denial could be considered an invalidation of the selection process, that is, the selection criteria do not serve as

accurate predictors of job performance. In reality, however, the failure to achieve tenure is more likely the result of one or more of these four conditions: (1) Incongruence between the values of the department and those of the central faculty review committee; (2) divergence of the assistant professor's interests from a research emphasis to a teaching emphasis; (3) inability of the assistant professor to maintain the department's standards of colleagueship; (4) a change (upgrading) in standards of evaluation between the time of appointment and the time of review for tenure.

3. Although tenure pressures are a factor in about a third of the voluntary resignations of assistant professors, other reasons have greater impact. Chief among these are intellectual isolation and intellectual incompatibility; neither were included in Caplow and McGee's "motives for migration" of prestige, security, and authority. Senior faculty members, on the other hand, are apt to leave for reasons involving relationships, including intellectual incompatibility, but are attracted by more prestigious positions.

Agreeing with Caplow and McGee's findings and with the subsequent research findings of Marshall (1964), Marsh and Stafford (1967), and Brown (1967), salary is rarely a primary motivator toward movement at any rank; yet it is relied upon heavily in attempts to retain the departing faculty member.

4. Generally, as in the Caplow and McGee study, assistant professors who leave to take another academic job go to lower-ranked departments; the move frequently includes promotion. In a change

from the earlier study, and as predicted by Cartter (1976), a larger proportion of the dismissed assistant professors (40 percent as compared to 27 percent) are leaving higher education altogether. Also different from the 1958 study, senior faculty members move laterally or upward in many cases. Confirming data reported in previous chapters and agreeing with Caplow and McGee, jobs beyond initial placement out of graduate school are likely to be located through personal contacts.

5. Early retirement appears to be gaining acceptance as an attractive option for older faculty members. Little research has been done on early retirement, but this study disagrees with Patton's (1977) projections on both sex and rank distribution of early retirees. The study results agree with those of Patton and with Finkelstein (1984) that a majority of retired faculty members remain professionally active.

6. Like the Caplow and McGee study, these data show an effect of the departure of a faculty member on the department in less than half the cases, although the impact is greater for associate professors and full professors than was reflected by the 1958 data. The impact of departure is felt most in the humanities and in departments ranked below the top twenty; less so in the social sciences and departments ranked in the top twenty but below the top ten; and least in the natural sciences and departments ranked in the top ten. (None of these pairings necessarily coincide in the sample.) The testimony from departments on this issue is ambiguous,

possibly reflecting a discomfort with the replaceable parts theme: "He was a theoretical multidimensional geobarbanalyst. They're dirt cheap; we got another." (Marketplace, p. 102) Another possibility is reaction to a changing society, new educational/research needs.

To sum up: Like the previous chapter on selection, this review of separation presents a mixed picture. Shifts in field and rank play an important role, but mobility via dismissal and resignation is virtually unchanged. New concerns unknown or unnoticed by Caplow and McGee -- tenure stresses, early retirement -- claim attention. Although assistant professors move down or out as in the Caplow and McGee era, and more frequently out than in the earlier study, senior professors may retain or improve their prestige when changing jobs (but note that more associate professors, like dismissed assistant professors, are leaving higher education). Finally, there is not a distinct change from the Caplow and McGee study in the impact of a departure on the department.

Departing from process in the next chapter, we may find further clues in pursuit of the question of change.

DATA ANALYSIS: MARKET AND POLICY

> Things are really fluky in the academic world. One can't get too caught up in the whole thing. Prestige etcetera are 80 percent an artifact of advancing age. People don't understand how everything is kind of conditioned by the overall market in higher education. It has little to do with our own merit or efforts.
>
> Associate Professor of History
> at a Private University

In this last data analysis chapter, we move from process to environment, considering the question, "What are the effects of market characteristics and institutional policies on the organization through its personnel processes?" The first three chapters provided information about the "who, how, why" of faculty mobility; this chapter looks at the setting in which the mobility occurred. That setting appeared to have changed dramatically from the late 1950s. Then, the increasingly differentiated academic market was expanding at an unprecedented rate and demand for Ph.D.'s was high; the participants in the market were overwhelmingly white and male. Now, higher education has experienced a period of retrenchment and stabilization characterized by a low demand for Ph.D.'s; at the same time that the market was shrinking, the population of participants was expanding to include women and minorities. Then, institutional policies were generally unresponsive to market needs: Budgeting rules were rigid and restrictive, discouraging flexibility in staffing. Now, the marketplace shows adaptive behavior in new forms of management that have increased flexibility and produced an institutional quest for higher status. Then, a growing emphasis on research was changing the nature of the marketplace; now, the research emphasis is well entrenched as an agent of differentiation between types of institutions. But has the social environment changed in ways that significantly affect the "phylogenetic inertia" of the academic marketplace?

This chapter explores that question by dealing with interview data on the market and on institutional policies that respond to the market. In the discussion, respondents' views are categorized as follows:

(a) About current market characteristics
(b) About research and the market
(c) About participants in the market
(d) About management in the marketplace
(e) About quest for status

Market Characteristics

Caplow and McGee, followed by Smelser and Content (1980), had remarked on the unique supply-and-demand nature of the academic labor market, with a set of universities both producing Ph.D.'s and creating the demand for them. Nowhere in this study did the dual role of the faculty member in the academic labor market emerge so strongly as in discussions about the market itself. In a majority of cases, responsibility for placing graduate students was predominant in the chairman's attitude; an increase in job opportunities was expressed in positive terms, even though it would make recruiting more difficult, and a lack of increase was viewed negatively. Chairmen and new appointees said essentially the same things -- for example, in these comments from a chairman of physics and from a new assistant professor of physics at different schools:

> The market is much better; there are plenty of ads.
>
> The market has changed for the better, from no jobs to quite a few jobs.

Or in a more discriminating response from a chairman of a large economics department and from a new assistant professor in a small language department, in different schools:

> My impression is that there are dual job markets in economics. The elite institutions are falling all over themselves trying to get a very small group of talented people, and then there is the rest of the world. For the best people, the sky is the limit!
>
> Different generalizations can be made for different levels of candidate. For example, people from the best schools, people from the middle schools, people from the poorest schools, the best students from the best schools, the best students from the middle schools, etc. The market will affect all those groups differently.

One chairman of classics said, almost gleefully:

> The market has improved and I think it will continue. I foresee days when we'll be right back where we were in the '60s and I'll be pulling people off the street.

Confirming Bowen and Schuster's (1986) findings about perceived improvement of the market, more than half of the responding chairmen considered the academic labor market to be improved and improving for placement of Ph.D.'s: 48 percent of the humanities chairmen; 53 percent of the natural sciences chairmen; and most optimistic, the social sciences chairmen at 71 percent.

Opinion within disciplines was not necessarily consistent. Although the philosophy chairmen agreed that the market in philosophy was "pretty grim" and the chairmen in English agreed that the market was improving, note this contrast in another classics department to the classics chairman quoted above:

> The market is not good and I don't think it's going to improve much.

Also reflected in the interviews was the differentiation of the market within a discipline that had been noted by Blau (1973). Clinical and developmental psychology were seen as thriving fields in an otherwise stable market in psychology; nuclear physics was considered on the decline within a good physics market. In an anthropology market generally viewed as bad, one new appointee said (and her opinion was verified by other anthropologists):

> There is a real future for anthropologists interested in nutrition, population, health in developing countries. This is my specialty and I think its future has just begun.

Further differentiation of the academic labor market was believed to be caused indirectly by the external environment. For example, international trade was reflected in language study: Chinese and Japanese were viewed as growing areas, Arabic declining, interest piqued in Italian. Political interest in Latin America has apparently contributed to a healthy market in Spanish and Portugese. The market for linguistics has improved, with a shift toward applied linguistics (e.g., English as a foreign language). A more direct influence was evidenced by several physicists who noted that the future of high energy physics was dependent upon the political fate of the Superconducting Super Collider. (For a description of this monumental project and its political treatment at the federal policy level, see the Chronicle of Higher Education, August 13, 1986.)

The differentiation of supply was seen specifically affected by national priorities in education, as manifested in federal funding of training grants, graduate scholarships, postdoctoral funds, etc. Although note this comment:

> I am surprised that the field has continued to flourish without the kind of full fellowship support that I had. Our students are working part-time and doing without that kind of financial assistance.

Another external factor, nonacademic competition for new Ph.D.'s, was described in a number of fields such as economics, telecommunications, biology, computer science, chemistry, and physics. Alluding to competition from professional schools (for arts and sciences faculty) an economist added that teaching in a business school was now "socially acceptable."

The market could be affected by a change in a field as well. Internally generated change was cited by this new appointee, a full professor of immunology:

> The market is better now than it was five years ago. There are ten academic positions now open across the country. Partially this is cancer research but also the advent of

> biomedicine, better defined. We can now identify the important molecules, whereas it was a highly intuitive science previously.

Another internal influence was the retirement rate expected in the 1990s. Retirements in this sample were projected, through an aggregation of data from chairmen, at an average of 15 percent of the faculty retiring by 1995 (based on a total of 495 expected retirements in this sample of 3,302 faculty members). Only slight variances occurred by type of institution (16 percent public, 14 percent private) and by disciplinary division (17 percent humanities, 13 percent social sciences, 15 percent natural sciences). Differences did occur by discipline (7 percent in economics, 24 percent in physics) but the data became small samples at that level and were therefore less reliable; departmental differences might have been distorted, for example, by the effect of subfields such as econometrics (which is a "young" field). Another comparison may be made by department ranking, where the retirement rate was projected as higher than average, 20 percent, in the departments ranked below the top twenty, and 14 percent for departments among the top twenty.

The degree of staffing preparation for retirements varied among institutions, with two large state schools planning in this way:

> The dean came up with a special program for hiring in our department. Because we have too many people in a certain age group, instead of replacing retirees, the hiring is going on at a steady rate. We have been hiring about one and a half people a year in anticipation of retirements.
>
> In this department we will have a recruiting job that will be unprecedented and it will be even worse in some other departments. The University lets the departments borrow

> appointments against anticipated retirements, but it is a matter of negotiation, not policy.

In spite of the specific knowledge about coming retirements on a particular campus, as well as general knowledge of increasing retirements (acknowledged in pieces in Change and the Chronicle of Higher Education, for example), this response from the third state university in the sample was not unique:

> We have a number of people retiring and it is going to be a problem for us. I have tried to tell the dean that we should be thinking about this now. Our dean would welcome a policy of replacing them three or four years hence!

Another condition that was expected by respondents to have an impact on the academic labor market was the number of Ph.D.'s who had "trickled down" to less research-oriented schools because of lack of choice when they entered the job market. Although some graduates of top programs self-selected to teaching colleges, they thought, others would prefer to be in a department with an active and stimulating research program. Additionally, several chairmen noted that although the number of openings was increasing, the applicant pool was inflated by "itinerant scholars" (people who had not been successful in finding permanent positions) as well as by the assistant professors who were trying to be upwardly mobile.

A few respondents viewed the market as a secondary concern. Confirming Caplow and McGee's and others' belief in the unique quality of the academic marketplace, one assistant professor commented:

> My perception of myself in relation to other people doing history colors my feeling about the job market. I went into

> school thinking that I would get a Ph.D. for the intrinsic value, not for the job per se, and I may have been lucky.

And a chairman said:

> The job market is mercurial, feast or famine. It is high risk, like the Foreign Legion. You get into it because you can't think of anything else you want to spend your life doing.

Research and the Academic Market

Yet another force of differentiation in the academic labor market is the research emphasis of the research university (demand) and the Ph.D.'s it produces (supply). Caplow and McGee recognized the increasing emphasis on research in the university in 1958. This study extended their understanding of transition to a well entrenched reality. Dill (1986) pointed out that research typifies the "culture" of the contemporary research university. It was clear from the recruitment criteria and reasons for accepting the job that were discussed in previous chapters that research was a shared value in this study among persons making hiring decisions and those accepting positions -- hence culture.

Caplow and McGee further developed (concomitant with Gouldner, 1957-58) the theory of disciplinary versus institutional attachment as a mobility factor. A research orientation was disciplinary; a teaching orientation was institutional. The faculty member with a research orientation was more strongly attached to the discipline and more likely to leave the institution. Using the same question upon which Caplow and McGee based their findings, whether the departing faculty member was well known in the institution and/or the discipline outside the institution, this study achieved similar results (Figure 2).

The data were aggregated according to rank and mobility status: assistant professors who were dismissed, assistant professors who resigned, associate and full professors who resigned, members of any rank who retired. As might be expected, there was a considerable difference between the profiles of the assistant professors who were dismissed and those who resigned, with 47 percent of the former and 73 percent of the latter well known in the discipline outside the institution. Only about a third of the assistant professors (35 percent for the combined group -- no difference between dismissals and resignations) were well known in the institution. At the senior level, there was little difference in the percentage of persons who had both strong institutional ties and strong disciplinary ties -- 74 percent for retirees and 75 percent for associate professors and professors who resigned. The retirees had stronger ties with the institution (87 percent versus 80 percent, perhaps owing to the seniority of the retirees) and those who had resigned had stronger disciplinary ties (95 percent versus 82 percent).

[Figure 2 about here]

These data suggest a strong discipline-oriented approach at the stage of building a career, with institutional orientation becoming more important as a career advances. The career cycle may match a life cycle, which could partially account for the lack of mobility at the associate professor rank, as indicated in this comment:

Figure 2. Disciplinary/Institutional Orientation of the Departing Faculty Member, by Rank and Type of Termination

ASST PROF (DIS)
(N=43)

		INSTITUTION	
		well known	not well known
DISCIPLINE	well known	19%	28%
	not well known	16%	37%

ASST PROF (RES)
(N=41)

		INSTITUTION	
		well known	not well known
DISCIPLINE	well known	24%	49%
	not well known	12%	15%

ASSOC & FULL PROF (RES)
(N=40)

		INSTITUTION	
		well known	not well known
DISCIPLINE	well known	75%	20%
	not well known	5%	—

RETIREES
(N=38)

		INSTITUTION	
		well known	not well known
DISCIPLINE	well known	74%	8%
	not well known	13%	5%

> There is a bit more local identification at the associate professor rank. People have kids in the schools, have houses, are involved in the community, etc.

The data also imply that strong disciplinary ties do have some effect on mobility.

It may be possible, however, that if research is indeed integral to the culture of the institution, a research orientation may no longer pull the faculty member away from the institution. As indicated by this study, it was lack of particular research compatibility that pushed the faculty members in the sample toward new jobs and particular research opportunities that attracted them, not a difference between a teaching and a research orientation.

Another aspect of a research orientation was collaboration with colleagues. Caplow and McGee investigated incidence of collaboration within the department in an attempt to determine whether it had any effect on a faculty member's decision to leave, and concluded that it did not. Identical results were obtained in the current study.

Considering those faculty members who had left the department (124 terminations), about a third had collaborated in research with members of the department. Excluding the humanities, where collaboration in research and publication was rare (only four cases reported), the breakdown of the remaining eighty-four cases showed no effect on mobility: Exactly half of the sample (forty-two) had collaborated with colleagues and half had not done so. There was virtually a fifty-fifty split at all ranks and little difference between disciplinary divisions in intradepartmental collaboration.

Not indicated in those numbers, however, was another element of collaboration -- that which took place with members of other departments or other institutions. Often interinstitutional collaboration resulted from professional ties established before the faculty member had joined the department. Often intrainstitutional collaboration grew out of contacts established through interdisciplinary programs. In some instances, collaboration was taking place between the faculty member who had left and someone still in the department.

Collaboration therefore appeared as a complicated factor, crossing organizational boundaries and exerting a complex influence as part of the research orientation.

Participants in the Market

Other changes have occurred in the supply. We have already noted the increase in numbers in the typical applicant pool. Sixty-seven percent of the chairmen said that there were more candidates for positions today; more than half of the 17 percent who thought otherwise were in the natural sciences. Sixteen percent of the respondents were not sure whether there had been an increase or decrease. Among the majority, there were reservations as to field, as noted earlier. A more important question focused on the quality of the supply: Only 35 percent of the chairmen thought that today's candidates were better than those of twenty years ago; many pointed out the difference in training as opposed to quality:

> It's hard to put "better" into perspective because there are a lot more things to be trained in and as chemists they know more because there is more to be known. The science has progressed. Whether they are trained better, I don't really think so.
>
> Whether they're better is a subject of an awful lot of dispute. I would say that the younger faculty members that we see in political science, I would consider yes, they are very well trained in things on the frontier, but no, they tend to be quite often from my perspective narrow technicians. They have marketable skills but things get lost in the process.

Another difference projected for the supply side of the market was a greater participation of women (although no one was sanguine about minority increases in the foreseeable future). A chairman of chemistry said:

> A big change in the job market will be the number of women teaching. Our graduate enrollment is up and has reached a critical mass; availability will be about 40 percent in a few years.

A change in the representation of women and minorities in the 1986 study from the 1958 study could already be seen in the breakdown of appointments (Table 16). In the current study, women constituted slightly less than a third of the appointments at the junior level, slightly more than a fifth at the senior level, and 28 percent of the total. Minorities were 7 percent of the total. The Caplow and McGee sample of ninety-one appointments included only four women, an instructor in speech and drama and two instructors and an associate professor in home economics, and one Asian associate professor in mathematics.

[Table 16 about here]

TABLE 16. BREAKDOWN OF APPOINTMENTS, BY RACE AND SEX

Study/Rank	Number of Appointments				
		White		Minority	
	Total	Male	Female	Male	Female
1958					
Instructor or Assistant Professor	66	63	3	-	-
Associate and Full Professor	25	23	1	1 Asian	-
Total	91	86	4	1	-
1986					
Assistant Professor	96	62	26	1 Black 3 Asian	1 Hisp 3 Asian
Associate and Full Professor	41	31	9	1 Black	-
Total	137	93	35	5	4

In a matter related to the greater number of women entering professional employment, the academic marketplace of the current study was perceptibly affected by the spouse employment issue. In this sample it was a factor in almost 20 percent of the resignations and appointments. The group of appointments included two academic couples (a professor, an assistant professor, and two associate professors), each in the same department, and the resignations included one academic couple (two assistant professors) from the same department. Excluding those six people, a breakdown by rank and sex of the departing or appointed faculty members is shown in Table 17. As a proportion of total female appointments, 18 percent of the women were affected by spouse employment problems; 19 percent of the men appointed were affected.

[Table 17 about here]

The problem is not limited to the university. In two-thirds of the appointment cases and one-third of the resignation cases, the spouse sought nonacademic employment.

In addition to specific resignations and appointments in this sample, there were other recent incidents recounted by respondents. Five chairmen offered accounts of losing women from their offer or short lists in the past two years because their husbands could not find jobs; six chairmen reported similar difficulties with senior men whose wives could not relocate satisfactorily. One chairman and one peer respondent were members of commuting couples -- a commuting distance of about 200 miles. One chairman had very recently received

TABLE 17. SPOUSE EMPLOYMENT EFFECT ON MOBILITY

Type of Action/Rank	Number of Faculty Members Affected		
	Total	Male	Female
Resignations			
Assistant Professor	7	5	2
Associate Professor	5	4	1
Professor	4	-	4
Total Affected	16	13	3
Total Resignations	81	67	14
Appointment			
Assistant Professor	15	10	5
Associate Professor	5	3	2
Professor	6	-	6
Total Affected	26	19	7
Total Appointments	137	98	39

an offer from another university but had rejected it because his wife was happy in her academic job and the recruiting university had hedged on the subject of a position for her. It was generally conceded that spouse employment was a critical factor in the academic marketplace, as reflected in these comments:

> The spouse problems are terrible these days. It's a factor in two-thirds of our offers.
>
> The spouse problem has become the most important problem in faculty recruiting. I have tried to organize a consortium in this area for spouse hiring.

On the other hand, there was the minority conservative viewpoint:

> Spouse employment is a variable of individuals. I would not make a position for anyone.

An historical perspective was offered by some:

> My wife is a faculty member in another department here and it was important to us when I was looking for a job that she find one as well. People just didn't talk about it in those days.
>
> When I came to this department, there was a superb geneticist here. She was quite good, but her husband was also a geneticist and he was a professor. She was on a one-year appointment as a lecturer. She scrounged around for money to do her research and he had the best of all possible worlds. My wife had a Ph.D. but we never considered looking for a job for her when I came here. She stayed home with the family for some years and then went back to doing odd job things. That has all changed.

Management Strategies

Caplow and McGee complained of rigid budgeting rules that froze positions in place. A new flexibility has encouraged two phenomena found in the current study: central funds made available to departments for special hiring; and shifting of positions from rank and department.

At three of the schools studied, there was a "target of opportunity" recruiting arrangement that covered special appointments of all kinds, including prestigious senior candidates. At another institution, the funding specifically applied only to women and minorities. At another, there was only a "superstar" fund, but additional money could be provided for campus interviews of women and minorities.

The various programs had been participated in since their inception by only nineteen departments; all but one of the participating departments were in the humanities or social sciences, thirteen were in private universities. The use varied: six departments (all in private schools) had appointed senior white males; three departments in private schools and three in public universities had appointed women; four departments in a single private university had appointed blacks. In the public university where candidate visits were underwritten, three departments had used the funds. All of the departments represented in the study that had hired or interviewed women and minority candidates in the past were ranked in the top twelve, with six in the top five.

In this study, however, only one of the 137 appointments was identified as an "affirmative action" appointment -- a specially budgeted position for a woman assistant professor. There was recruitment of a black full professor at one school, but the appointment was a budgeted replacement and more closely fit the normal senior recruitment pattern than a special case.

The second example was related to Caplow and McGee's assertion that a department was permitted to "own" a position, such that a full professor vacancy would automatically be filled by a full professor in the same department. As was pointed out in the previous chapter, this was no longer the case in the current study. There were shifts from full professor "vacancies" to assistant professor appointments, and from the humanities and social sciences to the natural sciences. Indeed, there was considerable administrative control over faculty positions at the outset, that is, at the point of the authorization to recruit, if not in the intellectual decisions of position definition and candidate selection. The control by the dean's office was evidenced in these comments by chairmen from a public and a private university:

> We have constant problems with replacements here. This year is pretty critical. We have a hard time convincing the college to give us back the money we turn in [from an unused budget line]. In the past the college has kept almost all that money to pay off a deficit. Adding new lines is a different story -- that's always a struggle!
>
> It is a very different search environment today from what it was in 1958. There are, for example, all the budget restrictions. We've had to fight hard for positions.

Dean's offices and departments have become conscious of planning -- a concept not encountered by Caplow and McGee. The dean's requirement of a department plan was mentioned in several instances. Departments themselves used a planning mechanism to make decisions or frame decision-making.

> Every two years we go off for a weekend retreat and talk about our long-term future, not specifically about people but about research, academics.
>
> We had a three-year program review that was really an intensive process. First we did our own review of the curriculum, then there was an internal review by a three-person committee, people outside of the department, and then there was an external review by three outside chairmen. After all the reports were in, we revised our curriculum. This year every department has had to submit a three-year plan.

This departmental planning confirms Cyert's (1982) idea that university planning must be "bottom up" -- "That planning works best that has been shaped to a great extent by the faculty in a department." (p. 7)

Other management concepts were expressed; indeed, many of the chairmen in this sample viewed themselves as managers in a way that was totally absent from the Caplow and McGee sample. For example, one chairman of a social science department complained that industry did a much better job of recruiting than did universities and presented his ideas, among them following up a campus visit with a book about the university sent from the provost's office. Another talked about his management job in this way:

> My job as a manager is to enable people to do their work. People need to be made to feel a part of a community of scholars, where they are measured by standards that are mutually agreed upon. Respect for the individual must be maintained in the department. It's important that everyone in the department participate in the process.

A classics chairman had these observations:

> We are heavily tenured but productivity after tenure is the responsibility of the chairman. I keep them from becoming stale, they don't teach the same stuff year after year after year. I don't give across-the-board raises. When I have

> withheld raises, I've had people go out and win major awards. I also give positive reinforcement; some people have blocks about publication, and I try to provide counseling.

And a sociology chairman described one of his management innovations:

> For example, we had some problem getting people to teach large classes and that is very important for us because the number of majors is decreasing. So I decided that anyone who taught X number of students a year would get a course off the following year, and it works very well.

There was concern among chairmen at all of the schools about additional layers of bureaucracy interfering with communication:

> They told us there were no new positions but we found out accidentally that in fact there were, that some departments were getting them. We have acquired all of this bureaucratic layering. I can't talk to the people I used to talk to, only to the divisional dean.
>
> There is a proliferation of deans. Communication is much more difficult. We have two new associate deans who are just buffers, keep us away from the dean.

Other aspects of institutional management were criticized: for example, an ultraconservative budget policy, a "comparative" salary policy (get an outside offer to get a raise).

In his 1983 book, George Keller characterized the introduction of strategic planning into universities as a management revolution in American higher education. His sentiments were summed up neatly in this comment from a chairman of anthropology:

> There has been a great change in higher education. You don't run it out of your hip pocket anymore.

Quest for Quality

A major research university exists in a competitive arena where comparative advantage in recruiting, often a matter of "image," is crucial to success. In this sample, a number of public relations efforts, complementing the university's research emphasis and prestige orientation, were described by respondents. A popular tactic used was the creation of special prestigious chairs; another source of prestige was a well respected research center or institute. The most heavily used technique was the faculty appointment within the department.

Responding chairmen, though, did not agree in their philosophies of strengthening a department. Some believed in change at the top and some believed in building from the bottom, as shown by the following comments:

> If you really want to build a department, you have to bring in senior people from outside and pay them well.
>
> Our improved quality has come about through luck and prayer! We haven't brought in a senior star for twenty years.
>
> I was a partisan for senior appointments, but we have had such good luck in these two junior appointments that I am now against the senior searches.

There was mention of the growth and development of Ph.D. programs and a general increase in "standards." Rankings were important; every chairman in a rated discipline knew where his or her department stood in the latest published rankings. There were several comments about aspiring to "move up" in the rankings, aiming for the "top ten," etc.

These aspirations may be placed in a certain perspective by looking at the top ten departments in three disciplines (those that were represented in the study sample in all six schools) in the Roose-Andersen (1970) and Jones et al. (1982) ratings:

	1970	1982
English:	Yale	Yale
	Harvard	Berkeley
	Berkeley	Virginia
	Chicago	Harvard
	Princeton	Chicago
	Columbia	Columbia
	Stanford	Cornell
	Johns Hopkins	Johns Hopkins
	Cornell	Princeton
	Virginia	Stanford
Economics:	Harvard	MIT
	MIT	Harvard
	Chicago	Chicago
	Yale	Stanford
	Berkeley	Princeton
	Princeton	Yale
	Michigan	Minnesota
	Minnesota	Pennsylvania
	Pennsylvania	Columbia
	Stanford	Berkeley
Physics:	Berkeley	Cal Tech
	Cal Tech	Harvard
	Harvard	Berkeley
	Princeton	Princeton
	MIT	MIT
	Stanford	Cornell
	Columbia	Chicago
	Illinois	Stanford
	Chicago	Columbia
	Cornell	Illinois

Although there was some jockeying for position within the elite group, there was little change over a decade. Given this continuity of ranking and the cynicism it may engender in lower-ranked departments, it was not surprising to find the study revealing human fallout from the search for excellence, as typified by this senior faculty member's remark:

> I have an iron in the fire and I hope it burns. I will leave here if I can. There is a general feeling of being unappreciated.

Data Summary

In this last chapter of the data analysis section, interview data dealing with conditions surrounding the recruitment and termination process have been presented. There is some carryover from the process chapters in the subjects of retirement and affirmative action. Generally, these are the points and comparisons following from the data in this chapter:

1. In most academic disciplines, a buyer's market is still in sway, although there is thought to be a gradual change under way to a seller's market. Here, buyers are defined as universities and sellers as the candidates for faculty positions, although the university's unique dual role of producer and user of the product, delineated by Caplow and McGee and later by Smelser and Content (1980), is supported by these data. Further support is given to the differentiation of the market among and within academic disciplines noted by Caplow and McGee and later researchers (Clark, 1966; Brown, 1967; Blau, 1973). In spite of structure, however, there is believed to be an intrinsic worth in the academic marketplace that apparently does not affect other kinds of labor markets.

2. The academic labor market is subject to a number of external and internal influences, some of which define the nature and source of its differentiation. For example, greater attention to

international relations increases the demand for language study; student financial aid policies of the federal government cause some fluctuation in graduate study. There is more nonacademic competition for Ph.D.'s. Internally, a field may develop its market through expansion and redefinition. An internal demographic effect on the market is being felt in the increasing number of retirements; institutional policies differ in the degree to which this market factor is being accommodated.

3. The participants in the market (the supply) generally are thought not to vary in aggregate quality from applicants of several years ago at the finalist level; the pool of top candidates was not deep then and is not deep now. There are more women and minorities participating in today's market, and the proportion of women is expected to grow larger. As women have entered the professional job market in substantial numbers, spouse employment has become a critical issue in faculty recruiting. The factor of spouse employment applies equally to the mobility of men and women faculty members but is not limited to the academic couple; it may include the nonacademic but usually professional employment of a spouse of either sex.

4. The budgeting rules that Caplow and McGee found to be rigid are now much more flexible in accommodating staffing needs. Two arrangements identified in the current study are central funds made available for special hiring (including affirmative action) and shifted resource allocations by rank and field. Participation in the

special hiring arrangements is rather low, suggesting that the impact of the central administration on faculty hiring continues to be insubstantial, as found by Caplow and McGee, and that the academic department drives the faculty personnel process. On the other hand, the administration does have a decisive hand in the initial authorization of recruiting, and may move budget lines from one field to another (in this case, from the humanities and the social sciences to the natural sciences) and from one rank to another (e.g., from professor to assistant professor).

5. Strategic planning, unknown to Caplow and McGee, is becoming a useful management technique in the research university. In addition to strategic use of the budgeting rules noted above, at the administration level deans are requiring plans from the academic departments; at the departmental level, faculties are meeting to discuss issues of a longer-term nature than next year's staffing needs. Further, chairmen frequently view themselves as managers, concerned with motivation, innovation, and communication within the organization. The research emphasis that was seen as growing by Caplow and McGee is now sufficiently entrenched to be linked with the organizational culture.

6. Also linked to strategic planning, a new phenomenon revealed by this study is the desire of many departments to achieve higher status, to "move up" in the rankings -- e.g., to the top ten. This appears to be an institutional policy in several instances. There is disagreement on how best to attain departmental improvement, whether

it is better to have a top-down approach (bringing in senior people) or to build from the bottom up (carefully selecting new junior faculty).

To sum up: It seems clear that one can say about market and policy that there has been noticeable change. Academia operates today in a buyer's labor market (although it is beginning to change), and in a highly competitive higher education environment. New ways of thinking about the world -- in international relations, for example -- affect the market. Women and minorities are entering the academic labor market in significant numbers; spouse employment is a critical issue. Management strategies that respond to the market include budgeting rules that give the central administration greater discretion in staffing patterns, combined with a new quest for quality. Research is a firmly placed part of the organizational culture.

In contrast, the elements of constancy in this chapter are few: The academic marketplace characteristics of supply-and-demand dual role and basic market stratification; the quality of the top contenders in the supply for faculty positions; the observed connection between faculty research orientation and mobility.

Here, in the effect of external forces on the faculty personnel system, we can surely say that substantial change has occurred. Our phylogenetic inertia has been overcome by the social environment.

PART III

SUMMATION

DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS

> One of the great inventions of 20th-century America, the private corporation, has begun to displace, as a formal structure and as a style of management, the older ecclesiastical and academic structures and styles in which universities grew up . . . "
>
> A. Bartlett Giamatti, former
> president of Yale University

The purpose of this study has been to examine the faculty personnel process in order (a) to assess change in the past thirty years since the Caplow and McGee study and (b) to present insights useful to further development of the process. With respect to the first objective, the interview data presented in the foregoing data analysis chapters lead to the conclusion that there has been little change in the process itself in this select group of research universities, but a great deal of change in the internal and external environment in which the process occurs and with which it interacts. This chapter summarizes the findings within the context of the research questions stated earlier, with additional attention to Caplow and McGee's eleven recommendations and to nonacademic perspectives in human resource management. The chapter concludes with attention to implications for practice and a synthesis of two major issues.

The Search Process

1. What are the existing practices and criteria for discovering and evaluating faculty candidates?

The prestige system identified by Caplow and McGee remains a primary factor in faculty recruitment. In spite of the much broader communication of information about today's faculty opening, faculty hiring is still the "closed," or preferential, system that they described. Beyond a certain threshold of ability, in which doctoral prestige plays a part, a candidate is judged initially on his or her professional reputation as attested to by others in the discipline. We saw earlier that Dornstein (1977) drew a parallel between faculty and executive recruitment, noting that preferential hiring was used in order to overcome the uncertainty surrounding the professional potential in an individual.

Letters of recommendation (and the prestige of their authors) are an important screening criterion in this preferential hiring. Similarly, research and writing are important factors, although their contribution may be enhanced in comparison with Caplow and McGee's day by the fact that publications are read by the departmental evaluators -- apparently so infrequent in the 1958 study that their Recommendation No. 8 called for improving existing procedures by seeing that the "professional publications of the candidate, including especially his doctoral dissertation, be read." (Marketplace, p. 249)

The initial advertising of a position does have the result of much larger applicant pools for junior positions than were present in the Caplow and McGee study (although there is little change in the applicant pools for senior positions). The increase in numbers, however, has not changed the quality nor the number of the finalists for the position. The top contenders generally are thought to be no better nor worse than those of previous years, and the pool of acceptable, i.e. best, applicants is not deep. The finalists may be different, in the sense of candidates who would not have known about the opening under the previous system of limited communication. But at the senior level, and even occasionally at the junior, outstanding candidates are specifically identified and aggressively recruited.

A relevant example of the similarity between the recruitment of faculty professionals and that of research professionals outside academia is Dill's (1985) research. In a study of research and development managers, he differentiated between "coarse sifting" (open recruiting procedures) and "fine sifting" (preferential recruiting procedures). Coarse sifting employs, for example, general advertisements in newspapers or professional publications. Fine sifting may include advertisements but features personal contacts, and particularly aggressive individualized pursuit of talented individuals, and was commonly used by the research-oriented groups in his study. Fine sifting procedures clearly apply to faculty recruitment, paralleling those procedures used to recruit researchers in the research and development organizations. Dill found that the process ensured a group of finalists "as homogeneous as possible on the critical dimension of scientific skill and knowledge." (p. 230) The respondents in this study made comparable statements about their finalists. In both situations, fine sifting reduced uncertainty about the professional competence of the candidates; the search process for research professionals may be seen as a validation of the faculty search process in research universities.

The context of today's faculty search is somewhat different from that of 1958, with activity shifting toward the natural sciences (but the greatest optimism about employment opportunities in the academic labor market comes from the social sciences). Another slight change occurs in an increased mobility for full professors, although the large majority of search activity remains at the assistant professor level.

Also new to the context of the search since 1958 are affirmative action requirements. It is generally acknowledged that affirmative action has been successful in providing an impetus for hiring women and minorities, but the current situation seems to be one where the concept of affirmative action has been institutionalized and the efforts of some departments have surpassed the institutional requirements. The philosophical arguments of the early 1970s (e.g., Hook, 1974; Lester, 1974) have waned; current complaints focus on administration of the affirmative action program within the institution. Affirmative action requirements are viewed primarily as preliminary to the selection process -- the applicant pool is broadened. While this has worked to the advantage of women as the number of Ph.D.'s awarded to women has increased, it has had little, if any, effect for those minorities (blacks and Hispanics) who are underrepresented in graduate schools. In view of the fact that the results have been limited for blacks, and the forecast for that group is not optimistic, one wonders if societal changes (e.g., a shift to a service-based economy and subsequent acceptance of women in more responsible jobs) should be given the most credit for the change that has occurred. Also, it is interesting that the legalism about which Smelser and Content (1980) expressed concern, at least in affirmative action programs has had no real effect on the collegial process in recruitment.

The factor apparently most closely associated with the success of affirmative action is the commitment of the individual department to the concept. Thus, although it is a "new" addition to the search procedure, affirmative action when successful relies upon the traditional responsibility of the department for the recruitment process.

The Selection Process

2. How are selection decisions made?

"Democracy in action" is the way that one chairman described the selection process. This is less change than intensification. Caplow and McGee found candidates selected by the full faculty of an academic department in 31 percent of the cases studied, by a chairman acting alone in only 13 percent, and by some combination of chairman, faculty, and administration in the remaining 56 percent, with administrators involved in the selection process in about 10 percent of all cases. The current study finds the process to have evolved to a more democratic one, with the full faculty voting in 82 percent of the cases, a combination of chairman and faculty acting in 18 percent, and neither a chairman acting alone nor involvement of administrators at the selection point.

That the process has become more participatory may reflect societal trends away from authoritarian behavior in organizations. But Clark (forthcoming) points out that ideas and devices such as "rank-and-file 'participation' and 'quality circles,' which American business firms have explored in the 1970s and 1980s to increase production by spreading responsibility and decision making, have been operative in universities for a long time" and illustrates his position with a quote from one of his respondents: "Authority is delegated down to the people who really have to live with the results of the decision. As a consequence, the faculty doesn't feel that it is being put upon; we feel that we made the decision we have to live with, and it is really very successful." (p. 259)

Offers require administrative approval, but personalities and relationships are factors in the procedure, again similar to earlier patterns. The administrative role in appointments may be extended through a central committee made up of faculty members from various disciplines that approves new appointments. Where this occurs at the junior level (in only one institution in the current sample), the process seems ineffective and inefficient. One recalls Caplow and McGee's Recommendation No. 9 calling for "regular, orderly procedures" for faculty selection and remarking that the "development of new committees and functionaries to diffuse the responsibility for appointments is almost wholly undesirable," often leading to rubber-stamp behavior. (Marketplace, pp. 249-250)

As for selection procedures, the current study notes the critical importance of the campus interview at the junior level -- and occurring in modified versions at the senior level as well (but taking a subordinate position to professional reputation in the latter case). This is a change from the Caplow and McGee study, where there were few campus interviews of candidates. Again there is a parallel in the current study with Dill's research, where the employment interview was of significant importance in the selection of research and development recruits (a preferred criterion of 60 percent of the managers surveyed in his study), as was the case in faculty appointments in this study.

The selection process, at least initially, appears to be quite successful. In a great majority of cases, as in the Caplow and McGee study, the department is successful in appointing its first or second choice; the candidate, too, is successful in obtaining the job he or she wanted. But where there was little negotiation of the employment contract in the Caplow and McGee study (in a seller's market), and there is still little negotiation at the junior level (in a buyer's market), today's senior candidate appears to be writing his or her own ticket. One could surmise that with a "lost generation" of scholars in the 1970s, research universities today are competing for a smaller pool of seasoned scholars, having failed to develop their own faculties.

Today's job selection decision is made by the candidate on diverse bases but, generally, the new faculty members are attracted by research opportunities; full professors are apt to be influenced by quality of life concerns. This correlates roughly to the motivation reported by chairmen in the Caplow and McGee study, although there was no mention of quality of life then and infrequent mention by the chairmen in the current study. Also, in the current study, chairmen often err in identifying the most important factors in a career decision. This suggests a lack of comprehension on the part of academic leaders as to what pulls or pushes a faculty member to or from the academic position.

The Separation Process

3. What are the circumstances of faculty terminations? What are the effects of terminations on the organization?

Since the Caplow and McGee study, the circumstances of faculty termination have changed dramatically with respect to retirement and death, reflecting the longer life-span of today's faculty member. Death accounted for 11 percent of terminations in the earlier study; in the current study the proportion is only 3 percent. The retirements projected for the latter part of this century are already being felt slightly -- at 23 percent of terminations in this 1984 sample.

Retirement was an insignificant factor in the Caplow and McGee study. Here, retirement accounts for almost a quarter of the termination activity and is an important factor to be considered in the future. Interesting to quality concerns, in terms of hiring opportunities, is the expectation of a higher than average retirement rate in lower-ranked departments.

Early retirement has become an attractive option for faculty members (and occasionally for an institution), which suggests that retirement projections may be less specific than might be thought. Another interesting finding of this study, providing some balance to early retirement, is that retirees frequently remain professionally active, sometimes in the same department doing much the same thing. But an unknown quantity at present is the effect of the new law prohibiting mandatory retirement. Bowen and Schuster (1986) suggest that already-conceived personal plans for the anticipated retirement years will cause the change in the law to have a minimal effect on retirement projections, and that view is generally supported by the current data. The seven-year delay in application of the law to tenured professors will also probably serve to maintain expected retirement rates.

On the other hand, perhaps the most surprising nonchange is the stability of proportions in dismissal and resignation, in spite of the change in market structure. Contrary to academic myth, there is little difference in the toll taken by tenure denials. Although there is a widespread feeling in academia that it is much tougher to achieve tenure today, the suspicion is not supported by the facts. Similarly, the proportion of voluntary resignations attests to a continuing degree of mobility that one might not expect in today's market.

Tenure is denied to assistant professors predominantly in lower-ranked departments (below the top ten) and frequently by a central faculty committee rather than the department itself. This suggests that the department that is less sure of its own quality, or more anxious to improve it, may be unable or unwilling to provide the assistant professor with the intellectual environment required for success. In some instances, too, there may not be universally shared values among the faculty, resulting in central decisions varying from those made at the departmental level.

Voluntary resignations at all academic ranks are also concentrated in the lower-ranked departments. Tenure pressures are not thought to be a significant factor in the resignation of assistant professors; much more prominent as reasons for disaffection are intellectual isolation and incompatibility, again pointing to the failure of the department to provide an appropriate intellectual climate. Full professors are likely to leave because of failed relationships of one sort or another, and *once the decision to leave has been made*, there is very little that the department can do to dissuade the faculty member. The associate professor is the least likely (of the three academic ranks) to leave, and when he or she does resign, it is often to go to a full professorship or other prestigious position, but usually not at a better department.

So, generally, Caplow and McGee's motives for migration -- prestige, security, and authority -- have been modified over the years into a more personal mold of status and professional concerns, that is, a personal career framework.

There is not as much contradiction in the reasons for leaving and the attractions of the new position as occurred in the Caplow and McGee study, where reasons for leaving were seen as personal and attraction as professional. Perceived attractions of the new job at the assistant professor level and the reasons new appointees gave for selecting the job are also similar, centering on research interests. At the senior level, though, again the quality-of-life point is missed by chairmen. And throughout, the 1958 motivators of prestige, security, and authority are less prominent.

But faculty mobility occurs for knowable reasons, some of which could be influenced by organizational behavior. Schein (1975, 1978) has developed the concept of "career anchors" in a study of MIT's Sloan School of Management alumni. He contended that work careers reflect both individual and organizational definitions of worthwhile activity, and there is a need for organizations to help their members recognize career anchors -- determined by actual experience, not construct -- and for the organization to create multiple paths and reward systems to permit effective utilization of talents. These ideas might be put to good use within academic departments.

The downward drift noted by Caplow and McGee is still present for assistant professors; most departing faculty members at the junior level go to lower-rated departments (frequently to higher academic rank). A change appears at the senior level, where there is substantial lateral and upward movement. This suggests a relaxation of the doctoral prestige theory with the acquisition of proven capabilities; however, the departing faculty members obtained their new positions primarily through personal contacts with colleagues to whom their reputations were known -- a continued reliance upon acquaintanceship. A noticeable change, too, has occurred in the proportion of faculty members leaving higher education, especially the less senior. Now, almost 50 percent more of the dismissed assistant professors (as predicted by Cartter in 1976) and 25 percent more of the departing associate professors leave higher education.

Departmental behavior in the face of impending departure has not changed in the case of assistant and associate professors, but unlike the Caplow and McGee study, the current study shows strong efforts being made to retain full professors. Again, this may be a reflection of the scarcity of outstanding people at the "young" senior level. Unfortunately, the efforts are primarily monetary, which is not the reason that the professor is leaving, and the efforts are made at a point in the departing professor's decision-making process when they are likely to be ineffective. It is interesting that money is thrown at the problem, in the best American tradition; perhaps rejection (as noted by Caplow and McGee) is easier for the members of the losing department to accept if they are able to reduce the matter to simple economics.

People have become more important to the academic department since Caplow and McGee's day, but not as much as one might expect. The departure of a faculty member still has surprisingly little effect on the department. This may reflect a personnel philosophy within academe that has not moved beyond the "replaceable parts" tenet of scientific management. As Kanter (1983) pointed out, in the early 1900s individuals constituted sources of error (p. 18); such an attitude seems to be reflected in departmental reaction to departure.

Caplow and McGee made several recommendations with respect to the termination aspect of mobility: (5) that the period of probation be extended; (6) that fringe benefits for faculty members be improved; (7) that the "personal and arbitrary control" of administrators over faculty members be reduced; (10) that "regular, orderly procedures be established for promotion." (Marketplace, pp. 239-253)

Recommendation No. 5 may be creeping into the culture via the new use of the rank of associate professor without tenure. Interestingly, though, the Caplow and McGee recommendation reflected the market of the times, where demand had lowered the age for tenure and increased the probability that tenure would be achieved before the individual's reputation was established. Therefore, they suggested that tenure not be awarded at "less than ten years of full-time faculty service, including service on the staff of another university." (Marketplace, p. 244) The realization of this recommendation would appear to be manifested in the current market by a weakening rather than an extension of tenure. Although not a formal part of this study, it is clear from initial data collected from university administrations that non-tenure track positions are quite popular as an alternative to long-term commitment of funds for salaries.

The sixth recommendation, about fringe benefits, has been implemented, with one notable exception, "reserved parking on campus" (*Marketplace*, p. 246). One is reminded of Clark Kerr's (1963) description of the modern university as a "series of individual faculty entrepreneurs held together by a common grievance over parking." (p. 20)

Finally, the recommendations about administrative control and promotion procedures, judging from the interview data, no longer appear to be a matter of contention. There were no incidents reported of arbitrary behavior of individual administrators toward individual faculty members in any of the 306 interviews (although faculty colleagues themselves were sometimes guilty parties). Further, promotion procedures, albeit not always accepted without criticism, were represented anecdotally as having structure similar to appointment procedures, a point confirmed in the written procedural material collected from each institution.

Market and Policy

4. *What is the effect of market characteristics on the organization through its personnel processes?*

5. *What is the effect of institutional policies on the organization through its personnel processes?*

The Caplow and McGee study was conducted at a time when higher education was expanding and candidates for faculty jobs were scarce.

The market swung from seller's to buyer's in a little over a decade beyond the time of their study. But in today's buyer's market, there is an optimistic air, a general feeling across disciplinary divisions that demand for Ph.D.'s is on the upswing. Differentiation of the market within disciplines plays a role, so that in a disciplinary market viewed as good, one or more subfields may be less promising, or in a discipline viewed as bad or not improving, a subfield may be otherwise. Both external and internal environments influence the market -- e.g., language study and attraction through new knowledge. The nonacademic labor market is a fierce competitor in some disciplines; professional schools also compete for some arts and sciences Ph.D.'s.

Indeed, a more important market condition of the future may be the competition for Ph.D.'s from outside academia, as suggested by aspects of the differentiation of the academic labor market and by the incidence of faculty members leaving higher education. Frank (1985) presents the notion that a "relative standing" theory makes more sense than traditional economic (market) theory in many instances and could be a better guide than traditional theory in policy issues. In an academic example, he comments on the bidding for top scientists: "When the University of Texas recently lured the Nobel physicist Steven Weinberg away from Harvard by offering a salary of $110,000, the pressing question for the traditional theory was not why Weinberg's salary is so high, but why it is so low." (p. 81) We have already seen how much status (relative standing) matters in the faculty personnel process.

A bulge of retirements -- the lower end already appearing -- will affect the market in the very near future, and not all institutions are preparing for it. But a counter-influence is present as a result of the "trickling down" of research-oriented Ph.D.'s to schools from which they would like to be upwardly mobile. Another "market factor" is the nonmarket: higher education as a career has an intrinsic worth that devalues market considerations.

Another causal factor in market differentiation, of both supply and demand, is research emphasis. Here conditions differ from the earlier study. Caplow and McGee made a major point of the conflict between teaching and research in the personnel process, recommending that a tenure rank of lecturer be established for those not interested in research. (Marketplace, p. 239) It is interesting to find this recommendation repeated in Boyer's latest Carnegie report (1986) on undergraduate education. The current study finds that recommendation largely irrelevant in a research university. There appears to be substantial agreement between hiring departments and job candidates that the candidate is being hired to do research and will be evaluated on the basis of research. Whether this is appropriate is outside the scope of this study. But there is no misunderstanding of the terms and conditions of employment. In fact, as noted earlier, research opportunities play a major role in the candidates' career decisions, suggesting that any behavioral change in the balance of teaching and research must originate in graduate education, before the Ph.D. becomes a faculty member.

The stress of research requirements, or failure to meet those requirements, can have an unfavorable effect on the individual. Nevertheless, the argument that an assistant professor is hired to teach and is evaluated on research does not prevail in the contemporary research university. Derek Bok clarified the nonargument in Higher Learning (1986): "There is an implication that professors are selfish and intent only on enhancing their scholarly reputations, with little acknowledgement of the intense effort required to serve simultaneously as undergraduate teachers, mentors of graduate students, and scholars seeking to enlarge knowledge and understanding. In stressing the virtues of effective pedagogy, moreover, critics often fail to recognize the immense importance of research, not just in contributing to the general store of knowledge but in helping to sustain the vitality of professors by ensuring that they continue to have something of genuine importance to teach." (pp. 64-65)

A more difficult question may be the effect of a research orientation on the faculty member's relationship to the department or institution. The effect of the "local" or "cosmopolitan" orientation of professional members of the organization on mobility has been studied in nonacademic organizations, and two contrasting studies are informative. London et al. (1977) studied professionals in three large architectural firms, where visibility on an important project was important to professional reputation but the teamwork needed by department and new appointees before they had become members of the department, and was taking place between new appointees in the department and members of other departments in the institution. Collaboration, therefore, may be a contributor to intellectual stimulation that crosses organizational boundaries.

The participants in the market (the supply) have changed, but purportedly not in quality. Whereas Caplow and McGee identified bias as a determinant in the academic labor market that excluded persons on the basis of sex, religion, race, and political affiliation, today's marketplace is theoretically open to all. Religion and political affiliation do not appear to be a factor in research university employment; substantially more women and minorities are seen in today's market and the prognosis for women, particularly, seems quite good. The poorer prospects for blacks and Hispanics (not Asians) are more likely to be related to graduate school enrollment than to recruitment policies and procedures (but note the responsibility of the supplier here). In fact, increases in the number of women on the faculty have occurred naturally with broadened applicant pools; increases in the number of blacks have come about only through intensive effort by individual departments to recruit the relatively few black Ph.D.'s.

A derivative of the entry of women into professional employment in large numbers is a major concern of this study not encountered by Caplow and McGee: spouse employment. Spouses needing employment may be part of an academic couple or seeking nonacademic jobs, but their the firms was at odds with the means of professional recognition. In this case, the researchers found a distinct difference between locals and cosmopolitans in terms of job performance within the firm, with the cosmopolitans decidedly averse to teamwork on projects. Goldberg (1976) conducted a study of engineers and found that an orientation that combined both cosmopolitan and local reference groups was more compatible with values and behaviors associated with professionalism than was a solely cosmopolitan reference group. Further, he found that contradictions could be traced to situational influences, such as career stage, occupational role primacy, and quality of the work environment.

Caplow and McGee had asserted that a teaching ("local") orientation fosters loyalty to the institution and that a research ("cosmopolitan") orientation results in identification with a discipline and a greater possibility of mobility. This study supports their conclusions generally but finds different combinations of orientation at different career stages, as did Goldberg, with the suggestion that local or cosmopolitan is neither a mutually exclusive nor a constant condition.

Caplow and McGee also studied collaboration to ascertain its effect on mobility and found none; the same is true in this study. But in relation to research emphasis, another question may be the effect collaboration has on the individual faculty career: In this study collaboration was taking place between departed faculty members and members of the department, had taken place between members of the needs are a visible and demanding variable in the faculty personnel picture. Unlike the Marwell et al. (1979) conclusions based on 1970 data, mobility constraints imposed by marriage were seen to affect men and women equally in this study. A difference in the sample, of course, is the newly appointed or departing faculty member of either sex, with a professionally but not necessarily academically employed spouse, in this study as compared to the academic men and women in place in the Marwell study. Nevertheless, the time lapse of a decade and a half between the Marwell data base and this one more likely provides the heavier weight.

Various management strategies have emerged from the interview data in this study. Chief among these is a change in budgeting rules. Caplow and McGee found a rigid system of vacancy and replacement, leading them to their eleventh recommendation: "That the existence of a faculty vacancy be established always on the basis of demonstrated need for a particular position, and never on the basis of automatic succession." (Marketplace, p. 253) These data would suggest that their recommendation has been fully implemented. The first step in faculty recruiting is now a matter of defining the position in order to negotiate its existence with the dean. As has been seen in the recruiting and termination data, positions are not filled on the basis of automatic succession. Indeed, the ownership of the position by the dean enables a latitude in meeting perceived organizational needs, as seen in shifts to natural sciences and junior level recruiting.

Another aspect of more flexible budgeting rules is the attempt by the administration to provide incentives for hiring through "target of opportunity" funds. This procedure has proved somewhat ineffective, however, perhaps because it is not a clearly defined position given to the specific department -- as is, say, an assistant professor position in a physics department -- and as such carries uncertainty about the future effect on the department of using the special funds to add a person now. There seems to be sufficient vagueness attached to that kind of budget incentive to result in its use primarily by the presumably more confident and aggressive top-ranked departments.

There are additional management techniques reported in the interviews that are also a departure from the Caplow and McGee norm. Deans are reported to be using strategic planning, in conjunction with the flexible budgeting rules noted above, resulting in like procedures at the departmental level (although some departments reported having been engaged in strategic planning activity prior to a dean's interest). Many chairmen view themselves as "managers," using various techniques such as faculty development and motivation and innovation. They are also critical in a sophisticated way of developments in the administration, such as expansion of middle management, that they consider contrary to the best interests of the organization.

Finally, the new strategies aimed toward achieving higher status -- departmental ranking in the discipline -- were not a feature of the 1958 study. Caplow and McGee did recognize a self-aggrandizement effect whereby faculty members "over-reported" the ranking of their departments, which is somewhat related. But the increasingly competitive environment of higher education has resulted in a quest for higher ratings that was not present thirty years ago. In reality, it appears difficult to move into the top ten from very far below that group, and the interview data suggest that research universities may be endangering the future stability of their professional staffs by aggressive pursuit of an unrealistic rating goal through 'restaffing'. Although not a critical issue at this time, as the market changes and mobility opportunities grow, the departments that have been most ruthless in displacing their senior scholars may be faced with excessive turnover at a time they can least afford it.

There were three remaining recommendations from Caplow and McGee's study: (2) that seniority be respected and strengthened; (3) that standard base salaries be adopted and made public; (4) that standard teaching loads be adopted. (Marketplace, pp. 239-241) Recommendation No. 2 was offered as a means of reducing turnover, and it does not appear to have been widely or consistently implemented in research universities, nor valued as the need to reduce turnover allegedly declined. Recommendation No. 4, according to the respondents in this study, has been substantially implemented.

Standard base salaries, however, may have been adopted in all of the universities in the 1986 study (and there is some anecdotal evidence supporting such an assumption), but salaries are public knowledge only in the state systems. Whether this secretive behavior in private universities is either necessary or desirable is certainly a debatable point that was not a major concern of the respondents in this study but did appear as a contributing factor in expressions of dissatisfaction. Caplow and McGee commented as follows: "An auxiliary function of salary secrecy is to cloak inequitable treatment of individuals. We submit that a policy of strict equity may be the best reliance of the rational administrator in the long term." (pp. 241-242) Their statement needs no further comment.

Comparison and Comment

As has become clear in this discussion, the study shows mixed results. Table 18 contrasts the constancies and the changes observed in search, selection, separation, and market over the last thirty years.

[Table 18 about here]

On the one hand, the faculty personnel process is unalterably tied to the "ecclesiastical and academic" origins through a dominant prestige system and a research orientation. On the other hand, the process is being informed by the structures and styles of the "private corporation" through a new awareness of management strategies.

To carry the latter assumption further, consider the results of a top-level meeting described by Walton and Lawrence (1985). In May 1984, twelve senior executives from major U. S. corporations met at Harvard with twenty-three members of the business school faculty in a colloquium designed to consider the trends and prospects for human resource management in American industry. The result was the crafting

TABLE 18: ELEMENTS OF CHANGE IN 1986 STUDY

Study Category	Change from 1958	No Change from 1958
Search	Codified procedures, including open advertising	Screening criteria: letters of recommendation, research, publications/writing samples Importance of doctoral prestige Importance of sponsorship Departmental responsibility for search
Selection	Codified procedures, including campus interview More negotiation of employment terms and conditions	Selection essentially a subjective process Departments hire first or second choice Departmental responsibility for selection Offers made with administrative approval Accommodation of special situations in "negotiated" positions
Separation	Proportions of death, retirement "Motives for migration" more personal-career oriented	Proportions of dismissal, resignation Split responsibility for tenure denial Salary peripheral to mobility decision

TABLE 18: ELEMENTS OF CHANGE IN 1986 STUDY (Continued)

Study Category	Change from 1958	No Change from 1958
Separation (continued)		"Downward drift" at junior level and some senior
		Jobs beyond first placement located through personal contacts
		Little impact of departure on department
		Collaboration has no effect on mobility
Market/ Policy	Buyer's market	Market differentiation among and within disciplines
	Nonacademic competition	Pool of top candidates not deep
	More women, minorities	
	Spouse employment as market issue	
	Management strategies: resource allocation, planning, innovation, improving competitive position	
	Research important to organization culture	
	Disciplinary and institutional orientations not mutually exclusive	

of clear evidence that a major, nonreversible change toward what they called "mutuality" was under way. The executive participants saw three forces driving change in human resource management: "changing values, intensified competition, and advanced information technology." (p. 353) They spoke of seeking a better way of working with people, reducing waste and conflict, in order to make the organization more effective.

Academia could learn from their results. Translated into the terms of the data in this study, the three forces can be exemplified by (1) changing values that cause phenomena such as a mobility motivator of quality of life and a mobility issue of spouse employment; (2) intensified competition among research universities and between academic and nonacademic opportunities for Ph.D.'s; and (3) advanced information technology that locates the faculty member in a research community established through a global communication network of research and scholarship.

Further, a telling parallel can be drawn between Lawrence's chronological chart of "human resource management systems" in the nonacademic sector and a similar construction for the academic sector (Table 19). Where American industry and American colleges began their colonial history with widely divergent systems, movement over the decades has brought the systems closer together, converging to states that are now quite similar.

[Table 19 about here]

TABLE 19. A COMPARISON OF NONACADEMIC "AMERICAN HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS" WITH ACADEMIC PERSONNEL SYSTEMS

<table>
<tr><th></th><th>Craft
to 1820</th><th>Market
to WW I</th><th>Technical
to WW II</th><th>Career
post-WW II</th><th>Commitment
(emerging)</th></tr>
<tr><td>Nonacademic</td><td>Master/journeyman/apprentice work team; multiyear mobility from apprentice to journeyman to master; lifetime system.</td><td>Unskilled labor in work gangs; high turnover; "Captains of industry.'</td><td>Fine division of labor; introduction of machines; semi-long-term employment; exempt career barrier; unionization.</td><td>Grouping of individual positions under a supervisor; long-term employment; career-oriented; movement up through ranks.</td><td>Semi-autonomous work groups; near lifetime employment; slow promotion; lateral and vertical movement.</td></tr>
<tr><td>Academic</td><td>Temporary teachers awaiting church appointments; presidents and trustees were often clergymen.</td><td colspan="2">Teaching most important work activity; emerging emphasis on research and specialization; high mobility of faculty; strong presidents; work organized in academic departments; professional associations were founded.</td><td>Research professor influential in organization; tenure system increasingly important; high faculty mobility at beginning of period; more selective later.</td><td>Semi-autonomous departments; chairmen as managers; slower promotion; expansion of interdisciplinary work; encouraging lateral relationship.</td></tr>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Walton and Lawrence (1985); Table 2-1, pp. 17-18

There are a number of ways in which, using Giamatti's phrasing, universities have grown up in the past several years. There appears to be less conflict between academic departments and central academic administrators as department chairmen have assumed a larger leadership role in the organization. The faculty personnel system is characterized by orderly procedure and greater access, albeit still in thrall to the prestige system. There is agreement between academic departments and job-seekers as to career and performance expectations. Thus, although there may be a tendency toward increased bureaucracy and organizational norms, there seems to be an accompanying tendency toward greater cohesiveness and less conflict in the organization than was observed by Caplow and McGee.

Implications for Practice

In terms of human resource management in the academy, what can be suggested by this study that would be of value to academic leaders? There appear to be four major points that emerge from the discussion.

1. That mobility factors are not sufficiently recognized or understood.

The chairmen interviewed in this study reported research interests as a motivator for the junior-level appointee but did not comprehend its degree of importance. Neither were they aware of the weight given quality-of-life conditions by more senior faculty members. At the exit point, they attempted to use money as the primary bargaining factor, when in fact salary was less important than other preventive measures.

This would imply that greater attention needs to be given by academic leaders to the reasons behind faculty mobility. What attracts someone to the department? What repels? How can the individual best be integrated into and supported by the department?

2. That there is inconsistency between the impact a new faculty member is expected to have on the department and the impact a departure is reported to have.

It seems somewhat incongruous that more than 80 percent of junior appointments in this study were expected to have a long-range effect on the department, while a much lower percentage of departing faculty members were missed. Assuming no great change in attitudes in the past decade, some faculty members decrease in value to the department as their seniority increases. What are the circumstances of such devaluation?

This leads to a reconsideration of Caplow and McGee's second recommendation, that seniority be respected and strengthened. Perhaps the question for academic leaders from item 1 should be repeated here: How can the individual best be integrated into and supported by the department?

3. That the influences of individual research orientation on the organization are not well understood.

Considerable attention has been given in the literature to the local-cosmopolitan construct and the effect of local or cosmopolitan dimensions on faculty mobility. This study finds some indication of a lack of constancy in the dimensions and an intimation of synthesis accompanying seniority. The study also raises the question of the effect of collaborative research.

Academic leaders could be encouraged to integrate individual research interests into the fabric of the organization. How can the cosmopolitan dimension be given local worth?

4. That spouse employment is a critical issue in building faculties.

In earlier days, organizations (of males) had auxiliary units for the women -- witness the Jaycettes. Not too many years ago, there were law wives' and medical wives' clubs for the spouses (female) of law and medical students (male). On some campuses, the old-fashioned "campus club" for faculty wives still exists. The world has moved beyond these anachronisms, but the dilemma of the dual-career couple has not been sufficiently addressed.

Academic leaders might consider formal organization, rather than the informal channels currently in use, for spouse career assistance. An important element of the organization would be its value as a substitute for the "acquaintanceship" noted earlier as a necessity for professional/executive placement. How could such an organization be created and made effective?

The combination of these four points may be considered a prescriptive component of the study, in line with contemporary thinking in the nonacademic sector: That greater attention be given to individual needs while using the individual to strengthen the organization in a climate of change.

Conclusions and Further Research

The elements of change or absence of change in this study may be divided into two categories. Absence of change applies primarily to the processes of faculty mobility within the organization, that is, the recruitment process and the separation process. Change is found predominantly in the social environment external to the organization. From these findings can be drawn two major issues for further discussion.

1. The role of the department.

The 'agent of nonchange' in the faculty personnel system is the academic department. When Hannan and Freeman (1977) listed the aspects of an organization that they believed generated inertia, they included specialization in the list. The academic department is a highly specialized unit and indeed, in this study, appears to generate inertia, or at least not to overcome it. The importance of this association can be seen in Caplow and McGee's statement that the department may be the most interesting part of the university because of the involvement and commitment of its members, followed by their assertion: "The process by which a department replaces its members and maintains its immortality is as nearly central to an understanding of academic institutions as anything can be." (Marketplace, p. 28)

The phenomenon they observed is reinforced by the current study. The academic department drives the personnel process. With few exceptions, the department defines the position to be filled and discovers and selects the person who fills it. The department may be subject to constraint and negotiation of financial terms, but intellectually it is in control. The direction and substance of the activity of the organization are thus determined by its professional members, acting in a specialized collegial unit not constrained by hierarchical considerations.

All of the intermediate steps in faculty recruitment are controlled by the department: determination of the specific media and methods by which news of the opening will be communicated, how the applications will be screened, who will be cut from the herd to be assessed in person. The department develops and applies the selection criteria.

Retention, too, is primarily the responsibility of the department. The new assistant professor is socialized in the department, not the university, and his or her success depends upon that socialization. The faculty member of any rank who leaves the organization voluntarily usually does so as a result of departmental, not institutional, relationships affecting his or her career. The professional performance of the individual faculty member has a strong link to the department. Kanter (1983) observed that the actions of the individual in an organization often stem from the organizational context rather than internal factors (p. 61). One could expect the context to be particularly important in the realm of intellectual work in which a faculty member is involved.

2. The role of external forces.

The 'agent of change' in the faculty personnel system is found in those relationships between the organization and the social environment that affect faculty mobility. In this study, the influences came predominantly from the structure of the academic labor market and the policy responses made within the academic marketplace.

One major change in the faculty personnel system that has resulted from external forces is the definition and implementation of organizational strategies in a competitive market for the best faculty. Strategic thinking has led to a firmer policy of centralized resource allocation, whereby deans and provosts set academic goals and authorize recruitment accordingly. Cyert (1982) called this behavior developing a "comparative advantage" -- finding the strengths of the organization on which excellence can be based and building from those strengths. Caplow and McGee pointed out (foreseeing a sense of "strategic planning" long before the terminology was invented) that this judgment was the "proper business of provosts and deans." (Marketplace, p. 254)

The other major change owing to external influences is in the participants in the academic market. They are more diverse demographically, and they are highly research-oriented. They have more employment opportunities outside academia, and according to Bowen and Schuster (1986) those opportunities are likely to increase. Further, they bring to the academy from the social environment a new problem, spouse employment, that is apparently having a profound effect on faculty mobility.

Therefore, the change (caused by externalities) and absence of change (generated by the academic department) recognized in this study indicate that Giamatti's lament about the loss of collegiality is wrong on two counts. First, the modern academy is in fact informed by the traditions of the guild, especially in the perpetuation of its faculty. Second, where the characteristics of a private corporation appear, they are additive rather than displacing. On a third trait he is mute: the highly complex organizational nature of the research university, recognized by Caplow and McGee, with its intrinsic contradictions.

According to Van de Ven (1983), Peters and Waterman, in their 1982 book, In Search of Excellence, focused on the contradictions that are built into human nature and, consequently, in organizations. For him, the central contribution of their book was a better appreciation of the paradoxes inherent in the nature of man and organization -- "a dynamic [administrative] theory that can explain both stability and change should begin with and directly address the tensions and conflicts inherent in human institutions." (p. 623) The excellent companies have learned to manage the paradox of change and stability. What this idea can bring to the research university is a key to quality control: an appropriate understanding of the people of the organization and ways in which they relate to change in the social environment.

It may be that the research university has not borrowed sufficiently from the private corporation. Dill (1982) observed that the long-term effectiveness of the strategic planning, marketing and management control advocated for universities was in fact being seriously questioned within the business community; he saw greater attention to human resources management emerging, particularly within a context of organizational culture. He urged "management of academic culture: the nurturing of the expressive life of academic institutions and the strengthening of social integration." (p. 319)

But there is an immediate problem in creating the organizational culture in a research university: the primacy of the academic department as a socializing factor. Where variance occurred in this study, it was found predominantly at the departmental rather than the institutional level, confirming that the important processes of the faculty "human resources management" system are controlled by the department. Wilkins and Ouchi (1983) suggested a concept of "local culture" residing in "clans," and thought that groupings of professionals would be likely to reinforce a shared professional clan rather than an overall organizational clan. Their idea coincides with Clark's notion, as cited by Dill (1982), of a culture of academic discipline, as well as Hazard Adams's (1976) distinction of academic tribes. Further attention to human resources management in research universities would therefore appear to hinge upon further attention to the academic department.

Consequently, the most useful research that could stem from this study would seem to be further examination of the role of the academic department in the faculty personnel system, the interaction of the department with the university and the influences outside the university that have an impact on the faculty personnel system, and integration of the departmental and institutional cultures.

It may be instructive here to quote the last sentence of Caplow and McGee's 1958 book (following their discussion of developing better procedures governing faculty perpetuation): "We believe, perhaps too hopefully, that the recognition of the academic department as the primary unit of identification, the recognition of the university administration as responsible for controlling the development of competing disciplines within a single framework, and the insistence on explicit procedures to hold each participant in academic government within the sphere of his proper competence will lead to a situation in which all academic men can live in greater ease and with more hope of achievement." (pp. 254-255)

Their work can be usefully extended in the 1980s and beyond through study of human resources management and the organizational cultures of academia, leading to a situation in which all academic men and women "can live in greater ease and with more hope of achievement," and in which the research university will strengthen and grow.

APPENDICES

AND

BIBLIOGRAPHY

APPENDIX Ia: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 1958

FACULTY MOBILITY STUDY

Form 4

VACANCY:

A____________

B____________

Name

Position

Department

Salary

Duties (% estimate)

Date of Termination

Age

REPLACEMENT:

Name

Position

Salary

Duties (% estimates)

Age

RESPONDENT:

Name

Position

Date of Interview

Time

Recept:

Yield:

Interviewer________________________

A. THE VACANCY

1. When was the vacancy foreseen? (dates of first rumor, known offer, known acceptance)

2. Were any efforts made to hold him here? (how, what outcome, if not, why not)

3. What attracted him most about the new position?

FOR RETIREMENTS What was his reaction to retirement?

4. Were there unsatisfactory elements in his position here?

5. How does his new position compare? (rank, salary, function, opportunities, perquisites)

6. How did he come to get an offer from there?
FOR RETIREMENTS - Did he have any opportunities offered when he retired?

7. Is he satisfied with his new position?

8. Was there any formal sendoff by the department when he left?

9. How long had he been there?

10. Would you say that his departure means a real change for the department?

11. Is there a particular professional viewpoint with which he is identified? (identify opposing school also)

12. Was he involved in active collaboration with any of his colleagues? (who, what rank)

13. Did you ever work with him yourself? (if applicable)

14. Was he well acquainted outside the department? (within the institution)

15. Are any of his students likely to follow him?
FOR RETIREMENTS - Are any of his students still working with him?

16. Do you think he has reached the peak of his productivity as yet?
FOR RETIREMENTS - When did he reach the peak of his productivity?

B. THE SEARCH

17. Did you consider a direct replacement to be necessary?

18. What were the first steps taken? (when, by whom, in what form)

19. Were the duties and responsibilities of the new position determined in advance?

20. How many names were mentioned for consideration?

How many became active candidates?

21. What credentials were submitted? (oral recommendations, written recommendations, curricula vita, publications unread, publications read, interviews, visits)

22. What were the desirable qualifications? Were they set down in writing? If not, did you have a clear idea of what was wanted?

23. What were the specific procedures for evaluation of the candidates?

24. On what basis was the choice made between the candidate finally selected and the closest runner-up?

C. THE REPLACEMENT

25. Through whom was the first contact made?

26. Did the candidate have any prior contact with the department or the university? (double-check)

27. How did his old position compare? (rank, salary, function, opportunities, perquisites)

28. Why was he willing to move?

29. How were his qualifications evaluated? (relate to question 21 and 23)

30. Who was consulted before the offer was made?

31. Who took what formal action when the offer was made? (in detail)

32. Was there any bidding process? Were there any special terms and conditions? Was there further consultation?

33. When and how was the offer made? (copies, if possible)

34. When and how was the acceptance received? When did the appointee take up his duties?

35. How about opportunities for outside consultation work?

36. Do you expect this appointment to have any long-run effect on the department's program as a whole?

37. Can you foresee the circumstances of the next major appointment in the department? Are there any balancing factors to be considered?

38. Will this appointment affect the policy of later appointments?

39. Name of colleague of nearest rank and age.

40. How would you rate the national reputation of this department in its own field? (among the first five, better than average of major institutions, average, poorer than average)

41. How has the job market in this field changed in the past five years?

Postscript

Remarks

APPENDIX Ib: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 1986

FACULTY MOBILITY STUDY

VACANCY:

FILE I.D.:

Position:

School:

Date of termination:

Dept:

Age:

Jones ranking
(Measure 08):

First appointment date:

REPLACEMENT/NEW HIRE:

Position:

Age:

Date of PhD:

RESPONDENT:

Name:

Position:

Date of interview:

Time:

Receptivity:

Yield:

A. THE VACANCY

1. When was the vacancy foreseen? (dates of first rumor, known offer, known acceptance; if involuntary, circumstances)

2. Were any efforts made to hold him/her here? (how, what outcome, if not why not)

3. What attracted him/her most about the new position?

FOR RETIREMENTS What was his/her reaction to retirement?

Did he/she take early retirement? If so, what was the incentive to do so?

Is he/she still professionally active?

4. Were there unsatisfactory elements in his/her position here?

5. How does his/her new position compare? (rank, salary, function, opportunities, perquisites)

6. How did he/she come to get an offer from there?
FOR RETIREMENTS - Did he/she have any opportunities offered when he/she retired?

7. Is he/she satisfied with his/her new position?

8. Would you say that his/her departure means a real change for the department?

9. Was he/she involved in active collaboration with any of his/her colleagues? (who, what rank)

10. Was he/she well acquainted outside the department? (within the institution, outside the institution)

B. THE SEARCH

11. Did you consider a direct replacement to be necessary?

12. What were the first steps taken? (when, by whom, in what form; determination of need, authorization to recruit, communication to prospective candidates)

13. Were the duties and responsibilities of the new position determined in advance?

14. How many applicants did you have for the position? (estimate recruitment source)

How many on "short list"? (recruitment source, schools; women, minorities)

How many visited? (recruitment source, schools; women, minorities)

15. What credentials were submitted?

16. What were the qualifications for the position? Were they set down in writing? If not, did you have a clear idea of what was wanted?

17. What were the specific procedures for evaluation of the candidates at each screening step? (criteria, application of criteria, participants in evaluation; include interview process)

18. On what basis was the choice made between the candidate finally selected and the closest runner-up?

Was he/she your first choice?

What was the successful candidate's recruitment source, school?

19. How was your search affected by affirmative action requirements? Were more women and/or minority candidates actually produced?

20. Was your search affected by recommendations or guidelines of your professional association (AEA, MLA, etc.)?

21. Compared with the way recruiting was done 15-20 years ago, do your present search procedures produce more candidates? Different candidates? Better candidates?

C. THE REPLACEMENT

22. Through whom was the first contact made?

23. Did the candidate have any prior contact with the department or the university? [inbreeding - outbreeding]

24. How did his/her old position compare? (rank, salary, function, opportunities, perquisites)

25. Why was he/she willing to move?

26. What attracted him/her to this department?

27. How was the offer made? (in detail; who was consulted, etc.)

28. Was there any negotiation with candidate or administration? Were there any special terms and conditions? Was there further consultation?

29. Are there any budgeting arrangements for special allocation of funds to hire exceptional people? Blacks or other minorities? Women? Other? (used in this instance? ever used in this department?)

30. Do you expect this appointment to have any long-run effect on the department's program as a whole?

31. Can you foresee the circumstances of the next major appointment in the department? Are there any balancing factors to be considered?

32. Will this appointment affect the policy of later appointments?

33. [deleted]

34. How has the job market in this field changed in the past five years? How is it going to change in the next five years?

35. Is the recruiting activity reported for 1985 appointments typical? (different the previous year or the year before, different this year; how, why)

D. NEW APPOINTEE

36. How did the job opening first come to your attention?

37. Did you have any prior contact with the department or the university?

38. How did your old position compare with this one? (rank, salary, function, opportunities, perquisites)

39. Why were you willing to move?

40. What attracted you to this department?

41. What credentials did you submit for consideration?

42. What were the procedures used during the evaluation process? (known or experienced)

43. How was the offer actually communicated to you?

44. Was there any negotiation involved in your acceptance?

45. Is this the job you wanted? How many other interviews did you have? (where, offers)

46. How would you rate the national reputation of this department? (among the first five, better than average of major institutions, average, poorer than average)

47. How has the job market in your field changed in the past five years? How is it going to change in the next five years?

REMARKS:

APPENDIX IIa: APPOINTMENTS - 1955-57

Number of Actions

	Public University A			Private University B			Public University C			Private University D			Private University E			Public University F		
	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof
HUMANITIES																		
Art																		
Classics																2		
Decrtv Art		1																
Drama/Thea	1	1		1														
English	2			1	1				1							1		
Fine Arts								1										
German	1			1						1								
Ital/French							2											
Music			1	1									1					
Nr East St	1																	
Philosophy	1			1														
Rom St/Lang				1	1					1				1		2		
Slavic Lang																		
Span & Port																		
Speech	1																	
Sub-total	7	2	1	6	2	0	2	1	1	2	0	0	1	1	0	5	0	0

APPENDIX IIa: APPOINTMENTS - 1955-57

	Number of Actions																	
	Public University A			Private University B			Public University C			Private University D			Private University E			Public University F		
	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof
SOCIAL SCI																		
Anthropology										1						2		
Economics		2		1						3			2			1		
Geography							1					1		1				
History	1	2					1		1		1		1			1		
Home Econ							1											
Journalism							1											
Polit Sci	1											1						
Psychology	1						2			1								
Social Svc							1											
Sociology																		
Sub-total	3	4	0	1	0	0	7	0	1	5	1	2	3	1	0	4	0	0

APPENDIX IIa: APPOINTMENTS - 1955-57

Number of Actions

	Public			Private			Public			Private			Private			Public		
	University A			University B			University C			University D			University E			University F		
	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof
NATURAL SCI																		
Astronomy				1									1					1
Biochem			1															
Biol Sci										1								
Botany													2					
Chemistry				1						1								
Geology				1												2		
Home Econ																1	1	
Mathematics	1	1								2	1							
Physics				2			3							1	1	1		
Zoology									1									1
Sub-total	1	1	1	5	0	0	3	0	1	4	1	0	3	1	1	4	1	1
TOTAL	11	7	2	12	2	0	12	1	3	11	2	2	7	3	1	13	1	1

APPENDIX IIa: APPOINTMENTS - 1955-57

Totals

HUMANITIES	Asst	Assc	Prof	All
Art	0	0	0	0
Classics	2	0	0	2
Decrtv Art	0	1	0	1
Drama/Thea	2	1	0	3
English	4	1	1	6
Fine Arts	0	1	0	1
German	3	0	0	3
Ital/French	2	0	0	2
Music	2	0	1	3
Nr East St	1	0	0	1
Philosophy	2	0	0	2
Rom St/Lang	4	2	0	6
Slavic Lang	0	0	0	0
Span & Port	0	0	0	0
Speech	1	0	0	1
Sub-total	23	6	2	31

SOCIAL SCI	Asst	Assc	Prof	All
Anthropology	3	0	0	3
Economics	7	2	0	9
Geography	1	1	1	3
History	4	3	1	8
Home Econ	1	0	0	1
Journalism	1	0	0	1
Polit Sci	1	0	1	2
Psychology	4	0	0	4
Social Svc	1	0	0	1
Sociology	0	0	0	0
Sub-total	23	6	3	32

NATURAL SCI	Asst	Assc	Prof	All
Astronomy	2	0	0	2
Biochem	0	0	1	1
Biol Sci	1	0	0	1
Botany	2	0	0	2
Chemistry	2	0	0	2
Geology	3	0	0	3
Home Econ	1	1	0	2
Mathematics	3	2	0	5
Physics	6	1	1	8
Zoology	0	0	2	2
Sub-total	20	4	4	28
TOTAL	66	16	9	91

APPENDIX IIb: APPOINTMENTS - 1984-85

	Number of Actions																	
	Public University A			Private University B			Public University C			Private University D			Private University E			Public University F		
	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof
HUMANITIES																		
Amer Civ													1					
Art History	1			1							1	1						
Classics	1			1						1						1		
Comp Lit				1														
Drama/Thea	1			1		1												
English	1					2							2	1		1		
Fine Arts								1				2						
German																		
History				1														
Ital/French	1																	
Linguistics													1					
Modern Lang																		
Music													1					
Nr East St	1					1												
Orien/As St							1						2					
Philosophy				1			1				2							2
Relig St							2											
Rhetoric																		
Rom St/Lang													1					
Russian Lit																		
Span & Port	1															1		
Sub-total	6	1	0	6	0	4	4	1	0	1	3	3	8	1	0	3	0	2

APPENDIX IIb: APPOINTMENTS - 1984-85

Number of Actions

	Public University A			Private University B			Public University C			Private University D			Private University E			Public University F		
	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof
SOCIAL SCI																		
Afro-Am St	1																	
Anthropology	1							1		1			1					
Asian-Am St																		
Economics				1			3	1		2	1		2					
Geography										1						1		1
Govt/Pol Sc				1			1	2					3					
History							1			1		1				3		
Home Econ							2											
Linguistics	1								1							2		
Psychology							2									1		
Region Sci																		
Sociology	1	1		1		1	1						1		1			
Telecomm							1											
Sub-total	4	1	0	3	0	1	11	4	1	5	1	1	8	0	1	7	0	1

APPENDIX IIb: APPOINTMENTS - 1984-85

Number of Actions

	Public University A			Private University B			Public University C			Private University D			Private University E			Public University F		
	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof
NATURAL SCI																		
Astronomy							1									1		
Molec Biol	2							1	1	2								
Chemistry									1		1		1		1	2		
Comp Sci							1									3		
Ecol & Sys																		
Geology							1											1
Home Econ																2		1
Mathematics			1				1				1	1						
Microb & Imm			1															
Nrbiol & Beh				1						1								
Physio & Ana	1																	
Physical Ed	1																	
Physics							1	1		1			3			1	1	
Psychology													1					
Statistics	1		1															
Zoology			1													1		
Sub-total	5	0	4	1	0	0	5	2	2	4	2	1	5	0	1	10	1	2
TOTAL	15	2	4	10	0	5	20	7	3	10	6	5	21	1	2	20	1	5

APPENDIX IIb: APPOINTMENTS - 1984-85

Totals

	Asst	Assc	Prof	All
HUMANITIES				
Amer Civ	1	0	0	1
Art History	2	1	1	4
Classics	4	0	0	4
Comp Lit	1	0	0	1
Drama/Thea	2	0	1	3
English	4	1	2	7
Fine Arts	0	1	2	3
German	0	0	0	0
History	1	0	0	1
Ital/French	1	0	0	1
Linguistics	1	0	0	1
Modern Lang	0	0	0	0
Music	1	0	0	1
Nr East St	1	0	1	2
Orien/As St	3	0	0	3
Philosophy	2	2	2	6
Relig St	2	0	0	2
Rhetoric	0	0	0	0
Rom St/Lang	1	0	0	1
Russian Lit	0	0	0	0
Span & Port	1	1	0	2
Sub-total	28	6	9	43

	Asst	Assc	Prof	All
SOCIAL SCI				
Afro-Am St	1	0	0	1
Anthropology	3	1	0	4
Asian-Am St	0	0	0	0
Economics	8	2	0	10
Geography	2	0	1	3
Govt/Pol Sc	5	2	0	7
History	5	0	1	6
Home Econ	2	0	0	2
Linguistics	3	0	1	4
Psychology	3	0	0	3
Region Sci	0	0	0	0
Sociology	5	1	2	8
Telecomm	1	0	0	1
Sub-total	38	6	5	49

	Asst	Assc	Prof	All
NATURAL SCI				
Astronomy	2	0	0	2
Molec Biol	4	1	1	6
Chemistry	3	1	2	6
Comp Sci	4	0	0	4
Ecol & Sys	0	0	0	0
Geology	1	0	1	2
Home Econ	2	0	1	3
Mathematics	1	1	2	4
Microb & Imm	0	0	1	1
Nrbiol & Beh	2	0	0	2
Physio & Ana	1	0	0	1
Physical Ed	1	0	0	1
Physics	6	2	0	8
Psychology	1	0	0	1
Statistics	1	0	1	2
Zoology	1	0	1	2
Sub-total	30	5	10	45

TOTAL	96	17	24	137

APPENDIX IIIa: DISMISSALS - 1955-57

	Number of Actions																	
	Public			Private			Public			Private			Private			Public		
	University A			University B			University C			University D			University E			University F		
	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof
HUMANITIES																		
Art																		
Classics																1		
Decrtv Art	1																	
Drama/Thea	1																	
English	2						1			1								
Fine Arts																		
German	1			1														
Ital/French																		
Music																		
Nr East St																		
Philosophy	1																	
Rom St/Lang																2		
Slavic Lang																1		
Span & Port																		
Speech	3																	
Sub-total	9	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0

APPENDIX IIIa: DISMISSALS - 1955-57

Number of Actions

	Public University A			Private University B			Public University C			Private University D			Private University E			Public University F		
	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof
SOCIAL SCI																		
Anthropology																2		
Economics																2		
Geography																		
History	2												1					
Home Econ																		
Journalism																		
Polit Sci																		
Psychology	1																1	
Social Svc																		
Sociology																		
Sub-total	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	4	1	0

APPENDIX IIIa: DISMISSALS - 1955-57

	Number of Actions																	
	Public University A			Private University B			Public University C			Private University D			Private University E			Public University F		
	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof
NATURAL SCI																		
Astronomy					1													
Biochem																		
Biol Sci																		
Botany																		
Chemistry										1								
Geology																1		
Home Econ																		
Mathematics										1								
Physics				1			1						3					
Psychology													1					
Zoology																		
Sub-total	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	2	0	0	4	0	0	1	0	0
TOTAL	12	0	0	2	1	0	1	0	0	3	0	0	5	0	0	9	1	0

APPENDIX IIIa: DISMISSALS - 1955-57

Totals

	Asst	Assc	Prof	All
HUMANITIES				
Art	0	0	0	0
Classics	1	0	0	1
Decrtv Art	1	0	0	1
Drama/Thea	1	0	0	1
English	4	0	0	4
Fine Arts	0	0	0	0
German	2	0	0	2
Ital/French	0	0	0	0
Music	0	0	0	0
Nr East St	0	0	0	0
Philosophy	1	0	0	1
Rom St/Lang	2	0	0	2
Slavic Lang	1	0	0	1
Span & Port	0	0	0	0
Speech	3	0	0	3
Sub-total	16	0	0	16

	Asst	Assc	Prof	All
SOCIAL SCI				
Anthropology	2	0	0	2
Economics	2	0	0	2
Geography	0	0	0	0
History	3	0	0	3
Home Econ	0	0	0	0
Journalism	0	0	0	0
Polit Sci	0	0	0	0
Psychology	1	1	0	2
Social Svc	0	0	0	0
Sociology	0	0	0	0
Sub-total	8	1	0	9

	Asst	Assc	Prof	All
NATURAL SCI				
Astronomy	0	1	0	1
Biochem	0	0	0	0
Biol Sci	0	0	0	0
Botany	0	0	0	0
Chemistry	1	0	0	1
Geology	1	0	0	1
Home Econ	0	0	0	0
Mathematics	1	0	0	1
Physics	5	0	0	5
Psychology	0	0	0	0
Zoology	0	0	0	0
Sub-total	8	1	0	9
TOTAL	33	2	0	35

APPENDIX IIIb: DISMISSALS - 1983-84

	Number of Actions																	
	Public University A			Private University B			Public University C			Private University D			Private University E			Public University F		
	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof
SOCIAL SCI																		
Afro-Am St																		
Anthropology																		
Asian-Am St																		
Economics	1												2					
Geography																1		
Govt/Pol Sc																		
History													2			1		
Linguistics																		
Psychology																2		
Region Sci													2					
Sociology													1					
Sub-total	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	0	0	4	0	0

APPENDIX IIIb: DISMISSALS - 1983-84

Number of Actions

	Public University A			Private University B			Public University C			Private University D			Private University E			Public University F		
	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof
HUMANITIES																		
Afro-Am Stud										1								
Amer Civ													1					
Art History																		
Classics													1			1		
Comp Lit																		
Drama/Thea																		
English							1			2			1			3		
German																		
History																		
Ital/French																		
Linguistics																		
Modern Lang																		
Music													2					
Nr East St																		
Orien/As St													1					
Philosophy										1						2		
Relig St																		
Rhetoric	1																	
Rom St/Lang																		
Russian Lit																		
Span & Port							1											
Sub-total	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	4	0	0	6	0	0	6	0	0

APPENDIX IIIb: DISMISSALS - 1983-84

Number of Actions

	Public University A			Private University B			Public University C			Private University D			Private University E			Public University F		
	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof
NATURAL SCI																		
Astronomy																		
Molec Biol																		
Chemistry				1			2											
Comp Sci																1		
Ecol & Sys																		
Geology													1					
Home Econ																1		
Mathematics										1						2		
Microb & Imm																1		
Nrbiol & Beh																		
Physio & Ana																		
Physical Ed																		
Physics													1					
Statistics																		
Zoology																1		
Sub-total	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	6	0	0
TOTAL	2	0	0	1	0	0	4	0	0	5	0	0	15	0	0	16	0	0

APPENDIX IIIb: DISMISSALS - 1983-84

Totals

HUMANITIES	Asst	Assc	Prof	All
Afro-Am Stud	1	0	0	1
Amer Civ	1	0	0	1
Art History	0	0	0	0
Classics	2	0	0	2
Comp Lit	0	0	0	0
Drama/Thea	0	0	0	0
English	7	0	0	7
German	0	0	0	0
History	0	0	0	0
Ital/French	0	0	0	0
Linguistics	0	0	0	0
Modern Lang	0	0	0	0
Music	2	0	0	2
Nr East St	0	0	0	0
Orien/As St	1	0	0	1
Philosophy	3	0	0	3
Relig St	0	0	0	0
Rhetoric	1	0	0	1
Rom St/Lang	0	0	0	0
Russian Lit	0	0	0	0
Span & Port	1	0	0	1
Sub-total	19	0	0	19

SOCIAL SCI	Asst	Assc	Prof	All
Afro-Am St	0	0	0	0
Anthropology	0	0	0	0
Asian-Am St	0	0	0	0
Economics	3	0	0	3
Geography	1	0	0	1
Govt/Pol Sc	0	0	0	0
History	3	0	0	3
Linguistics	0	0	0	0
Psychology	2	0	0	2
Region Sci	2	0	0	2
Sociology	1	0	0	1
Sub-total	12	0	0	12

NATURAL SCI	Asst	Assc	Prof	All
Astronomy	0	0	0	0
Molec Biol	0	0	0	0
Chemistry	3	0	0	3
Comp Sci	1	0	0	1
Ecol & Sys	0	0	0	0
Geology	1	0	0	1
Home Econ	1	0	0	1
Mathematics	3	0	0	3
Microb & Imm	1	0	0	1
Nrbiol & Beh	0	0	0	0
Physio & Ana	0	0	0	0
Physical Ed	0	0	0	0
Physics	1	0	0	1
Statistics	0	0	0	0
Zoology	1	0	0	1
Sub-total	12	0	0	12

TOTAL	43	0	0	43

APPENDIX IVa: RESIGNATIONS - 1955-57

Number of Actions

	Public University A			Private University B			Public University C			Private University D			Private University E			Public University F		
	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof
HUMANITIES																		
Art		1																
Classics																		
Decrtv Art																		
Drama/Thea	1			1				1										
English				1		1				1							1	
Fine Arts							1	1	1									
German										1		1						
Ital/French																		
Music					1								1					
Nr East St	1																	
Philosophy				1		1												
Rom St/Lang				1						1		1			1			
Slavic Lang							1											
Span & Port																		
Speech																		
Sub-total	2	1	0	4	1	2	2	2	1	3	0	2	1	0	1	0	1	0

APPENDIX IVa: RESIGNATIONS - 1955-57

	Number of Actions																	
	Public University A			Private University B			Public University C			Private University D			Private University E			Public University F		
	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof
SOCIAL SCI																		
Anthropology											1		1					
Economics		1	1							3			1					
Geography							1						1		1			
History											1					1		
Home Econ																		
Journalism							1											
Polit Sci	1										2	1		1				
Psychology							2			1	2							
Social Svc							1											
Sociology																		
Sub-total	1	1	1	0	0	0	5	0	0	4	6	1	3	1	1	1	0	0

APPENDIX IVa: RESIGNATIONS - 1955-57

Number of Actions

	Public University A			Private Univetsity B			Public University C			Private University D			Private University E			Public University F		
	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof
NATURAL SCI																		
Astronomy																		
Biochem																		
Biol Sci											2							
Botany														1				
Chemistry				1						1								
Geology				1														1
Home Econ																2		1
Mathematics										2								
Physics		1			1	1		1						1		1		
Psychology																		
Zoology								1										
Sub-total	0	1	0	2	1	1	0	2	0	3	2	0	0	2	0	3	0	2
TOTAL	3	3	1	6	2	3	7	4	1	10	8	3	4	3	2	4	1	2

APPENDIX IVa: RESIGNATIONS - 1955-57

Totals

HUMANITIES	Asst	Assc	Prof	All
Art	0	1	0	1
Classics	0	0	0	0
Decrtv Art	0	0	0	0
Drama/Thea	2	1	0	3
English	2	1	1	4
Fine Arts	1	1	1	3
German	1	0	1	2
Ital/French	0	0	0	0
Music	1	1	0	2
Nr East St	1	0	0	1
Philosophy	1	0	1	2
Rom St/Lang	2	0	2	4
Slavic Lang	1	0	0	1
Span & Port	0	0	0	0
Speech	0	0	0	0
Sub-total	12	5	6	23

SOCIAL SCI	Asst	Assc	Prof	All
Anthropology	1	1	0	2
Economics	4	1	1	6
Geography	2	0	1	3
History	1	1	0	2
Home Econ	0	0	0	0
Journalism	1	0	0	1
Polit Sci	1	3	1	5
Psychology	3	2	0	5
Social Svc	1	0	0	1
Sociology	0	0	0	0
Sub-total	14	8	3	25

NATURAL SCI	Asst	Assc	Prof	All
Astronomy	0	0	0	0
Biochem	0	0	0	0
Biol Sci	0	2	0	2
Botany	0	1	0	1
Chemistry	2	0	0	2
Geology	1	0	1	2
Home Econ	2	0	1	3
Mathematics	2	0	0	2
Physics	1	4	1	6
Psychology	0	0	0	0
Zoology	0	1	0	1
Sub-total	8	8	3	19
TOTAL	34	21	12	67

APPENDIX IVb: RESIGNATIONS - 1983-84

Number of Actions

	Public University A			Private University B			Public University C			Private University D			Private University E			Public University F		
	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof
HUMANITIES																		
Amer Civ																		
Art History						1												
Classics													1					
Comp Lit	1																	
Drama/Thea	1			1		1												
English											1		1		1			1
German																1		
History																		
Ital/French																1		
Linguistics																		
Modern Lang				1														
Music																		
Nr East St				1														
Orien/As St														1				
Philosophy	1																	
Relig St														1				
Rhetoric																		
Rom St/Lang						1												
Russian Lit						1												
Span & Port							1		1									
Sub-total	3	0	0	3	0	4	1	0	1	0	1	0	2	2	1	2	0	1

APPENDIX IVb: RESIGNATIONS - 1983-84

	Number of Actions																	
	Public University A			Private University B			Public University C			Private University D			Private University E			Public University F		
	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof
SOCIAL SCI																		
Afro-Am St																		
Anthropology		1		1					1			1						
Asian-Am St	1	1																
Economics				1			1						6			3	1	
Geography										1								
Govt/Pol Sc										1		1	2			1	1	
History									1			2			1	2		
Home Econ							1											
Linguistics																		2
Psychology				2													1	1
Region Sci															1			
Sociology							1									1		
Speech Comm									1									
Sp & Hrg Sci							1											
Sub-total	1	2	0	4	0	0	4	0	3	2	0	4	8	0	2	7	3	3

APPENDIX IVb: RESIGNATIONS - 1983-84

	Number of Actions																	
	Public University A			Private University B			Public University C			Private University D			Private University E			Public University F		
	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof
NATURAL SCI																		
Astronomy																		
Molec Biol								1	1									
Chemistry									1									1
Comp Sci								2										
Ecol & Sys				1														
Geology									1									
Home Econ																1	1	1
Mathematics								1	1									
Microb & Imm																		
Nrbiol & Beh																		
Physio & Ana																		
Physical Ed																		
Physics									1				1			1	1	
Zoology																		
Sub-total	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	4	5	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	2	2
TOTAL	4	2	0	8	0	4	5	4	9	2	1	4	11	2	3	11	5	6

APPENDIX IVb: RESIGNATIONS - 1983-84

Totals

	Asst	Assc	Prof	All		Asst	Assc	Prof	All		Asst	Assc	Prof	All
HUMANITIES					SOCIAL SCI					NATURAL SCI				
Amer Civ	0	0	0	0	Afro-Am St	0	0	0	0	Astronomy	0	0	0	0
Art History	0	0	1	1	Anthropology	1	1	2	4	Molec Biol	0	1	1	2
Classics	1	0	0	1	Asian-Am St	1	1	0	2	Chemistry	0	0	2	2
Comp Lit	1	0	0	1	Economics	11	1	0	12	Comp Sci	0	2	0	2
Drama/Thea	2	0	1	3	Geography	1	0	0	1	Ecol & Sys	1	0	0	1
English	1	1	2	4	Govt/Pol Sc	4	1	1	6	Geology	0	0	1	1
German	1	0	0	1	History	2	0	4	6	Home Econ	1	1	1	3
History	0	0	0	0	Home Econ	1	0	0	1	Mathematics	0	1	1	2
Ital/French	1	0	0	1	Linguistics	0	0	2	2	Microb & Imm	0	0	0	0
Linguistics	0	0	0	0	Psychology	2	1	1	4	Nrbiol & Beh	0	0	0	0
Modern Lang	1	0	0	1	Region Sci	0	0	1	1	Physio & Ana	0	0	0	0
Music	0	0	0	0	Sociology	2	0	0	2	Physical Ed	0	0	0	0
Nr East St	1	0	0	1	Speech Comm	0	0	1	1	Physics	2	1	1	4
Orien/As St	0	1	0	1	Sp & Hrg Sci	1	0	0	1	Statistics	0	0	0	0
Philosophy	1	0	0	1	Sub-total	26	5	12	43	Zoology	0	0	0	0
Relig St	0	1	0	1						Sub-total	4	6	7	17
Rhetoric	0	0	0	0										
Rom St/Lang	0	0	1	1										
Russian Lit	0	0	1	1										
Span & Port	1	0	1	2										
Sub-total	11	3	7	21										
										TOTAL	41	14	26	81

APPENDIX Va: RETIREMENTS - 1955-57

	Number of Actions																	
	Public University A			Private University B			Public University C			Private University D			Private University E			Public University F		
	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof
HUMANITIES																		
Art																		
Classics																		1
Decrtv Art			1															
Drama/Thea																		
English			1						1									1
Fine Arts																		
German		1																
Ital/French									1									
Music																		
Nr East St																		
Philosophy																		
Rom St/Lang						1									1			
Slavic Lang																		
Span & Port																		
Speech																		
Sub-total	0	1	2	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	2

APPENDIX Va: RETIREMENTS - 1955-57

Number of Actions

	Public University A			Private University B			Public University C			Private University D			Private University E			Public University F		
	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof
SOCIAL SCI																		
Anthropology																		
Economics						1												
Geography																		
History									2									
Home Econ																		
Journalism																		
Polit Sci																		
Psychology																		
Social Svc																		
Sociology																		
Sub-total	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

APPENDIX Va: RETIREMENTS - 1955-57

	Number of Actions																	
	Public University A			Private University B			Public University C			Private University D			Private University E			Public University F		
	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof
NATURAL SCI																		
Astronomy															1			
Biochem			1															
Biol Sci																		
Botany						1									3			
Chemistry																		
Geology																		
Home Econ																		
Mathematics	1		1			1									1			
Physics						1												1
Psychology																		
Zoology																		1
Sub-total	1	0	2	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	2
TOTAL	1	1	4	0	0	5	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	4

APPENDIX Va: RETIREMENTS - 1955-57

Totals

HUMANITIES	Asst	Assc	Prof	All
Art	0	0	0	0
Classics	0	0	1	1
Decrtv Art	0	0	1	1
Drama/Thea	0	1	0	0
English	0	0	3	3
Fine Arts	0	0	0	0
German	0	1	0	1
Ital/French	0	0	1	1
Music	0	0	0	0
Nr East St	0	0	0	0
Philosophy	0	0	0	0
Rom St/Lang	0	0	2	2
Slavic Lang	0	0	0	0
Span & Port	0	0	0	0
Speech	0	0	0	0
Sub-total	0	1	8	9

SOCIAL SCI	Asst	Assc	Prof	All
Anthropology	0	0	0	0
Economics	0	0	1	1
Geography	0	0	0	0
History	0	0	2	2
Home Econ	0	0	0	0
Journalism	0	0	0	0
Polit Sci	0	0	0	0
Psychology	0	0	0	0
Social Svc	0	0	0	0
Sociology	0	0	0	0
Sub-total	0	0	0	3

NATURAL SCI	Asst	Assc	Prof	All
Astronomy	0	0	1	1
Biochem	0	0	1	1
Biol Sci	0	0	0	0
Botany	0	0	4	4
Chemistry	0	0	0	0
Geology	0	0	0	0
Home Econ	0	0	0	0
Mathematics	1	0	3	4
Physics	0	0	2	2
Psychology	0	0	0	0
Zoology	0	0	1	1
Sub-total	1	0	12	13
TOTAL	1	1	23	25

APPENDIX Vb: RETIREMENTS - 1983-84

	Number of Actions																	
	Public University A			Private University B			Public University C			Private University D			Private University E			Public University F		
	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof
HUMANITIES																		
Amer Civ																		
Art History						1												
Classics						1					1							
Comp Lit																		
Drama/Thea																		
English			1			1			1						1			1
Fine Arts										1		1						
German															1			
History																		
Ital/French																	1	1
Linguistics																		
Modern Lang																		
Music																		
Nr East St									1									
Orien/As St									1									
Philosophy																		
Relig St													1					
Rhetoric																		
Rom St/Lang																		
Russ/Ur/Slav									1			1						
Span & Port									1								1	
Sub-total	0	0	1	0	0	3	0	0	5	1	1	2	1	0	2	0	1	1

APPENDIX Vb: RETIREMENTS - 1983-84

	Number of Actions																
	Public University A			Private University B			Public University C			Private University D			Private University E			Public University F		
	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof
SOCIAL SCI																		
Afro-Am St																		
Anthropology			1															
Asian-Am St																		
Economics																		1
Geography																		1
Govt/Pol Sc									3									
History															1			
Linguistics																		
Psychology																		
Region Sci																		
Sociology			1			1												
Sub-total	0	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	2

APPENDIX Vb: RETIREMENTS - 1983-84

	Number of Actions																	
	Public University A			Private University B			Public University C			Private University D			Private University E			Public University F		
	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof	Asst	Assc	Prof
NATURAL SCI																		
Astronomy																		1
Molec Biol															1			
Chemistry																		1
Comp Sci								2										
Ecol & Sys																		
Geology																		1
Home Econ																		1
Mathematics																		
Microb & Imm			1															
Nrbiol & Beh					1													
Physio & Ana																		
Physical Ed																		
Physics			1			1												
Statistics																		
Zoology																		
Sub-total	0	0	2	0	1	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	4
TOTAL	0	0	5	0	1	5	0	0	8	1	1	2	1	0	4	0	2	8

APPENDIX Vb: RETIREMENTS - 1983-84

Totals

HUMANITIES	Asst	Assc	Prof	All
Amer Civ	0	0	0	0
Art History	0	0	1	1
Classics	0	1	1	2
Comp Lit	0	0	0	0
Drama/Thea	0	0	0	0
English	0	0	5	5
Fine Arts	1	0	1	2
German	0	0	1	1
History	0	0	0	0
Ital/French	0	1	1	2
Linguistics	0	0	0	0
Modern Lang	0	0	0	0
Music	0	0	0	0
Nr East St	0	0	1	1
Orien/As St	0	0	1	1
Philosophy	0	0	0	0
Relig	1	0	0	1
Rhetoric	0	0	0	0
Rom St/Lang	0	0	0	0
Russian Lit	0	0	2	2
Span & Port	0	1	1	2
Sub-total	2	3	15	20

SOCIAL SCI	Asst	Assc	Prof	All
Afro-Am St	0	0	0	0
Anthropology	0	0	1	1
Asian-Am St	0	0	0	0
Economics	0	0	1	1
Geography	0	0	1	1
Govt/Pol Sc	0	0	3	3
History	0	0	1	1
Linguistics	0	0	0	0
Psychology	0	0	0	0
Region Sci	0	0	0	0
Sociology	0	0	2	2
Sub-total	0	0	9	9

NATURAL SCI	Asst	Assc	Prof	All
Astronomy	0	0	1	1
Molec Biol	0	0	1	1
Chemistry	0	0	1	1
Comp Sci	0	0	0	0
Ecol & Sys	0	0	0	0
Geology	0	0	1	1
Home Econ	0	0	1	1
Mathematics	0	0	0	0
Microb & Imm	0	0	1	1
Nrbiol & Beh	0	1	0	1
Physio & Ana	0	0	0	0
Physical Ed	0	0	0	0
Physics	0	0	2	2
Statistics	0	0	0	0
Zoology	0	0	0	0
Sub-total	0	1	8	9
TOTAL	2	4	32	38

APPENDIX VI: RESPONDENTS - 1958, 1986

	Public Univ A	Private Univ B	Public Univ C	Private Univ D	Private Univ E	Public Univ F	Total
ASST PROF							
1958	5	1	7	7	3	8	31
1986	10	10	13	10	16	18	77
ASSOC PROF							
1958	7	2	6	8	9	3	35
1986	6	5	10	9	5	11	46
PROFESSOR							
1958	25	20	20	16	20	20	121
1986	30	29	33	25	29	37	183
TOTAL							
1958	37	23	33	31	32	31	187
1986	46	44	56	44	50	66	306

APPENDIX VII: DISCIPLINES REPRESENTED IN STUDY SAMPLE - 1958, 1986

Discipline	No. of Depts	
	1958	1986
Afro-American Studies	-	2
American Civilization	-	1
Anthropology	3	5
Art/Art History	1	3
Asian-American Studies	-	1
Astronomy	2	2
Biochemistry	1	-
Biology (incl Molecular)	1	4
Botany	2	-
Chemistry	2	5
Classical Studies	1	5
Comparative Literature	-	2
Computer Science	-	2
Decorative Art	1	-
Drama/Theatre Arts	3	3
East Asian Language & Culture	-	1
Ecology & Systematics	-	1
Economics	5	6
English	5	6
Fine Arts	2	2
Geography	2	3
Geology	2	3
German	3	2
History	5	5
Home Economics	2	2
Italian and/or French	1	3
Journalism	1	-
Linguistics	-	4
Mathematics	4	4
Microbiology and/or Immunology	-	2
Modern Language	-	1
Music	3	1
Near Eastern Language/Studies	1	3
Neurobiology & Behavior	-	2
Oriental/Asian Studies	-	2
Philosophy	2	5
Physical Education	-	1
Physics	5	6
Physiology & Anatomy	-	1
Political Science/Government	3	5
Psychology	5	4
Regional Science	-	1
Religious Studies	-	2
Rhetoric/Speech	1	2
Romance Studies/Language	4	2
Russian Literature	-	1
Slavic Studies	2	1
Social Service	1	-
Sociology	-	5
Spanish & Portugese	-	3
Speech & Hearing Sciences	-	1
Statistics	-	1
Telecommunications	-	1
Uralic & Altaic Studies	-	1
Zoology	2	2
TOTAL NUMBER OF DEPARTMENTS	78	131
TOTAL NUMBER OF DISCIPLINES	32	50

APPENDIX VIII: DATA SUMMARY, BY INSTITUTION - 1958, 1986

	Public Univ A	Private Univ B	Public Univ C	Private Univ D	Private Univ E	Public Univ F	Total
APPOINTMENTS							
1958	20	14	16	15	11	15	91
1986	21	15	30	21	24	26	137
DISMISSALS							
1958	12	3	2	3	5	10	35
1986	2	1	4	5	15	16	43
RESIGNATIONS							
1958	7	11	12	21	9	7	67
1986	6	12	18	7	16	22	81
RETIREMENTS							
1958	6	5	4	0	6	4	25
1986	5	6	8	4	5	10	38
DEATHS							
1958	3	0	4	2	4	3	16
1986	1	1	3	0	0	0	5
ALL TERMS							
1958	28	19	22	26	24	24	143
1986	14	20	33	16	36	48	167
ALL ACTIVITY							
1958	48	33	38	41	35	39	234
1986	35	35	63	37	60	74	304
RESPONDENTS							
1958	37	23	33	31	32	31	187
1986	46	44	56	44	50	66	306
DEPARTMENTS							
1958	16	13	13	12	12	12	78
1986	24	20	28	17	20	22	131

APPENDIX IX: DEPARTMENT SIZE BY INSTITUTION - 1986

	Public Univ A	Private Univ B	Public Univ C	Private Univ D	Private Univ E	Public Univ F	Average
HUMANITIES							
Amer Civ	-	-	-	-	9	-	9
Art History	13	14	-	8	-	-	12
Classics	18	15	-	8	16	19	15
Comp Lit	24	5	-	-	-	-	15
Drama/Thea	6	21	14	-	-	-	14
English	70	49	63	20	47	93	57
Fine Arts	-	-	34	3	-	-	19
German	-	-	-	-	13	23	18
History	-	28	-	-	-	-	28
Ital/French	7	-	20	-	-	29	19
Linguistics	-	-	-	-	11	-	11
Modern Lang	-	27	-	-	-	-	27
Music	-	-	-	-	13	-	13
Nr East St	17	11	5	-	-	-	11
Orien/As St	-	-	10	-	25	-	18
Philosophy	18	13	15	14	-	28	18
Relig St	-	-	16	-	7	-	12
Rhetoric/Sp	13	-	9	-	-	-	11
Rom St/Lang	-	17	-	-	19	-	18
Russ/Ur/Slav	-	4	14	6	-	-	8
Span & Port	15	-	17	-	-	35	22
Sub-total	201	204	217	59	160	227	
Average	20	19	20	10	18	38	20
SOCIAL SCI							
Afro-Am St	9	-	-	6	-	-	8
Anthropology	30	17	20	12	30	-	22
Asian-Am St	2	-	-	-	-	-	2
Economics	39	27	32	28	49	33	35
Geography	-	-	-	5	-	15	10
Govt/Pol Sc	-	27	30	27	18	44	29
History	-	-	45	27	29	49	38
Home Econ	-	-	10	-	-	-	10
Linguistics	13	-	12	-	-	20	15
Psychology	-	26	38	-	-	51	38
Region Sci	-	-	-	-	13	-	13
Sociology	19	15	25	-	28	32	24
Sp & Hrg Sci	-	-	11	-	-	-	11
Telecomm	-	-	19	-	-	-	19
Sub-total	112	112	242	105	167	244	
Average	22	22	24	18	28	35	25

APPENDIX IX: DEPARTMENT SIZE BY INSTITUTION - 1986

	Public Univ A	Private Univ B	Public Univ C	Private Univ D	Private Univ E	Public Univ F	Average
NATURAL SCI							
Astronomy	-	-	7	-	-	22	15
Molec Biol	16	-	52	26	33	-	32
Chemistry	-	30	37	34	27	48	35
Comp Sci	-	-	18	-	-	35	27
Ecol & Sys	-	18	-	-	-	-	18
Geology	-	-	24	-	12	39	25
Home Econ	-	-	-	-	-	31	31
Mathematics	75	-	48	43	-	53	55
Microb & Imm	12	-	-	-	-	17	15
Nrbiol & Beh	-	15	-	9	-	-	12
Physio & Ana	17	-	-	-	-	-	17
Physical Ed	7	-	-	-	-	-	7
Physics	68	49	40	29	47	63	49
Psychology	-	-	-	-	28	-	28
Statistics	28	-	-	-	-	-	28
Zoology	31	-	-	-	-	64	48
Sub-total	254	112	226	141	147	372	
Average	32	28	32	28	29	41	33
TOTAL	567	428	685	305	474	843	
AVERAGE	23	20	24	18	24	38	25

APPENDIX X: DEPARTMENT RANKING* (STUDY SAMPLE) - 1986

	Public Univ A	Private Univ B	Public Univ C	Private Univ D	Private Univ E	Public Univ F
HUMANITIES						
Art History	6	17		23		
Classics	2	13		-	11	9
English	2	7	17	19	11	23
French/Rom	8	10	11		7	20
German					18	6
Linguistics	5		23		5	3
Music					6	
Philosophy	4	10	15	35		24
Span & Port	5	13	11			3
SOCIAL SCI						
Anthropology	1	17	32	11	4	
Economics	10	20	50	10	8	42
Geography				27		29
Govt/Pol Sc		11	17	13	30	26
History		15	14	18	12	23
Psychology		15	15		4	19
Sociology	3	19	12		12	17
NATURAL SCI						
Molec Biol	8		18	26	18	
Chemistry		11	18	12	29	17
Comp Sci			35			10
Geology			30			13
Mathematics	2		23	23		30
Microb/Imm	23					23
Physiol/Anat	22					
Physics	3	6	32	36	14	16
Statistics	1					
Zoology	2					9

*Jones et al. (1982)

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